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"Change demands that each of us prepare for, guide where possi-
ble, and adapt to the new order quickly .... Life insurance has
been of great benefit in our history of change."1
"[W]e must have missed something because here we are again,
faced with another life insurance product that just doesn't look
like life insurance."
2
Holgar J. Johnson, Foreword to John Gudmundsen, The Great Provider, The Dramatic
Story of Life Insurance 8 (1959).
2 Tax Treatment of Single-Premium Life Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Tax'n and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 2d Seass. 2
(Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Senate Hearing] (statement of Senator Max Baucus,
Chairman). Senator Baucus' lament reflects the recurring challenge to Congress presented
by the taxation of life insurance. The income tax benefits of life insurance are generally
considered by Congress to be worthy of preservation, but only for those products which
resemble, by some yardstick, "traditional" forms of life insurance protection. Recent strug-
gles in determining the acceptable boundaries of life insurance income tax incentives are
[Vol. 11:263264
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is often stated that the income tax laws should be applied
with reference to the substance of transactions rather than their
form.' Tax statutes nevertheless contain arbitrary distinctions
which draw lines between similar transactions, producing very dif-
ferent results.' The income tax treatment of life insurance pro-
ceeds presents an example of tax results which vary dramatically
with one factor, the timing of receipt. If received as a result of the
death of the insured, the proceeds are excluded completely from
the recipient's income.5 If, on the other hand, proceeds are re-
ceived even one moment before the insured's death, the exemption
is generally limited to the policyowner's investment in the life in-
surance contract comprised of the aggregate premiums previously
paid.'
In recent years Congress has addressed the income taxation of
life insurance on several occasions, distinguishing between "tradi-
tional" life insurance and products with a more pronounced invest-
ment flavor. 7 In a similar manner, Congress will probably be re-
quired at some point to reassess the significance of death as the
line of demarcation in the income tax treatment of life insurance
described at infra text accompanying notes 165-95.
3 See, e.g., Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,
324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945). For a discussion of this doctrine see Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence
Lokken, Federal Income Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 4.3.3 (2d ed. 1989) [herein-
after Bittker & Lokken].
4 "There are times, however, when form alone determines the tax consequences of a
transaction." Bittker & Lokken, supra note 3, 4.3.3, at 4-33. Cash or accrual methods of
accounting, accelerated or straight-line depreciation, specific identification of shares sold
from a block of stock and designated child support are examples of tax fictions with few
nontax consequences. Id.
5 Section 101(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code excludes from income "amounts re-
ceived (whether in a single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such
amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured." The exclusion is limited, however,
in situations in which life insurance policies have been transferred for a valuable considera-
tion. See I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). See also infra note 268.
" Subsections 72(e)(5)(A), (C) & (E) of the Internal Revenue Code, taken together, estab-
lish the rule that the insured includes in gross income, the amount received under a contract
on its complete surrender, redemption, or maturity, to the extent it exceeds the "investment
in the contract." The phrase, "investment in the contract", is defined for this purpose "as of
any date as the aggregate amount of premiums or other consideration paid for the contract
before such date, minus the aggregate amount received under the contract before such date,
to the extent such amount was excludable from gross income." I.R.C. § 72(e)(6).
See infra text accompanying notes 165-95.
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proceeds. The recent development of life insurance settlement op-
tions, which in general permit the lifetime payment of life insur-
ance death benefits upon certain events such as the insured's ter-
minal illness or permanent confinement to a nursing home,6 may
be a catalyst to such an appraisal.
This article examines the tax treatment of accelerated death
benefits, assessing in particular a proposal to expand the existing
income tax exclusion for death benefits to encompass these new
insurance products. Arguably, an income tax exclusion for acceler-
ated death benefits further exalts life insurance as a tax favored
investment, ignoring income from the sales of other assets necessi-
tated by terminal illness. Moreover, an exclusion, no matter how
carefully fashioned, is inconsistent with, and potentially detracts
from, the survivor-protection role of life insurance, thereby under-
mining the traditional rationale for its favored tax treatment. Al-
though the terminally ill insured, family members caring for the
insured, and other dependents, often share financial concerns as a
unit and cannot be readily separated, a shift in primary focus from
the needs of survivors to the care of the insured may ultimately
blur the present distinction between the income taxation of life in-
surance, which traditionally emphasizes survivor protection, and
the taxation of retirement, health, and long-term care
requirements.
A brief discussion of the concerns which prompted the develop-
ment of life insurance settlement options permitting the acceler-
ated payment of death benefits is presented first. A description of
the Prudential Life Insurance Company of America ("Prudential")
"living needs benefit" plan follows in Part III, including a discus-
sion of the apparent income tax treatment of such payments. Part
IV examines the tax policy issues presented by an income tax ex-
emption for accelerated death benefits, and Part V concludes the
article with a critique of several legislative proposals.
'II. CONVENTIONAL LIFETIME INSURANCE PAYMENT OPTIONS
As of 1989 there was $8.7 trillion of life insurance in force in the
United States.' The face value of life insurance payable upon the
B For description of accelerated death benefit payment options see infra text accompany-
ing notes 29-87.
' The precise amount of life insurance in force in 1989 was $8,694,015,000,000. American
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death of the insured can represent an important asset for individu-
als of moderate wealth.' 0 However, under the terms of conven-
tional whole life insurance policies, only limited amounts of the
face value could be tapped prior to the death of the insured
through insurance policy loans," loans from third party lenders,1
2
Council of Life Insurance, 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book 5 [hereinafter 1990 Life Insurance
Fact Book]. This total was in turn comprised of $4,939,964,000,000 in ordinary life insur-
ance, $3,469,498,000,000 in group insurance, $24,446,000,000 in industrial insurance and
$260,107,000,000 in credit insurance. Id.
10 In 1989, the average amount of life insurance in force in the United States per house-
hold was $93,600, and per insured household, $115,500. 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book,
supra note 9, at 5. Life insurance was owned by 81% of American households, and approxi-
mately 70% of adult Americans owned some form of life insurance. Id. at 6. Despite these
modest average amounts, life insurance may provide an attractive income and estate tax
avoidance opportunity for wealthy individuals. See infra note 102.
" The owner of a permanent life insurance policy can usually withdraw cash by borrow-
ing against the cash surrender value under the terms of the policy.
The practice of making a policy loan available to the individual policyowner, secured
by the cash value of his policy, was started on a voluntary basis by life insurance
companies themselves at a relatively early date. It proved so valuable that the laws of
most states now require most cash value policies to include a policy loan provision.
Janice E. Greider & William T. Beadles, Principles of Life Insurance 133 (rev. ed. 1972)
(hereinafter Greider & Beadles]. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:25-8 (West 1991); N.Y. Ins.
Law § 3203(a)(8)(A) (McKinney 1885 & Supp. 1991). The value of this option would be
limited during the early years of permanent policies because cash surrender values increase
with the duration of the policy.
A policy loan would be unavailable under most policies of term insurance. First, a cash
value, on which most policy loans are based, can usually arise only in term insurance policies
of greater than 15-20 years duration, depending upon the policy and state law. "The Stan-
dard Nonforfeiture Law requires the cash surrender benefit . .. to be included in every
whole life and endowment policy, as well as in level term contracts for periods longer than
15 years." Greider & Beadles, supra, at 144. See, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 4220(a)(8) (McKinney
1985 & Supp. 1991) (cash surrender value requirements not applicable to term insurance of
20 years or less) and Cal. Ins. Code § 10165(e) (West 1972 & Supp. 1991) (no cash surrender
value for certain types of insurance, including term insurance of 20 years or less, terminat-
ing prior to age 71). Second, even if a cash value accumulates under a term insurance policy,
for purposes of the standard nonforfeiture provision, it does not necessarily follow that a
policy loan for that amount is available. New York insurance law, for example, does not
require policy loans for term policies. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 3203(a)(8) I (McKinney 1985 &
Supp. 1991).
12 Life insurance policies have been commonly used as collateral for loans. "The life in-
surance contract, with its valuable prematurity rights and promise to pay a specified sum of
money upon maturity, is an ideal form of collateral for credit transactions. Hence, it is not
surprising that the assignment of life insurance policies as collateral security has reached
large proportions." Dan M. McGill, Life Insurance 606 (rev. ed. 1967) [hereinafter McGill].
This assumes that a policy loan from the insurer is otherwise unavailable or insufficient in
amount, because most policyholders would probably prefer the favorable interest rates and
simplified loan procedures provided under the terms of policy loans. Some state laws pre-
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policy surrenders, 8 and endowment options."' The life insurance
scribe maximum rates of interest on policy loans. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 41-1909 (1977 &
Supp. 1990); Cal. Ins. Code § 1232 (West 1972 & Supp. 1991). Policy loans are exempted
from the required minimum interest rate provisions of I.R.C. § 7872. See Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.7872-5T(b)(4).
It is the author's impression that commercial lenders generally do not lend funds based
solely on the pledge of a life insurance policy, although a pledge will be welcome or required
as additional collateral if the bank is uncomfortable with the overall creditworthiness of the
borrower or quality of other collateral. This was confirmed by an admittedly nonscientific,
limited survey conducted by the author with several lenders. The lenders cited among other
reasons, uneasiness with the ultimate maturity date of the loan (i.e., the insured's death)
and the inability of an otherwise impecunious insured to make current interest and/or prin-
cipal payments pending death. If that view is accurate, it would reduce the availability of
such loans to a terminally ill person of moderate wealth and assets. Even if such loans were
extended, to account for the increased risk presented by the uncertain date of death and
resulting maturity of the policy, it might be made as only a modest percentage of the face
value. If the lender was operating in an entrepreneurial fashion more closely resembling an
outright purchase of the policy, however, a loan might be made to the terminally ill individ-
ual. Of the companies in the business of purchasing life insurance policies on the lives of
terminally ill insureds surveyed by Messrs. McCormack & Petersen, only one, Life Benefits
Corporation, would structure the transaction as a loan. "The mechanism designates a series
of rising beneficiary percentages in favor of [the lender] to match the rising debt. If [the
insured] dies before allowable interest can compound up to the face amount, a second bene-
ficiary of the client's choice receives the balance of the policy payout." Thomas McCormack
& David Petersen, 'Living Benefits' for the Insured, Terminally Ill Client: A Remarkable
New Resource with Tax, SSI, and Medicaid Implications, 24 Clearinghouse Rev. 1348, 1350
(April 1991) [hereinafter McCormack & Petersen].
1" The owner of a policy can usually surrender it to the insurance company and receive an
immediate cash payment, its cash surrender value. Like policy loans based on cash surren-
der values, this alternative is of limited benefit for newer permanent life policies with mod-
est surrender values, and of little utility for pure term insurance which typically offers only
a minimal cash value, if any. See supra note 11. Surrendering a traditional policy results in
forfeiting the difference between the face value and the cash surrender value. This amount
would be less significant in older policies which have accumulated a significant cash value,
but many insureds die prematurely. Based on 1985 statistics, 19.2% of insureds under ordi-
nary life policies die before age 44. In addition, 29.9% of all ordinary life policies mature
when the policy duration is less than 5 years. 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9,
at 47. In. 1988, 65.6% of the deaths from AIDS, for example, were individuals under the age
of 40. U.S. Centers for Disease Control, reprinted in United States Department of Com-
merce-Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, No. 119 (110th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter 1990 Statistical Abstract].
" In 1989, only .9% of ordinary life insurance in force and 2.9% of industrial life insur-
ance in force was "endowment." Id. The so-called "endowment policy" has been in existence
for a number of years and is an exception to the general rule of limited lifetime benefit
options. The purpose of such a policy is to provide an investment fund which grows, matur-
ing at a time certain.
Endowment life insurance policies are appropriate for any situation in which a fund
needs to be accumulated, since they guarantee that the fund will be completed by the
end of the specified period, whether the insured lives or dies. Such policies are most
appropriate, however, where the need for life insurance is somewhat incidental -
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death benefit consequently remained largely beyond the reach of
insureds, including those facing death from protracted, costly ter-
minal illnesses such as cancer and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS"), or those requiring extended nursing home
care.
As an alternative to the conventional options noted above, the
owner of a policy can generally sell it to a third party.15 This trans-
that is, where the policyowner needs life insurance only to assure himself that his
savings plan will be completed in the event of his death prior to the end of the speci-
fied period.
Greider & Beadles, supra note 11, at 37.
The endowment policy is therefore commonly sold for education or retirement needs. Id.
at 42. Some would compare the endowment to whole life policies; it just takes whole life
policies longer to reach scheduled maturity, at approximately age 100.
An endowment life insurance policy, in its basic makeup, is very similar to a whole
life policy. In fact, if the whole life policy is viewed for the entire period contem-
plated by the mortality table - that is, for a period ending at the insured's age 100
- the policies are exactly alike; and the whole life policy is, in effect, an endowment
at age 100.
Greider & Beadles, supra note 11, at 36.
Contributing to its position as a small percentage of total life insurance in force is the
expensive death protection coverage under an endowment contract. In a common analysis,
one treatise compares the life insurance protection of a $10,000, 18-year endowment policy
to that of a whole life policy requiring the same annual premium. The whole life insurance
death protection under those facts is $31,300, more than triple that of the endowment pol-
icy. Moreover, the cash value of the whole life policy 18 years later, is $7,019, more than
70% of the endowment's cash value. Greider & Beadles, supra note 11, at 42-43.
If the matured policy amount is received as a lump sum, the income tax treatment is
essentially the same as that for a policy surrender as noted in supra note 6. However, if
received as an annuity, an exclusion ratio is computed which is applied to each payment in
determining the portion which is a return of investment, with the balance taxable income.
See I.R.C. § 72(b). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1(b) (defining amounts received as an annuity
if payable at regular intervals over a period of more than one full year from the date on
which they begin, provided the total amount payable or the payment period can be deter-
mined as of that date). The exclusion ratio is computed as the ratio of the investment in the
contract (as of the annuity starting date) to the expected return under the contract, on the
same date. Id. The investment in the contract is the aggregate amount of premiums or other
consideration paid for the contract minus the aggregate amount received under the contract
before such date to the extent such amount was excludable from gross income. See I.R.C. §
72(c)(1). The "expected return" for installment payments is simply the aggregate of the
amounts receivable under the contract. See I.R.C. § 72(c)(3)(B). If instead the amounts pay-
able under the contract depend in whole or in part on the life expectancy of one or more
individuals, the expected return is determined with reference to actuarial tables. See I.R.C.
§ 72(c)(3)(A).
16 One insurance law reporter currently lists cases from five jurisdictions which require an
assignee for value to have an insurable interest in the policy. 17 Crouch on Insurance 2d §
63A:17 (Rhodes ed. 1983 & Supp. 1990) (listing decisions from Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky,
Texas, and Virginia). Alabama and Virginia have statutorily abolished this requirement. See
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action would be taxed much like a policy surrender."l The owner
would be inclined to sell the policy, rather than borrow against the
policy or surrender it to the life insurer, if a purchaser would offer
a price, net of applicable transaction costs, in excess of the cash
surrender value. A purchase price in excess of the policy's cash sur-
render value is calculated by reference to a maturing of the policy
upon the approaching death of an insured, and in 1989 a number
of articles appeared in the popular press discussing sales of life in-
surance policies by the terminally ill as a source of needed funds.17
The emergence of investors willing to gamble"8 on the immi-
nence of an insured's death by purchasing policies from the termi-
Ala. Code § 27-14-21(b) (1990); Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-3111 (1990). Texas law apparently
retains a requirement of an insurable interest by assignees. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 3.49-1
§ 2 (Vernon 1990). Kansas and Kentucky statutory law is unclear. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-
424 (1990); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 304.14-050, 304.14-250 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
16 The transaction would be governed by I.R.C. § 1001, rather than I.R.C. § 72. If the
proceeds received exceeded the policyholder's investment in the contract, and the contract
was a capital asset in thepolicyowner's hands, the excess would seem eligible for treatment
as a capital gain. However, there are judicially imposed limitations, principally the assign-
ment of income doctrine, that "leave little room for capital gains treatment save for the sale
of a policy at a gain attributable to the insured's supervening ill health." Bittker & Lokken,
supra note 3, 12.4.4, at 12-45 (questioning whether the Tax Court's application of the
assignment of income theory to require ordinary income treatment for an increase in value
due to accumulated income, in Gallun v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 798 (1963), aff'd,
327 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1964), would also extend to an increase in value from other factors
such as an impending maturity of the mortality gain). One would usually not sell for less
than the cash surrender value because the policy could be surrendered to the insurer for the
full cash surrender value.
17 See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, For AIDS Patients, a Special Insurance Plan, The N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1989, § A, at 27, col. 1; Mike Scotti, Living Benefits Policies Slowly Gaining Ac-
ceptance, 12 Orange County Bus. J., April 2, 1990, No. 45, § 1, at 7; Christine Woolsey, More
insurers expected to offer 'living benefits', Bus. Ins., Mar. 12, 1990, at 1. A survey conducted
by the American Council of Life Insurance noted that accelerated death benefits were being
offered by some insurers as early as 1987. See infra note 30.
10 The price is in many respects a gamble, determined by a number of factors.
Besides the question of disability waivers of premium, numerous variables determine
offering prices for life policies, including the face amount payable, cash loans on the
policy, future premium expenses, and the cost of financing. The offering prices will
also be affected by the patient's diagnosis, prognosis and symptoms, months of life
expectancy, the administrative costs of securing releases from former beneficiaries
and other loved ones, medical and legal professional fees for each case review ....
Since no actuarial tables of life expectancies by HIV symptom pattern have been
developed, prices must be arrived at by painstaking and somewhat ad hoc judgments
on each case.
McCormack & Petersen, supra note 12, at 1349.
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nally ill, often afflicted with AIDS, 19 demonstrated the need for
policy terms under which terminally ill insureds could obtain more
of the face value of their life insurance policies prior to death.20
The magnitude of the problem is unclear, and the reported evi-
dence could be no more than anecdotal.21 Nevertheless, AIDS re-
lated deaths account for a large percentage of life insurance death
benefits, and the percentage is increasing.22 Cancer remains a sig-
"9 "Almost all policies purchased so far have been upon the lives of [persons with AIDS]."
Id.
20 Living Benefits, Inc., based in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was one of the first private
firms established in the United States for the purpose of purchasing life insurance policies
from the terminally ill. Reportedly, the purchase price reflected a 20-45% discount from the
face value of the policy. See Martha Groves, A Final Hope for the Dying, L.A. Times, July 2,
1990, § A, at 1, col. 1. For a critical review of this program see Joseph M. Belth, A System
for the Exploitation of the Terminally Ill, 16 The Ins. F., Mar. 1989, at 11-14 (noting that
the discount can be 25-40%, the terminally ill person and family members are under stress
and may be vulnerable to exploitation, and suggesting an inquiry into whether this is a form
of gambling or moneylending). A recent survey reported the existence of at least eight com-
panies engaged in this business. See McCormack & Petersen supra note 12, at 1355. For a
positive view of private brokers see id. at 1351 (rejecting the "vulture" comparison, noting
the benefits of having an "unexpected source of desperately needed money," and justifying
the high discounts from face value in view of the high administrative costs of evaluating
each case). See also supra note 18. The Prudential Insurance Company of America now
offers high percentages of the face value under its living needs benefit plan, see infra text
accompanying note 39. If such favorable insurance company options become common, the
private brokers may become an avenue of last resort only for individuals for whom life in-
surance company accelerated death benefits are unavailable.
2I One article highlighted the situations of three individuals, a pharmacist, a gift sales-
man, and a doctor, all suffering from AIDS and needing cash for medical and living ex-
penses. See Groves, supra note 20. The article reported that one purchaser of policies from
the terminally ill, Living Benefits, Inc., had purchased or signed contracts to purchase 71
policies, with an additional 69 applications in process. Id. A recent article listed eight com-
panies actively involved in the purchase of life insurance policies from the terminally ill, and
reported the results of a January, 1991 telephone survey which placed at 472 the number of
policies bought by all eight companies since inception of their programs. See McCormack &
Petersen, supra note 12, at 1355. Robert P. Hill, Executive Vice President of the Prudential
Insurance Company of America, testified on June 12, 1991, that "So far, more than 135
policyholders have received accelerated death benefits. Most have been victims of cancer or
AIDS." Hearing on Miscellaneous Tax Bills Before the Subcomm. on Tax'n of the Senate
Comm. on Fin., 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Senate Hearing].
11 It was estimated for 1988 that AIDS accounted for 6.6 deaths per 100,000 population
and .75% of deaths from all causes. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statis-
tics of the United States, reprinted in 1990 Statistical Abstract, supra note 13, No. 115. In
1988, there were 15,463 reported deaths due to AIDS. U.S. Centers for Disease Control,
reprinted in 1990 Statistical Abstract of the United States. Id., No. 119. Another study re-
ports that AIDS deaths accounted for 1% of all deaths in 1989. 1990 Life Insurance Fact
Book, supra note 9, at 41. Based 'on a survey of 275 life insurance companies, identifiable
1989 AIDS death benefits were 1.7% of individual life benefits, 2.5% of group benefits, and
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nificant cause of death.2 3 With the aging of the general population,
paying for long-term health care will assume even greater signifi-
24 2cance, a factor health insurers already recognize. 5 These trends
suggest that the adequacy of financial resources during the lifetime
of the insured will be of increasing concern.
1.5% of credit life benefits. Id. These percentages had increased from their comparable
figures for 1988 of 1.1%, 1.6%, and .9%, respectively. Id. A reported study by Professor
Warren Greenberg of George Washington University, based on interviews of insurers, indi-
cated that as of early 1989, the average cost for lifetime treatment of an AIDS patient
ranged from $35,054 to $60,000. Kari Berman, AIDS not hurting group health costs: Study,
Bus. Ins., Feb. 27, 1989, at 32. Since 1985 an increasing number of insurers require an HIV
blood test before extending coverage, particularly for individual policies. This phenomenon
would tend to limit life insurance benefits to AIDS victims, depending upon the timing of
their HIV symptoms.
11 In 1988, it was estimated that malignancies accounted for 488,200 deaths, 22.5% of
total deaths in the United States. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics
of the United States, reprinted in 1990 Statistical Abstract, supra note 13, No. 115. A Pru-
dential Insurance Company of America spokesman was reported in mid-1990 to have stated
that most of the policyholders taking advantage of their living benefits program for the
terminally ill were suffering from cancer, not AIDS. Groves, supra note 20.
" It is estimated that the number of individuals 75 years old and over will increase by
26.2% in the period 1990-2000, that the increase then tapers off to a 10.1% increase for the
years 2000-2010, and that there is a projected 46.0% increase in the number of individuals
of age 45-54 years in the period 1990-2000. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports reprinted in 1990 Statistical Abstract, supra note 13, No. 18. The per capita federal
outlay for Medicare is estimated at $349 for 1989, up from $142 in 1980, and $31 in 1970.
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, reprinted
in id. at No. 141. However, the private sector plays an important role in funding long-term
care costs. For example, one author has stated that 50% of nursing home expenses are paid
by personal expenditures, 41% by Medicaid, 4% by other government programs, 2% by
Medicare, 2% by private insurance, and 1% from miscellaneous sources. Anthony J. Gajda,
Long Term Care Insurance, 14 Employee Benefits J. 10, 11 (June 1989). He also asserts that
70% of single persons become impoverished within three months of their confinement in a
nursing home, and when the patient has a spouse, 50% become impoverished within six
months. Id., at 10. See generally Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Popula-
tion: A Challenge to the Law, 42 Hastings L.J. 683 (1991) (addressing the scope of the prob-
lem of an aging population and the law's treatment of the elderly).
' A new health insurance product is the long-term care contract or "LTC," which is
designed to cover the expense of nursing home care. The promotion of accelerated death
benefit plans by life insurers, which can in part provide for long-term care, has reportedly
created new competition between the health care insurance industry and life insurers. See,
e.g., Cliff Green, Riders In the Storm, Fin. Plan., May, 1990 at 62. See also Marshall B.
Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future, 42 Hastings L.J. 719,
746-49 (1991) (discussing, in part, the recent development of private long-term care health
insurance); Lauren Chambliss, It's About Time, 159 Fin. World, Oct. 16, 1990, at 58 (dis-
cussing development of long-term care insurance with more liberal eligibility requirements);
Pamela Sherrid, A Microscope on Nursing-Home Plans, 100 U.S. News & World Rep. 621,
Aug. 13, 1990, at 62 (criticizing limitations imposed on benefits by many LTC plans).
Accelerated Death Benefits
The illiquidity of life insurance products has historically brought
cash poor insureds to the marketplace. In 19th century England,
elderly insureds lacking resources to continue coverage offered
their policies at auctions.
In London, [Elizur Wright] visited the insurance auctions at the
Royal Exchange. There he saw old men standing on the life insur-
ance auction block, their policies.being offered to the highest bid-
der at a fraction of their actual worth. In one case a man had paid
premiums for forty-four years and could meet the payments no
longer. "This was done, I was told, because the companies made it
a rule never to buy their own policies," wrote Mr. Wright.
2'
This grisly process prompted Elizur Wright to advocate reforms in
the United States such as the cash surrender provisions now com-
mon in life insurance policies.
2 7
The following section examines the response of the life insurance
industry to the concerns of the terminally ill insured, sometimes
referred to as "accelerated death benefits," "living benefits ' 28 or
"living needs benefit" options.
III. ACCELERATED DEATH BENEFITS POLICY TERMS
A. Operation
Prudential followed the lead of several smaller life insurance
companies in offering accelerated death benefits to the terminally
ill. 29 A number of life insurers now embrace the concept, and a
:' Albert W. Atwood, The Great Stewardship 75 (1945).
7 Wright's actions were apparently successful:
As a result of the activities of Elizur Wright, the Massachusetts legislature in 1861
enacted a law requiring insurance companies to continue a limited amount of insur-
ance in force under a policy that lapsed after premiums had been paid for a specified
number of years. Legislation enacted later required the company to pay a cash value
under these same circumstances if the policyowner wished to surrender his policy.
Greider & Beadles, supra note 11, at 71. See supra note 11 (discussing cash surrender
provisions).
*8 Although used in connection with the recent development of accelerated, lifetime pay-
ments of death benefits, the term "living benefits" or some variation of that term has been
used for a number of years to describe policy terms which provide for lifetime payments to
the insured. See Greider & Beadles, supra note 11, at 164-65. John C. Pyle, Jr., Taxation of
Living and Death Benefits Under Life Insurance Policies, reprinted in The Beneficiary in
Life Insurance 214 (Dan M. McGill ed. 1956).
2 The concept of lifetime death benefit payments to the terminally ill was reportedly
first developed in Canada by Ron Barbaro, president of Canadian operations for Prudential.
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majority of states now permit such plans.30 Accelerated death ben-
efits are not limited to terminal illness and may be combined with
other qualifying events. Some plans provide accelerated benefits
upon the incidence of a "dread disease" such as cancer.3 1 Others,
such as the Prudential plan, also provide for the payment of death
benefits for long-term care to individuals permanently confined to
a nursing home. To simplify discussion of a broad range of compet-
ing product variations still under development, s2 and in view of
Mr. Barbaro's interest was prompted by his volunteer work in an AIDS hospice. See Lewin,
supra note 17 § A, at 27, col. 1. Prudential did not announce a U.S. plan until January 26,
1990. At that time at least five other insurers already offered such benefits. See Frank Allen,
Prudential to Offer 'Acceleration' Plan for Life Insurance, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1990, A3, col.
2. A survey of life insurers reported that accelerated death benefits were first introduced in
the U.S. in 1987. See ACLI Survey infra note 30.
o A survey commissioned by the American Council of Life Insurance, found that as of
October, 1990, 70 companies offered some type of accelerated death benefit product. Ameri-
can Council of Life Insurance, Accelerated Death Benefit Products - Results of a Study 1
(Dec. 1990) [hereinafter ACLI Survey]. The preliminary results from a recent survey show
that "more than 100 companies are now offering some variation of [accelerated death bene-
fit plans]." 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of Daniel A. Mica, Executive
Vice President, American Council of Life Insurance). A recent article places the number of
states permitting accelerated benefits by insurers at 44. See McCormack & Petersen, supra
note 12, at 1351. For example, Colorado law provides that:
Any policy of life or endowment insurance or annuity contract or contract supple-
mental thereto may contain benefits providing for the acceleration of life or endow-
ment or annuity benefits in advance of the time they would otherwise be payable for
an insured ... (a) who is diagnosed with a terminal case of AIDS .... or with any
other terminal illness, for healthcare expenses or for long-term care which is certified
or ordered by a physician; or .. . (b) upon the occurrence of a qualifying event, as
defined by the policy or contract.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-7-113(1) (Supp. 1991). A representative of Prudential has stated that
"Forty-nine states have approved our Living Needs Benefit." 1991 Senate Hearing, supra
note 21 (statement of Robert P. Hill, Executive Vice President, the Prudential Insurance
Company of America).
31 A contract offered by Jackson National Life Insurance Company, discussed at infra
note 58, is an example of a dread disease policy. A survey sponsored by the American Coun-
cil of Life Insurance reported that specific conditions covered by dread disease products
include "heart attacks, strokes, life-threatening cancer, coronary-artery bypass surgery, and
renal failure." ACLI Survey, supra note 30, at 5. Conditions covered less frequently are
"major organ transplant, Alzheimer's disease, severe bodily injury, paraplegia, total perma-
nent blindness, and loss of both arms or legs." Id.
12 As of October, 1990, 70 companies offered some type of accelerated death benefit.
ACLI Survey, supra note 30, at 1. The Prudential plan appears to be one of the broadest.
Competition may cause other insurers to expand their narrower policy terms. Commercial
Bankers Life, for example, as of April 2, 1990 reportedly would pay only 50% of policy face
value for a terminal illness, and Transamerica Life paid 25% of the death benefit and only
for six "dread" illnesses, excluding AIDS. See Scotti, supra note 17. Competition apparently
has already had its effect. "In early 1991, Connecticut Mutual Insurance Company an-
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Prudential's position as the largest life insurer in the United
States, the following discussion will focus on the Prudential "Liv-
ing Needs Benefit" plan."3
The Prudential plan generally provides lifetime payments of
benefits, calculated as a percentage of face value, if the insured
becomes terminally ill or is permanently confined to a nursing
home. Prudential currently extends this benefit to new and ex-
isting policies for no additional premium.3 4 However, the options
are available only on permanent policies (which would exclude
term insurance) 3 with face amounts of at least $25,000-$50,000.3o
1. Terminal Illness Option
The terminal illness option is available if it is demonstrated to
Prudential that the insured has six months or less to live. Evidence
of a terminal condition includes documentation from a qualified
physician.3 7 Organ transplants also qualify for the benefit if
nounced a . . .rider [similar to the Prudential plan] for all of its existing or new policies;
other insurance firms are expected to add these benefits, too - probably with the life ex-
pectancy of six months or permanent nursing home confinement provisions." McCormack &
Petersen, supra note 12, at 1348.
"a Except where otherwise indicated, the discussion is based on the author's examination
of Prudential's Living Needs Benefits brochure ORD 87246 Ed. 10-90 [hereinafter Brochure
ORD 87246 Ed. 10-90], and a specimen living needs benefit policy rider, ORD 87241-90
[hereinafter Rider ORD 87241-90].
" "[M]ore than 900 thousand Prudential policyholders have a Living Needs Rider on
their life insurance policies." 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 21 (oral testimony of Robert
P. Hill, Executive Vice President of the Prudential Insurance Company of America). A
spokesman for the American Council of Life Insurance reported that industry-wide "more
than 4 million individuals are now eligible for this benefit." 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note
21 (statement of Daniel A. Mica, Executive Vice President, American Council of Life
Insurance).
36 There are, however, reported instances of the availability of living needs benefit terms
in group term insurance plans offered by United of Omaha Life Insurance Co. and Travelers
Insurance Co., with similar offerings being planned by other insurers. See Woolsey, supra
note 17. In a survey commissioned by the American Council on Life Insurance, only 4 insur-
ance products out of 62 (6%) offered accelerated death benefits in individual term life poli-
cies, and only 1 (2%) offered such benefits under group term life policies. ACLI Survey,
supra note 30, at 5.
as The Prudential brochure states only that "clients applying for new policies must meet
certain face amount... requirements." Brochure ORD 87246 Ed. 10-90, supra note 33. An
early article indicated that the rider is available on existing policies with a death benefit of
at least $25,000, plus most new policies with a death benefit of at least $50,000. Green, supra
note 25, at 62.
1' "In most cases, documentation from a qualified physician will suffice. The Prudential
reserves the right to investigate further and decide eligibility for payment." Brochure ORD
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claimed before the transplant procedure is performed.3 8 The bene-
fit is generally 90 to 95 percent of the applicable death benefit.3 9
The payments can be received as a lump sum or in six equal
monthly installments." All or a portion of this benefit can be
87246 Ed. 10-90, supra note 33. The life insurance policy rider states "[T]o choose this
option you must give us evidence that satisfies us that the Insured's life expectancy is 6
months or less; part of that evidence must be a certification by a licensed physician." Rider
ORD 87241-90, supra note 33. A survey prepared by the American Council of Life Insurance
states that "[s]ix months is the period most commonly specified, although several provide
for longer periods - i.e. nine, twelve, or twenty-four months." ACLI Survey, supra note 30,
at 5.
" While Rider ORD 87241-90, supra note 33, does not expressly state this, the descriptive
brochure states that "[i]n most instances under current claim procedures, this option can
also advance funds if the Insured requires a vital organ transplant, including heart, heart-
lung, liver and bone marrow." Brochure ORD 87246 Ed. 10-90, supra note 33.
8' The 90 to 95 percent figure is stated in the descriptive brochure. Brochure ORD 87246
Ed. 10-90, supra note 33. Robert P. Hill, Executive Vice President of Prudential, stated that
it "generally works out to about 96 percent of the death benefit." 1991 Senate Hearing,
supra note 21. The policy rider discusses the mechanics of the determination. The computa-
tion begins with "convertible proceeds", calculated as the death benefit, less contract debt
and term insurance that comes from supplementary benefits (except level term insurance
still in the conversion period and for which a premium is being charged). A "benefit base" is
then computed, considering factors such as the insured's age and sex, expected future pre-
miums, future dividends, continuation of any reduction in guaranteed charges, continuation
of the current rate of any excess interest credited on contract values, and a processing
charge of up to $150. The benefit base is at least as great as the net cash value of the
contract multiplied by the percentage of the convertible proceeds placed under that option.
Rider ORD 87241-90, supra note 33. The generous percentages of face value offered by Pru-
dential need to be compared with those of non-insurance companies which buy policies. See
supra note 20. The author has no evidence that Prudential is in effect operating the pro-
gram as a "loss leader" to promote sales of new policies. However, Mr. Hill has testified that
"The Prudential makes [a Living Needs Rider] available on both existing and new perma-
nent life insurance policies - at no extra charge. We don't make money on this program.
It's just the right thing to do." 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 21. Although better finan-
cial resources may be a large factor in the disparity, the independent companies also
purchase policies for individuals with more months, or years, to live, reducing the present
value of the purchaser's investment. In addition, the purchaser must pay federal income
taxes on the profit from the death benefit proceeds in excess of the purchase price. See infra
note 268. However, life insurance companies are also subject to federal income taxation, and
death benefits paid, juxtaposed against premiums received, would be components in the
determination of taxable income. See I.R.C. §§ 801-847.
40 If the installment payout is elected, the unpaid sum is computed with reference to an
annual interest rate factor of 5%. Rider ORD 87241-90, supra note 33. The implicit 5% rate
will increase the aggregate of payments received over six months as compared with a lump
sum. Section 101(d) of the Code, (dealing with interest on life insurance proceeds held on
deposit with the life insurer after death and paid on a deferred basis) does not apply since it
refers to the date of death of the insured. Section 483 of the Code does not apply because
the sales price is not due more than 6 months after the date of the sale or exchange. See
I.R.C. § 483(c)(1). The original issue discount provisions of I.R.C. § 1272 do not apply to
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claimed, and unused benefits remain as a death benefit.
2. Nursing Home Option
If the insured has been confined to a nursing home for six
months, and it is demonstrated to Prudential that the insured will
remain in the nursing home for life, the insured can receive 70 to
80 percent of the death benefit in a lump sum or over a term of
years.4' The likelihood of nursing home care for the remainder of
the insured's life is evaluated under the same procedures as for a
terminal illness.42
obligations which have a fixed maturity date not more than 1 year from the date of issue.
See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2)(C). Section 7872 is not applicable to loans to which sections 483 or
1274 apply. See I.R.C. § 7872(f)(8). For this purpose, "section 7872 does not apply to any
loan which is given in consideration for the sale or exchange of property . . . or paid on
account of the sale or exchange of property ... even if the rules of those sections do not
apply by reason of exceptions or safe harbor provisions." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-
2(a)(2)(ii), 50 Fed. Reg. 22557 (Aug. 20, 1985). The imputed interest provisions may not
apply even in extended payment arrangements encompassing several years. See infra note
41.
4' The 70 to 80 percent figure is set forth in Brochure ORD 87246 Ed. 10-90, supra note
33. The benefit base is determined under the same criteria established for the terminal
illness option. See supra note 39. The benefit base may be paid in one sum upon the in-
sured's request. If a lump sum is not elected, payments will be made in equal monthly
payments over a term of years set forth in the rider which declines with the insured's age. If
the insured is 65-67, for example, the payment period is 8 years. If the insured is 74-77, for
example, the period is 5 years. If the insured is 87 or older, the period is 2 years. Upon the
agreement of Prudential and the insured, the payment period can be extended. The nursing
home payments are determined with reference to a 5% interest rate factor, which can be
increased at Prudential's discretion. Rider ORD 87241-90, supra note 33. Original issue dis-
count might be a concern at first because of the payment period which extends beyond one
year. See supra note 40. However, I.R.C. § 1275(a)(1)(B) excludes from the definition of the
operative term "debt instrument," for purposes of I.R.C. §§ 483 and 1272, "any annuity
contract to which section 72 applies" and which depends (in whole or in substantial part) on
the life expectancy of one or more individuals or is issued by a life insurance company in a
transaction in which there is no consideration other than cash or another annuity contract
meeting the requirements of the passage. The Prudential payments are roughly tied to re-
maining life expectancy and most policies would have been issued for cash consideration.
Payments received over a period exceeding one year would probably be considered an annu-
ity contract under I.R.C. § 72. Even if not treated as interest or original issue discount, the
interest element would be recognized as additional insurance proceeds under annuity taxa-
tion principles. See supra note 14. Compare I.R.C. § 72(j) which states that "if any amount
is held under an agreement to pay interest thereon, the interest payments shall be included
in gross income."
" See supra note 37.
Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 11:263
3. Benefit Adjustments
Under both the terminal illness and nursing home options, no
recalculation of benefits is made if the insured lives longer than six
months or leaves the nursing home. Similarly, if the insured dies
before the six month period on which the calculation of payment is
based, or the insured dies without living in the nursing home for a
great length of time, no adjustment is made to the benefit amount.
If the insured dies while being paid benefits on an installment ba-
sis, however, the present value of the remaining benefits is paid in
a lump sum to the policy beneficiaries.43
B. Taxation
1. Terminal Illness Option
Life insurance benefits received "by reason of the death of the
insured" are excluded from the gross income of the recipient."" Be-
cause the terminal illness option is payable only upon impending
death, the income tax exclusion does not apply." ' The transaction
is essentially a policy surrender governed by settled tax princi-
ples. 8 Consequently, the owner of the policy must report income
"3 This treatment applies to both the terminal illness and nursing home options. The
Prudential rider otherwise permits living needs benefit payments only to the insured and to
no other persons. Rider ORD 87241-90 supra note 33.
" See supra note 5.
The exclusionary language was introduced to the Internal Revenue Code in 1913. See
infra text accompanying notes 110-51. The living needs benefit was not foreseen at the time,
but the congressional debate clearly focused on the distinction between lifetime surrenders
and payments on account of the death of the insured. See infra text accompanying notes
145-46. A literal reading of the statute does not support an exclusion for the living needs
benefit, and generally exclusions are narrowly construed. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b)
("[E]xceptions from a rule of taxation of general and uniform application, are strictly con-
strued and do not extend either beyond the words or the underlying assumptions and pur-
poses of the exception."). Legislation is pending which would exempt living needs benefit
payments from taxation. See infra text accompanying notes 260-63.
" A taxpayer surrendering a policy will be required to report income for any surrender
proceeds received in excess of aggregate premiums previously paid during the term of the
policy. See I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(A) & (E). A surrender to the insurer has been held not a "sale
or exchange" producing capital gain income. See Hawkins v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH)
1135 (1944), rev'd on another issue, 152 F. 2d 221 (5th Cir. 1945). If, on the other hand,
aggregate premiums exceed the surrender proceeds, the recognition of a loss is generally not
permitted. See, e.g., London Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1935), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 663 (1936) (denying loss on surrender to insurer). However, "if the tax-
payer receives less than the policy's cash surrender value ... because of the insurer's insol-
vency or for some other reason, the taxpayer should ordinarily be able to establish that it
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to the extent proceeds received exceed the aggregate premiums
paid."'
2. Nursing Home Option
Like benefits paid for terminal illness, the nursing home benefits
are paid for reasons other than the death of the insured, and a
lump sum payment must be taxed accordingly. If payments are re-
ceived in installments over a term of years, the benefits will be
taxed as an annuity.'8 However, a medical expense deduction may
be allowable for a portion of the nursing home expenses.'9
arose in a transaction entered into for profit within the meaning of section 165(c)(2)....
Bittker & Lokken, supra note 3,$ 12.6.2, at 12-53 (citing Cohen v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A.
709 (1941)). Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.56-1(c)(5)(i) (permitting the recognition of a loss on
policy surrenders for purposes of the corporate minimum tax computation).
17 The most extended period for the -payment of the terminal illness benefit is six months.
See supra text accompanying note 40. Since the payments are not payable over a period of
more than one full year, they are not received as an "annuity" for income tax purposes. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1(b) (defining amounts received as an annuity). Subsections
72(e)(5)(A),(C) & (E) of the code suggest that the recipient of a terminal illness option
applies a basis recovery method of income recognition, reporting no income until aggregate
payments received exceed the amount of the aggregate premiums previously paid. Unless
the payment period spans two taxable years of a recipient, the net result for a given year of
receipt is the same as that for one lump sum payment described in supra note 46. If termi-
nal illness benefits were received in connection with an organ transplant, an offsetting medi-
cal expense might be available for a portion of the expenses. See infra note 49.
,8 Amounts received as an annuity for income taxation purposes are "amounts which are
payable at regular intervals over a period of more than one full year from the date on which
they are deemed to begin, provided the total of the amounts so payable or the period for
which they are to be paid can be determined as of that date." Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1(b). Gen-
erally speaking, annuity taxation principles would treat the aggregate premiums paid as the
taxpayer's investment in the annuity. A portion of each benefit payment would constitute a
nontaxable return of investment, and the balance taxable income. See supra note 14 (briefly
discussing the taxation of annuity payments). Brochure ORD 87246 Ed. 10-90, supra note
33, states that "some portion of the payments may be taxable income."
, Where an individual is in an institution, and his condition is such that the availability
of medical care in such institution is not a principal reason for his presence there,
only that part of the cost of care in the institution as is attributable to medical care..
. shall be considered as a cost of medical care; meals and lodging at the institution in
such a case are not considered a cost of medical care for purposes of this section.
Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(b). See Rev. Rul. 75-302, 1975-2 C.B. 87 (portion of lump sum
paid for life care to retirement home allowed as medical expense). However, one commenta-
tor on long-term care, Harold Evensky, has stated that "The fact is that most long-term
care, the kind that goes on for more than 90 days, is custodial care and skilled nursing isn't
necessary." Chambliss, supra note 25, at 58. Moreover, I.R.C. § 213(a) (West Supp. 1991)
allows a medical expense deduction only for expenses "not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise." In several decisions, the Tax Court has stated that this language refers to any
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3. Unanswered Taxation Questions
a. Loan Treatment
The Prudential plan is structured as a policy surrender. The
benefit, although payable in installments at the election of the in-
sured, is a final amount, not subject to adjustment based on the
actual life span of the insured. 0 It is unclear if the plan could be
configured as a nontaxable policy loan, by placing a lien against
the policy in the amount of any death benefits advanced to the
insured.5 1 Unlike most policy loans which are limited to cash sur-
form of reimbursement, not only reimbursements excluded from income. See Litchfield v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C. 967, 969 (1963), aff'd, 330 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1964) (deduction denied
for payments by payor son for mother's medical expenses offset by reimbursements from
siblings); McDermid v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1727, 1729-1730 (1970) (deduction allowed
only for medical expenses paid with taxpayer's own funds; deduction denied for payments
from aunt's pension income). It is unclear whether taxable accelerated death benefits would
be considered as "insurance" for this purpose or an amount included under "otherwise." If
the taxpayer had other available assets to which the payments of medical expenses could be
traced, the potential impact of these precedents could be minimized. However, if the tax-
payer is so needy that accelerated death benefits are a necessary option, other assets may be
unavailable. If benefits paid under the nursing home option are includible in taxable in-
come, then the 7.5% adjusted gross income threshold to the medical care deduction is par-
ticularly inappropriate if it reflects adjusted gross income swollen by the insurance pro-
ceeds. See I.R.C. § 213(c). An incrementalist reform of a minor nature would exclude living
needs benefits from adjusted gross income for this purpose and would expressly permit a
medical expense deduction for expenses subject to taxable reimbursements.
60 See supra text accompanying note 43.
11 The receipt of insurance proceeds through a policy loan generally does not require the
recognition of taxable income. At first blush, this result apparently is derived from the stat-
ute. Section 72(e)(1) deals with distributions under annuity and insurance contracts and
applies to "any amount which ... is received under an annuity, endowment, or life insur-
ance contract, and . . . is not received as an annuity, if no provision of this subtitle (other
than this subsection) applies with respect to such amount." The rule of I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(A)
would apparently apply and "the amount shall be included in gross income, but only to the
extent it exceeds the investment in the contract." The investment in the contract is essen-
tially aggregate premiums paid. See I.R.C. § 72(e)(6). The aggregate premiums will usually
exceed the cash surrender value due to the portion of the premiums paid for pure death
insurance protection, so most loans based on cash surrender values would not run afoul of
this provision. However, the exemption is instead based on general tax principles that the
borrowing of money is not a taxable event, and a loan does not even rise to the level of "any
amount ... received under an annuity, endowment or life insurance contract." See Drake v.
United States, 597 F. Supp. 1271 (D.C. N.C. 1984) and In Re: Robert and Mary Minnis, 71
T.C. 1049 (1979) applying this analysis to annuity contract loans under the law prior to the
changes introduced by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) ("TEFRA"). The TEFRA
amendments added an express provision treating loans under an annuity contract as a taxa-
ble amount not received as an annuity, but excluded life insurance or endowment contracts
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render values, the Prudential living benefits would often exceed
that amount.52 No precedent exists to guide the appropriate taxa-
tion treatment of a loan from an insurer in excess of the cash sur-
render value.5"
from this treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 72(e)(4)(A), 72(e)(5)(A), & 72(e)(5)(C). This suggests that
Congress considered it necessary to expressly treat certain loans as distributions, in contrast
with the prevailing loan treatment. The 1982 Blue Book supports this conclusion:
The Act does not change the tax treatment of withdrawals from most life insurance
and endowment contracts. However, the Secretary is authorized to issue regulatory
guidelines as to when the amount at risk under these types of contracts is sufficiently
minimal that the contract should be treated as an annuity for purposes of these
provisions.
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 97th Cong. 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Reve-
nue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 363 (Comm. Print
1982) [hereinafter 1982 Blue Book]. See also Siskin v. United States, 790 F.2d 480, 482-83
(6th Cir. 1986) (in the context of unrelated business income taxation, withdrawals against
cash value of life insurance policy are indebtedness and not advances under the contract,
acknowledging, however, that such transactions differ from an ordinary loan); Salley v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 896, 903 (1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1972) (dealing with
interest deduction for policy loan interest but recognizing uniqueness of policy loans be-
cause of a lack of true personal liability). In the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26 U.S.C.) ("TAMRA"), Congress further narrowed the loan exemption, to exclude
loans against certain "modified endowment contracts." See I.R.C. §§ 72(e)(10) & 7702A. See
infra text accompanying notes 186-92.
52 State insurance law statutes generally limit policy loans to an amount no greater than
the loan value, which is typically tied to cash surrender value. See supra note 11.
53 If a loan were available and bona fide, the pledge of a life insurance policy generally
would not be a disposition of the policy resulting in the recognition of taxable income. The
pledge of certain annuity and modified endowment contracts could, however, produce a tax-
able distribution. See supra note 51. One of the companies that purchases policies from the
terminally ill structures the transaction as a loan in an arrangement that closely resembles
the common pledge of an insurance contract to a third party lender. See supra note 12.
While that is a different situation than one in which the insurer is the lender, the rationale
underlying the decisions cited in supra note 51 (holding that insurance policy loans do not
give rise to the recognition of taxable income) is that the relationship of the insured and the
insurer under the circumstances of a policy loan is that of a borrower and a lender, respec-
tively. The cash surrender value would therefore seem irrelevant to that inquiry as a matter
of tax law, and the relationship closely resembles a nonrecourse loan. However, to be even
considered as a loan, the amount of the Prudential benefit would need to he left open for
final determination with reference to the term of the loan, the insured's actual life span;
that would detract from the finality of the present arrangement.
A survey sponsored by the American Council of Life Insurance reported a number of
differing approaches in reflecting the payment of accelerated benefits. In 46 of the 62 prod-
ucts surveyed (74%), the acceleration of benefits reduced the face amount by the amount of
the payout. In 10 products, liens were placed on the policies in the amount of the payout.
For the remaining six products, assignments in the amount of the accelerated benefits were
made against the policies. ACLI Survey, supra note 30, at 10. The effect of acceleration on
cash surrender values demonstrated broad variations. In 34 of the products, the cash value
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b. Disability Exclusion
As noted above, medical expense deductions can offset taxable
income from the nursing home benefit.5 4 This could also be true
for terminal illness benefits paid on account of an organ transplant
procedure. Other exclusions or deductions may also apply to the
terminal illness option. For example, section 104(a)(3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code [hereinafter "Code"] excludes from income
amounts received through health insurance for personal injuries or
sickness if the premiums were paid by the insured. Although sec-
tion 104(a)(3) states the exclusion broadly, 55 the terminal illness
option may not be paid strictly on account of sickness or disability;
it is paid on account of impending death usually arising from ill-
ness and often involving disability. Prudential adopted this liberal
eligibility standard, rather than one linked to specific dread dis-
eases, for example, to benefit the insured:
Some policies also limit living benefits to specific illnesses, such as
stroke, heart attack, cancer, coronary artery surgery or renal fail-
ure .... 'We think that is the wrong way to go,' says [Prudential
was reduced proportionately to the reduction in face value. In three products, a reduction
was made in the amount of the accelerated payout. In seven products, a lien attached to the
policy, in an amount proportionate to the reduction in face value. In four products a lien
attached in the amount of the accelerated payment. In three products, cash values were
assigned in the amount of the accelerated benefit. Of the remaining products, six provided
for no reduction, four provided no answer, and the question was not applicable to one be-
cause the insurance had no cash value. Id. In a loan scenario, the death benefit income tax
exclusion would be available to the insured's estate which would in effect immediately pay a
portion of the proceeds to the lender in satisfaction of the loan. The death benefit exclusion
and other provisions of I.R.C. § 101 would generally not apply to the lender's receipt of the
pledged policy proceeds. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(4) (section 101 is inapplicable to any
amounts received by the pledgee). See Landfield Finance v. United States, 418 F.2d 172, 175
(7th Cir. 1969) (exclusion denied to lender that received policy proceeds upon death of bor-
rower insured), distinguishing Durr Drug Co. v. United States, 99 F.2d 757, 759 (5th Cir.
1938) (creditor deemed to be owner of the policy from the outset and eligible for the death
benefit exclusion).
" See supra note 49.
46 The "primary function of § 104(a)(3) is to exempt from taxation amounts received
under ordinary accident and health insurance policies that pay medical expenses, lump-sum
amounts for bodily injury, per diem amounts during hospitalization, amounts related to the
taxpayer's wage level or length of incapacity during recuperation, and perhaps other bene-
fits." Bittker & Lokken, supra note 3, 13.1.5, at 13-14. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-155, 1973-1
C.B. 50 (excluding no-fault auto disability payments for loss of income); Rev. Rul. 58-90,
1958-1 C.B. 88 (excluding income replacement insurance payable if taxpayer is sick or dis-
abled); Rev. Rul. 55-331, 1955-1 C.B. 271 (excluding disability insurance proceeds for disa-
bility due to a loss of a part of the body).
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senior vice-president Robert] Hill. 'Why should someone be penal-
ized because he got one disease and not another?' 6
However, the Treasury has favorably interpreted section
104(a)(3) as applying to combined policies of life and disability in-
surance. 7 Other accelerated death benefits plans which link eligi-
bility to specific physical maladies also enjoy exclusion under this
section."8
Section 105(c) provides an exclusion for disability payments, but
it too may be inapplicable because the disability in question, such
as cancer or AIDS, is generally not tied to "permanent loss or loss
of use of a member or function of the body." 9 In addition, the
benefit, computed primarily as the net present value of the policy's
face value, may not meet the statutory requirement of computa-
Green, supra note 25, at 67.
In Rev. Rul. 63-181, 1963-2 C.B. 74, an insured was covered under a group, renewable
term life or disability insurance policy. A benefit was payable upon death or permanent and
total disability prior to age 65. The employee was found to be "permanently and totally
disabled, with a life expectancy of a few months, on account of an acute cancerous condi-
tion." Id. at 74. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that the lump sum was excludable
under I.R.C. § 104(a)(3) (and under I.R.C. § 105(c) discussed in the text which follows). In
Estate of Wong Wing Non, 18 T.C. 205 (1952) the insured owned an endowment policy
which contained a disability benefit. Upon the disability of the insured, future premiums
were waived. However, the policy benefit was not paid until the endowment's maturity. The
Tax Court found, because the government had already conceded the point, that the prede-
cessor of I.R.C. § 104(a)(3) applied to exclude the endowment contract proceeds in excess of
the cost of the contract.
8 The author reviewed a copy of a February 9, 1988 opinion letter issued by Peat
Marwick Main & Company with respect to the tax status of Jackson National Life Insur-
ance Company's "Life Line Ultimate" policy. The opinion concludes that a portion of the
benefit, which is accelerated upon the occurrence of certain events designated with reference
to medical conditions, is exempt as an accident and health insurance benefit under I.R.C. §
104(a)(3). The accelerated benefit is payable upon proof of the occurrence of heart attack,
stroke, coronary artery surgery, life threatening cancer, and renal failure. Id. at 2. The Peat
Marwick opinion is based largely on Rev. Rul. 63-181, supra note 57, and Estate of Wong
Wing Non, supra note 57.
88 I.R.C. § 105(c). Section 105(c) of the Code provides:
Gross income does not include [amounts received by an employee for personal inju-
ries or sickness] to the extent such amounts (1) constitute payment for the perma-
nent loss or loss of use of a member or function of the body, or the permanent disfig-
urement of the taxpayer ... and (2) are computed with reference to the nature of the
injury without regard to the period the employee is absent from work.
See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 352 (9th Cir. 1983) (hypertension resulting in
permanent disability is not a permanent loss of bodily function. "The terms 'work' and
'body' simply are not synonymous.").
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tion "with reference to the nature of the injury." 60 However, a lib-
eral revenue ruling may again provide relief, and the Prudential
options might benefit from restatement as a disability benefit rider
consistent with the favorable precedent,61 at a price of reduced
flexibility.2
c. Miscellaneous Issues - Constructive Receipt, Policy Ex-
changes, and Definition of Insurance
An insured should not be deemed in constructive receipt of ben-
efits because he or she does not exercise a living needs benefit op-
tion. This result obtains because both the nursing home and termi-
nal illness options require the election of the insured and the
approval of the life insurance company before any benefits are
payable.6 3
An insured may generally exchange life insurance, endowment,
or annuity contracts of one company for other policies of the same
or different insurer without the income tax recognition of gain or
60 See Gordon v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 630, 640-41 (1987) (payment for arteriosclerotic
heart condition was not calculated with regard to the severity or nature of the injury and
therefore could not be excluded from income under I.R.C. § 105(c)); Hines v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 715, 720 (1979) (benefits qualify for exclusion only if they vary according to the type
of injury suffered by the taxpayer).
6 Rev. Rul. 63-181, supra note 57, held that a lump sum paid on account of disability due
to a cancerous condition was also excludable under I.R.C. § 105(c).
62 The Jackson National life plan described at supra note 58, for example, pays an accel-
erated benefit only upon the presence of specified medical conditions. Specificity is arguably
illusory if one treats as a terminal illness, for example, "any medical condition reasonably
certain to result in death within 6 months." On the other hand, Rev. Rul. 63-181, described
a loose standard of "permanently and totally disabled, with a life expectancy of a few
months, on account of an acute cancerous condition." See supra note 57.
63 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a). The regulation provides:
Income . .. is constructively received .. . in the taxable year during which it is
credited to [the taxpayer's] account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so
that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during
the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income
is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to sub-
stantial limitations or restrictions. .."
The requirements of proof of illness or nursing home care arguably pose a substantial
restriction. With respect to annuities, the Internal Revenue Service has issued a private
letter ruling concluding that the surrender of a policy as a condition to the payment of
certain income was a substantial restriction. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-42-036 (July 22, 1980).
See also Cohen v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 1055 (1963) (no constructive receipt of increment
in cash surrender value because policy surrender required).
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loss."' Subject to applicable surrender charges, insurability and
other underwriting conditions, and financial aspects of the replace-
ment policy, an insured can convert policies without an accelerated
death benefit, or one on less favorable terms, into a new policy
offering such benefits. Pending legislation would address technical
problems presented by accelerated death benefits in connection
with the income tax definition of life insurance."5
C. Issues of a Nontax Nature
The living needs benefit options present several nontax issues
which are briefly introduced in the materials which follow.
1. Creditors of the Insured
If the owner of a life insurance policy files for bankruptcy pro-
tection, the policy is an asset of the bankruptcy estate. 6 However,
a bankrupt may choose between exemptions allowed under state
law and federal statutes other than the Bankruptcy Code or those
See I.R.C. § 1035 (stating that no gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of
specified combinations of life insurance, endowment or annuity contracts). See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.1035-1 ("but section 1035 does not apply to such exchanges if the policies ex-
changed do not relate to the same insured. . ."); Rev. Rul. 72-358, 1972-2 C.B. 473 (holding
that I.R.C. § 1035 applies to exchange of policies issued by different insurers). See, e.g.,
Dorothy K. Dropick, Life Insurance Exchanges Under Section 1035: Think Twice Before
You Surrender, 17 Conn. L. Rev. 525 (1985) (discussing the structure and potential pitfalls
of policy exchanges). If the insured were terminally ill at the time of the proposed exchange,
lack of insurability would be a potential obstacle in finding a substitute policy.
'G The Peat Marwick Main & Company opinion letter, supra note 58, raises the issue of
whether an accelerated death benefit may alter the status of a policy under the income tax
definition of life insurance under I.R.C. § 7702(f)(7) (dealing with subsequent changes in
benefits). Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-06-050 (Nov. 16, 1990) held that long-term care and home
health care benefits provided under a life insurance contract rider were not a "qualified
additional benefit" under I.R.C. § 7702(f)(5)(A). Pending legislation would add terminal ill-
ness benefits as a "qualified additional benefit" under this provision. Senate Bill 284, infra
note 260, § 2(b). One implication would be treatment of charges for the terminal illness
benefit as "future benefits." See I.R.C. § 7702(f)(5)(B). That in turn impacts the guideline
premium tests, which are tied to the cost of premiums for future benefits under the con-
tract, by increasing the amount of the limitation. See I.R.C. § 7702(c)(3). The pending legis-
lation also amends I.R.C. § 818 (stating definitions applicable to provisions for the taxation
of life insurance companies) with the addition of a new subsection (g) which expressly in-
cludes terminal illness riders in the definition of life insurance for the purposes of insurance
company taxation. Senate Bill 284, infra note 260, § 2(a).
66 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988) (the estate is comprised of "... all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.").
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under the Bankruptcy Code. 7 States can require that a bankrupt
utilize only the state exemption statutes, barring the federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions. 8
a. Federal Exemptions
Two federal bankruptcy exemptions address life insurance. One
exempts "[a]ny unmatured life insurance contract owned by the
debtor, other than a credit life insurance contract."6 e The second
exempts "[t]he debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $4,000...
in any accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of, any
unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor under
which the insured is the debtor or an individual of whom the
debtor is a dependent. ' 70 The legislative history suggests that the
two exemptions taken together prohibit the trustee from surren-
dering a life insurance policy. However, the trustee may exercise
other rights under the contract, such as the right to borrow against
the cash surrender value of all policies of the debtor, leaving the
debtor with the policies encumbered by the loans (subject to the
$4,000 exemption).7 Structured as a policy surrender, the living
benefits option possibly falls within the first exemption which does
not require a surrender of policies, provided that the "unmatured"
policies language could not be applied to preclude an exemption
for ripened living benefits.7 2 It is uncertain if the living benefits
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
'8 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1988). A number of states have enacted such legislation. See,
e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.130 (West 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-54-107 (Supp.
1991); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4914 (Supp. 1990); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.20 (West 1991); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 110, 12-1201 (Smith-Hurd 1991); New York Debt. & Cred. Law § 284 (Mc-
Kinney 1990).
" 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7) (1988).
7 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(8) (1988).
7' [T]he trustee may not surrender a life insurance contract, which remains property of
the debtor if he chooses the Federal exemptions . . .'. A trustee is authorized to
collect the entire loan value on every life insurance policy owned by the debtor as
property of the estate. First, however, the debtor will choose which policy or policies
under which the loan value will be exempted.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 361 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6317.
72 In In Re O'Brien, 67 B.R. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986), the court addressed the issue of
whether a single premium whole life policy was "unmatured" for purposes of an Iowa state
exemption statute which exempted unmatured life insurance policies. The court noted the
similar wording of the federal bankruptcy exemption, but could locate no state or federal
law definition of the term. Drawing upon definitions of insurance in the Internal Revenue
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option also skirts the second exemption which is couched in terms
of traditional policy loan provisions.
The Prudential disclosures state: "[W]e do not believe that cred-
itors, a trustee in bankruptcy, or a bankruptcy court could force
you to exercise this option involuntarily. 7' This conclusion draws
force from a form of spendthrift clause which states, "If you are
required by law to use this option to meet the claims of creditors,
whether in bankruptcy or otherwise, you are not eligible for this
benefit. 71 4 It is uncertain, however, if the Prudential rider creates a
spendthrift trust relationship that will prevent the living needs
benefit from becoming property of the bankruptcy estate.7 5
Code (I.R.C. § 7702(e)(lMB) (stating that the maturity date for that purpose is no earlier
than the day on which the insured reaches age 95, and no later than the day on which the
insured reaches age 100)) and industry usage, the court concluded that the policy did not
"mature", until the cash value equalled the death benefit. In most whole life policies this
does not occur until age 95-100. See supra note 14. If one accepts this rough analysis, the
living needs benefit, which is not greater than 95-96 percent of face value, is not matured for
purposes of bankruptcy. See also In Re Buffinton, 100 B.R. 448 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1987)
(applying In Re O'Brien).
If the ripened living benefit were property of the bankruptcy estate, then the effect of a
debtor's relinquishment of the option prior to the filing of the petition would need to be
considered. In that regard, the Prudential living needs benefit plan permits the insured's
removal of the option at any time. See Rider ORD 87241-90, supra note 33. A concern is
that the relinquishment of the property interest prior to the bankruptcy filing, for the bene-
fit of the secondary beneficiary, would have the effect of a fraudulent transfer under 11
U.S.C. § 548 (1988). But see Hoecker v. United Bank of Boulder, 476 F.2d 838 (10th Cir.
1973) (disclaimer of an inheritance by an individual prior to filing a petition in bankruptcy
was not a "transfer"). However, the result in Hoecker turned upon the court's construction
of the disclaimer statute, which produced a passing of property directly from the decedent
to the ultimate beneficiary, without any connection to the disclaimant. Otherwise, "[t]he
term 'transfer' would include the disclaimer filed by the bankrupt if the effect of such dis-
claimer was to transfer from him to his children the property devised and bequeathed to
him by the will." Id. at 840-41.
" Brochure ORD 87246 Ed. 10-90, supra note 33.
, Rider ORD 87241-90, supra note 33.
In bankruptcy, an interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate
notwithstanding any provision in an agreement "that is conditioned on the insolvency or
financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, or on the
appointment of ... a custodian" of a debtor's property, unless the restriction is "on the
transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under 'applicable
nonbankruptcy law'...." 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(c)(1)(B), (c)(2) (1988).
The first issue is whether the Prudential rider creates a trust relationship. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959) [hereinafter the Second Restatement] defines a trust in
part as: "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom
the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit
of another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it."
However, § 12 of the Second Restatement states that "[a] debt is not a trust." Comment k
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b. State Exemptions
If the federal exemptions are not attractive, the debtor can take
of that section states that when the insured or the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
exercises an option to receive deferred payments, the insurer does not become a trustee
unless it is under a duty to segregate the proceeds as a separate fund, and the insurer does
so. Otherwise, it is only a debtor. See George G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §
240 (1977 and Supp. 1986) (discussing the repudiation by courts of a trust characterization
for insurance company payment arrangements in the absence of a segregated fund, but cit-
ing a number of overriding state statutes which recognize a trust relationship and the en-
forceability of spendthrift clauses under such circumstances). See, e.g., In Re Brown, 86
B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988) (life insurance company annuity contract containing a
nonalienation clause purchased by the Arizona Lottery Commission for the benefit of a lot-
tery winner characterized as a contract rather than a trust); compare In Re Haddad, 9 B.R.
368 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 15 B.R. 903 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1981) (applying California Insurance Code provisions recognizing the enforceability
of spendthrift clauses in insurance policies).
Legislative history indicates that 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) was directed at interests in spend-
thrift trusts. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6325. Even if the Prudential rider is held to create a trust, it is not clear
that it would be considered the type of trust relationship excluded from the estate. Courts
are split, for example, on the issue of whether interests under trusts that comply with The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), requiring inclusion of anti-
alienation clauses, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988), are excluded from property of the estate
under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) if the beneficiary is in bankruptcy. The liberal minority rule
reasons that since ERISA spendthrift restrictions are enforceable against creditors outside
of bankruptcy, they are also enforceable against the bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., In Re
Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990). The majority of courts, however, hold that the legisla-
tive history of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) indicates that Congress intended only to exclude tradi-
tional spendthrift trusts under state law. See, e.g., In Re Kerr, 65 B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Utah
1986) (the spendthrift clause was not enforced against creditors because Utah law does not
enforce such clauses if the trust is self-settled). A stated rationale is that if Congress in-
tended to include ERISA anti-alienation provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), thereby exclud-
ing all ERISA benefits from the estate, no function would be served by 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(10)(E) which exempts certain ERISA benefits. See, e.g., In Re Starkey, 116 B.R. 259,
262 n.1 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). A similar argument could be made with respect to an unma-
tured life insurance contract as it is already exempted under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(7). How-
ever, whether living benefits would be included as unmatured life insurance is unclear. See
supra note 72.
The final issue is whether a spendthrift provision in favor of the creator of the trust or
other relationship is enforceable against the claims of creditors as a matter of state law. A
typical test of enforceability under state law as a spendthrift trust includes a determination
of: (a) whether spendthrift trusts are valid in the state; (b) whether the trust restrains the
voluntary or involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's interest; and (c) whether the settlor is
the beneficiary and has thereby created an invalid spendthrift trust. See In Re Matteson, 58
B.R. 909, 911 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986). (A principal factor is the degree of dominion and
control a beneficiary has over the trust corpus. The pension plan was held to be a valid
spendthrift trust and excludable under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) because Matteson had limited
access to the plan.). The Prudential clause is technically a forfeiture restraint which termi-
nates the debtor's interest upon an attempted alienation. This type of clause is generally
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advantage of state creditor exemption statutes which make life in-
surance "the most privileged capital asset in the United States. ' '7
An examination of such statutes77 and their application to the liv-
ing benefit options is beyond the scope of this article. However, it
enforceable. See § 150 of the Second Restatement (a forfeiture restraint is valid as to in-
come) and § 153 of the Second Restatement (a forfeiture restraint on principal is generally
enforceable, subject, however, to sections 156 and 157). Section 157 of the Second Restate-
ment deals with certain classes of claimants, such as a spouse or child claiming support, a
supplier of necessaries, or a governmental claim, who are not barred by a spendthrift clause.
Section 156 of the Second Restatement provides that where a person creates for his or her
own benefit a trust with a spendthrift provision, creditors can reach his or her interest.
Comment f to § 156 states that "it is not necessary that the beneficiary shall have himself
conveyed the property held in trust. It is sufficient that he paid the purchase price for a
conveyance upon a trust, of which he is the beneficiary or one of the beneficiaries." It would
seem that the insured who pays the life insurance premiums could be compared to the crea-
tor of a self-settled trust.
In bankruptcy cases, which typically involve retirement plans, the self-settled aspects of
such plans often preclude an exemption. See, e.g., In Re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983)
(self-settled aspects of plan, where only the debtor contributed to the plan, violated state
law concerning spendthrift trusts); In Re Swanson, 79 B.R. 422 (D. Minn. 1987) (pension
fund under Minnesota Teachers Retirement Act not an exempt spendthrift trust, in part
because beneficiary was an indirect settlor of a self-settled trust to the extent of employee
contributions, and in part because beneficiaries could withdraw funds at will upon termina-
tion of their employment); In Re Walker, 108 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Okl. 1989) (self-settled
aspects of Individual Retirement Arrangement precluded recognition as valid spendthrift
trust interest); In Re Boykin, 118 B.R. 716 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (Wal-Mart Profit Shar-
ing Plan interest found not excludable because debtor's control, including the right to re-
ceive benefits upon a termination of employment, was inconsistent with spendthrift trust
law); In Re Lyons, 118 B.R. 634 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (debtor's interest in Illinois State Employees
Retirement System not exempt because employee could reach assets by voluntarily termi-
nating his employment).
"' Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United States, 4
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 583, 617 (1957).
77 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.100 (West 1987) (exempts $4,000 of loan value, but
balance of loan value is subject to creditor claims; otherwise, unmatured life insurance poli-
cies are exempt, and benefits from matured policies (including endowment and annuity poli-
cies) are exempt to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the judgment debtor
and the spouse and dependents of the judgment debtor); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-102(1)(1)
(Supp. 1990) (life insurance to the extent of $5,000 exempt from levy and sale); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 222.14 (West 1991) (cash surrender value and proceeds of annuity contracts are ex-
empt); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, 12-1001(f) (Smith-Hurd 1991) (exempts all proceeds paid
because of death of the insured and the aggregate net cash value of life insurance, endow-
ment policies, and annuity contracts payable to a wife or husband of the insured, or to a
child, parent, or other person dependent upon the insured); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-10-3.
(Michie 1978) (broad exemption for most insurance proceeds); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §
42.002(7) (West 1984) (exempts cash surrender value of any policy in force more than two
years if a member of the insured's family or a dependent of a single person claiming the
exemption is a beneficiary).
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can be said that the common law, in tandem with state statutory
exemptions, is very protective of the owners and beneficiaries of
life insurance. A number of courts have found that in the absence
of special circumstances, such as fraud, creditors are precluded
from obtaining the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy
by garnishment or other proceedings. 78 The presence of the spend-
thrift clause is also of some force in frustrating creditor claims
against available living needs benefits.
79
2. Public Assistance Eligibility
The receipt of living needs benefits may affect eligibility for fu-
ture Medicaid or other public assistance benefits.80 A question to
which an answer is less clear is whether a life insurance policy con-
taining an exercisable living benefits option should be valued ac-
cording to the available benefits, even if the option is not
exercised.
The standard for determining Medicaid eligibility is "income
and resources . . . as are available to the applicant or recipient." 81
Limited authority previously held that only the cash surrender
value of life insurance policies could be taken into account for this
purpose.8 2 It is difficult to distinguish a cash surrender value from
78 In explaining why an insured cannot be compelled to request the cash surrender value
of a policy, one commentary states, "(T]his distinction between an option right, available to
but not exercised by the insured, and a fully matured and accrued liability or debt on the
part of the insurer to the insured, is made apparent by many of the cases." 6 Couch on
Insurance 2d, supra note 15, § 32.155, at 449. Another commentary states, "[t]he courts have
considered that the purpose of life insurance is to provide for the maintenance of those
surviving the insured and dependent upon him. Consequently, one of the most popular in-
door sports among jurists is to find new reasons for this rule." 2A John A. Appleman, Insur-
ance Law and Practice § 1341, at 567 (1966). For a thorough, although somewhat dated,
exposition of the law in this area see Riesenfeld, supra note 76.
" See supra text accompanying note 74. An objection to enforcement of the spendthrift
clause is that it runs in favor of the insured, who would also generally be the policyowner
and also the beneficiary. Moreover, the insured can terminate the rider, at his or her option,
so the rider, and its spendthrift provision, is cancellable by the insured. A spendthrift clause
in a trust for the settlor's own benefit is generally not given effect. See supra note 75.
SO The Prudential brochure disclosures state that "[y]ou may affect your ability to receive
certain government benefits or entitlements." Brochure ORD 87246 Ed. 10-90, supra note
33. A reported administrative agreement supports this conclusion. See infra note 84.
81 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (1988).
" See Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509 (D. Conn. 1971) (state Medicaid eligibility
regulation requiring evaluation of life insurance policies at face value held invalid). The
Prudential rider, for example, permits the relinquishment of the rider and its benefits. If
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the living needs benefit option. The traditional distinction that the
face amount, as compared to the cash surrender value, was not in-
cludible because it was not available appears inappropriate; for the
living needs benefit is available to an insured, and the face value of
traditional policies never was.8 3 The Social Security Administra-
tion and Health Care Financing Administration agreed, however,
that potential living benefits are not an "available" resource.8,4
A spendthrift provision in the Prudential rider also addresses
this issue, stating that, "[i]f you are required by a government
agency to use this option in order to apply for, obtain, or keep a
government benefit or entitlement, you are not eligible for this
benefit." 85 Although not directly on point, state case law is divided
on the issue of whether a spendthrift clause can make trust prop-
erty unavailable to public agencies providing support to the
beneficiary."6
the option would otherwise be an asset to be considered for purposes of public assistance,
would the relinquishment be an impermissible transfer of property to the beneficiary? In
that regard, most public assistance statutes prohibit asset transfers within a specified period
prior to an application for benefits by the transferor. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1396a(a)(51)(B), 1396p(c) (West Supp. 1991) (Medicaid standards for pre-application asset
transfers); Abramson v. Welfare Commission, 31 Conn. Supp. 544, 330 A.2d 822 (1974) (ad-
dressing a transfer of assets prior to application for benefits).
8' The individual in Wilczynski v. Harder, supra note 82, was not terminally ill, so that
the face value of the policy was not ripe. Moreover, this 1971 decision predates the recent
development of sales by the terminally ill to independent brokers as an avenue in realizing a
portion of the face value of policies. Life insurance company options aside, it would seem
that the net realizable value of the policy that can be obtained from independent brokers
could be the value of the policy for this purpose, like any other asset.
" These two agencies have agreed that benefits when and as received are considered as
resources; potential benefits are not. McCormack & Petersen, supra note 12, at 1352.
8' Rider ORD 87241-90, supra note 33.
This again raises the issue discussed at length in supra note 75 of whether a life insur-
ance company settlement option creates a trust relationship for state law purposes. Com-
ment k to § 12 of the Second Restatement, supra note 75, states: "Thus, just as a restraint
on the alienation of the interest of a beneficiary under a trust may be valid... so a restraint
on the interest of the beneficiary of an insurance policy may be valid, since the policy per-
mitting spendthrift trusts is equally applicable to life insurance contracts."
The leading case finding that a spendthrift trust clause can defeat the claims of a public
agency for the support of a beneficiary is Zeoli v. Comm'r of Social Services, 179 Conn. 83,
425 A.2d 553 (1979) (the trustee's standard for distributions was absolute, uncontrolled dis-
cretion). See also Miller v. Ibarra, 746 F. Supp. 19 (D. Colo. 1990) (court-created trusts for
incompetent nursing home residents were not available resources for Medicaid). Trusts have
been tapped where the intent of the settlor was support of the beneficiary, and no prohibi-
tion was expressed on the use of trust funds for support which public agencies would other-
wise provide. See, e.g., Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. First
Virginia Tax Review
If the living benefits would be subject to offset if received or
affect eligibility for assistance even if not exercised, the living ben-
efits options would be less attractive to needy individuals who wish
to leave a death benefit to survivors. Pending legislation would ex-
empt unexercised living benefit options from available resources
for public assistance eligibility.
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IV. CONSIDERING AN INCOME TAX EXCLUSION FOR ACCELERATED
DEATH BENEFITS
A. General Policy Questions
The enactment of an income tax exclusion for terminal illness
benefits could be based on humanitarian grounds. Simply stated,
the tragedy surrounding a person who is about to die, and his or
her family and loved ones, should not be exacerbated by the fed-
eral government collecting a tax. This rationale is partially re-
flected in exclusions for personal injury awards."8 Humanitarian
appeals have their limits, however, and a more common legislative
response is to fashion a need-based exclusion or deduction.s
Another argument for excluding living benefits is that the tax
collector should not receive a windfall from a taxpayer's misfor-
tune. If the taxpayer could have waited a bit longer, all of the pro-
ceeds would be exempt from tax upon the insured's death. This
same argument, however, could be leveled at almost any favorable
provision, the attainment of which a taxpayer barely misses.90 The
Nat'l. Bank, 104 Ill. App. 3d 461, 432 N.E.2d 1086 (1982); McNiff v. Olmstead County Wel-
fare Dept., 287 Minn. 40, 176 N.W.2d 888 (1970). The current status of the law encourages
explicit drafting. See generally Annotation, Eligibility for Welfare Benefits as Affected by
Claimant's Status as Trust Beneficiary, 21 A.L.R. 4th 729 (1983 and Supp. 1987).
" See infra note 278.
" "The imposition of an income tax on compensation received by persons who have been
seriously injured by accident would no doubt be regarded as heartless, unless recoveries
from tortfeasors were correspondingly increased." Bittker & Lokken, supra note 3, 13.1.1.,
at 13-2.
89 One example is the 7.5% of adjusted gross income floor for medical expenses imposed
by I.R.C. § 213(a). Other examples are the $100 floor and 10% of adjusted gross income
limitations applicable to personal casualty losses, I.R.C. § 165(h), and the partial inclusion
of social security benefits, I.R.C. § 86.
90 Some in the insurance industry have voiced this argument: "[An exclusion for acceler-
ated death benefits] is simply the same treatment as if the benefits were paid a few months
later, after death . . . . [A]ccelerated death benefits are just death benefits paid a few
months early." 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 21 (oral testimony of Robert P. Hill, Execu-
tive Vice President of the Prudential Insurance Company of America). There is, however, a
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argument, however, has more force, if it is restated in terms of
"substantial compliance;" that is, if proceeds are totally excluded
upon the insured's death, doesn't the same policy justification ap-
ply to a lifetime payment shortly before death? The role of death
as the determinative factor is addressed in section IV(B) below.
An exclusion for accelerated death benefits at first seems consis-
tent with horizontal 1 and vertical92 equity. An exclusion would,
however, conflict with the principles of economic neutrality"s and
horizontal and vertical equity aspect to this argument which is discussed at infra text ac-
companying notes 91-103.
91 "As applied to income taxation, the horizontal equity principle is usually said to re-
quire that persons with equal [economic] incomes pay the same amount of taxes." Bittker &
Lokken, supra note 3, 3.1.4, at 3-10. Taxing living benefits must fail the horizontal equity
test if one compares, all other factors equal, the tax burden of a terminally ill person who
receives a taxable living benefit, with that of a terminally ill person who defers receipt, such
that his or her beneficiaries receive the benefits without the imposition of a tax. This
doesn't prove much, because most tax exclusions, when viewed comparatively, operate in
this fashion. Moreover, the comparison is not altogether accurate; the decedent received the
living benefits while living, while in the latter case the beneficiaries received the benefits.
The comparison is closer if one compares the family group, including the insured, before,
and the family group survivors, after, the insured's death. This recognizes that the survivors
are financially impacted by the care of the insured and their own support requirements
prior to the insured's death, as well as their support after the insured's death. The taxation
of the living as compared to the taxation of the heirs and the devisees of the once living also
demonstrates skewed results arising from the use of death as a line of demarcation. For
example, if the insured would sell shares of corporate stock before death, or would gift
shares to a family member who ultimately sold them, any gain on the transaction would be
determined with reference to the insured's adjusted basis. See I.R.C. § 1015. If the family
member, however, received the stock upon the death of the insured, the adjusted basis of
the stock would become the stock's fair market value at the insured's date of death (or
alternate valuation date, if applicable). See I.R.C. § 1014. The analogy of an accelerated
death benefits exclusion to I.R.C. § 1014 is discussed in the text which follows.
" "[V]ertical equity as a principle mandates only that there be some differentiation be-
tween each group and the next higher and lower groups, and does not specify the amount of
the differentiation." Bittker & Lokken, supra note 3, 3.1.4, at 3-12. This factor is discussed
in the text which follows.
93 "Any tax has an efficiency cost because it alters the relative values of labor, capital and
leisure, thereby affecting the allocation of resources. The goal is to choose a tax system,
consistent with other objectives, that minimizes these efficiency costs." Stanley S. Surrey,
Paul R. McDaniel, Hugh J. Ault, & Stanley A. Koppelman, Federal Income Taxation 46-47
(1986) [hereinafter Surrey & McDaniel]. The availability of living benefits could direct more
investment into life insurance products. A recent article foreshadows the obvious marketing
theme: "Life insurance is finally living up to its name. Instead of just protecting your near-
est and dearest from financial burden after your death, some new policies free up the pro-
ceeds before you die.... The enthusiasm is understandable." Steven Findlay, Now, Benefits
for the Living, 109 U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 8, 1990, at 78. According to a study
sponsored by the American Council of Life Insurance, of individuals interviewed, approxi-
mately 40% of "those without individually-purchased life insurance indicated that the avail-
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simplicity. In this regard, the strongest traditional tax policy ar-
gument in support of an exclusion apparently rests on considera-
tions of vertical equity. In the absence of a tax exemption for ac-
celerated death benefits, a person with other financial resources
could avoid the income tax on insurance benefits by using other
assets rather than an accelerated payment of death benefits. This
would seem to present the greatest negative impact on the middle
to upper-middle class taxpayer with dependents; wealthy people
would not need to utilize a lifetime benefit payment, or want to
utilize it due to the obvious adverse income and estate taxation
consequences," while a poor individual or individual without de-
pendents96 may not be overly concerned about the tax aspects of
ability of accelerated death benefits increased the likelihood of their purchasing life insur-
ance." ACLI Survey, supra note 30, at 2. This additional incentive to life insurance
acquisition is not necessarily desirable. In addressing a proposed exclusion for accelerated
death benefits the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation stated, "[t]he treatment of
inside buildup under present law favors life insurance as an investment over other invest-
ment vehicles thereby distorting the flow of savings and investment in the economy. The
bill would provide an additional incentive for individuals to purchase life insurance and
would exacerbate the inefficiencies of present law." Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Description of
Tax Bills (S. 90, S. 150, S. 267, S. 284, S. 649, and S. 913) 23 (Comm. Print. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Staff Explanation]. Some in the insurance industry apparently expect to sell, or keep in
force, more life insurance. One industry spokesman has urged the adoption of an exclusion
in part to "contribute to the stability of that sector of the financial services community
represented by life insurers." 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of Denis F.
Mullane, CEO and President, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company).
" "Simplicity .. .can be used to assess the way a statute is written and the ease with
which taxpayers may comply with the system... [I]t can also refer to the extent to which
taxation complicates everyday life for taxpayers by requiring that transactions be structured
to take consequences into account. Or simplicity can relate to the ease with which a tax
system is administered." Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 93, at 47. A difficulty would arise
in determining who is "terminally ill" for purposes of a statute. See infra text accompanying
notes 276-77.
" A wealthy person for whom estate taxation is an issue, would generally seek to avoid
any "incidents of ownership" in the life insurance which would require inclusion in the taxa-
ble estate. See I.R.C. § 2042. An inter vivos payment to the insured would frustrate this tax
avoidance plan by making the unexpended proceeds an asset of the estate under I.R.C. §
2033.
" The distribution of life insurance ownership bears a relationship to household income
such that an income tax on the average amount of insurance owned by a low income house-
hold could be negligible. See infra note 208. A single person, without dependents, might not
claim the proceeds as income. If death is imminent, income taxes payable and an insolvent
estate, even assuming the discrepancy is disclosed by a timely audit, may not be a practical
concern. "Despite the current law, many policy sellers have decided not to pay taxes on
their proceeds. Some acknowledged that is one reason they prefer not to give their full
names." Groves, supra note 20, at A 19. There currently is not a Form 1099 reporting re-
1991] Accelerated Death Benefits 295
the transaction.
The current life insurance death benefit exclusion grants to the
insured's estate or other beneficiary, an income tax basis in the
policy equal to the death proceeds, in a fashion resembling the at
death basis adjustment provided by section 1014.1" Placed in that
light, the vertical equity objections advanced above are not limited
to the treatment of accelerated death benefits, but apply to any
assets (with an inherent gain) that must be sold prior to death. In
speaking to the reasons for the elimination of section 1014 in favor
of the stillborn section 1023,98 the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation noted:
Prior law resulted in an unwarranted discrimination against those
persons who sell their property prior to death as compared with
those whose property was not sold until after death. Where a per-
son sells appreciated property before death, the resulting gain is
subject to the income tax. However, if the sale of the property
could be postponed until after the owner's death, all of the appre-
ciation occurring before death would not be subject to the income
quirement for sales of policies to companies other than the insurer. Life insurance compa-
nies must report certain policy surrenders. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 35.3405-1, F-18.
" If the theme of I.R.C. § 1014 had not been followed, that of I.R.C. § 691, applicable to
income in respect of a decedent, could have been adopted to tax the recipient on any insur-
ance proceeds in excess of the decedent's basis in the contract; that result would resemble
I.R.C. § 1015 carryover basis. A carryover basis treatment for life insurance was, however,
rejected in the carryover basis rules of I.R.C. § 1023(b)(2)(B) introduced by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). This exclusion of life insurance met with some criticism. Michael Graetz proposed
that "at a minimum, interest earned on life insurance policies should be subject to a death-
time income tax." Michael Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death - An Evaluation
of the Current Proposals, 59 Va. L. Rev. 830, 846 (1973). The § 101 exclusion has also been
compared to the exclusion for gifts and inheritances provided by I.R.C. § 102. See infra text
accompanying notes 134-37. The easiest analogy is to a testamentary transfer arranged
through a contract between the insured decedent and an insurance company for the benefit
of the insurance policy beneficiary. The analogy does not work well, however, when a third
party procures insurance on the life of the insured decedent, who plays no part in the con-
tract other than being the insured life. In that regard too, the I.R.C. § 101 exclusion is even
broader than the I.R.C. § 1014 basis adjustment which applies only to the basis of property
acquired or passing from a decedent.
08 A new I.R.C. § 1023 (the former I.R.C. § 1023 was redesignated as I.R.C. § 1024), was
enacted with the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1872-79, and
provided for a carryover basis regime, with certain exceptions, in the case of decedents dy-
ing after December 31, 1976. The effective date of the provisions was deferred to December
31, 1979 by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2884, and the
provision was repealed by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
223, § 401, 94 Stat. 299-300.
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On closer examination, an income tax exclusion for accelerated
death benefits could be viewed as underinclusive, as elevating life
insurance above other significant assets, such as homes and retire-
ment savings, which also may need to be liquidated on account of
terminal illness. An exclusion might also be viewed as a further
expansion of an overexpanded principle: the death basis adjust-
ment in section 1014 of the Code. 100
Without the special circumstances presented by payments to the
terminally ill, the current death benefit exclusion apparently oper-
ates in an uneven fashion when considered from the standpoint of
vertical equity. Life insurance ownership is a tax advantaged in-
vestment for the middle to upper-middle class, 101 of mixed attrac-
" Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 552 (1976).
100 Proponents of the I.R.C. § 101 life insurance exclusion might not appreciate compari-
son with I.R.C. § 1014, a statute which is seen by some as inconsistent with the overall
coherence of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 97; D. Allen
Grumbine, Alternative Gains Tax Treatment of Decedents' Appreciated Capital Assets, 27
Vand. L. Rev. 493 (1974); Russell Osgood, Carryover Basis Repeal and Reform of the Trans-
fer Tax System, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 297 (1981); Harry L. Gutman, A comment on the ABA
Tax Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 Tax Law. 653, 657
(1988).
101 Treasury estimates in 1983 of the distribution of life insurance demonstrated an in-
crease in the percentage of families with cash-value life insurance that correlated with in-
creases in family income.
Families with Cash-Value
Life Insurance Policies
Family Economic Income Percentage
$ 0 -9,999 13
10,000 - 14,999 25
15,000 - 19,999 33
20,000 - 29,999 41
30,000 - 49,999 53
50,000 - 99,999 68
100,000 - 199,999 78
200,000 or more 70
All Families 42
Reprinted in Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth: The Treasury De-
partment Report, Vol. 2, 262 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Treasury I]. Based on ordinary life
insurance purchases, the greatest percentage of insurance purchased was by insureds in the
$25,000-$49,999 income range, while 45% was purchased by insureds with incomes in excess
of $50,000.
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tiveness to the very wealthy,"'2 and most likely not tax driven at all
for the very poor. l" s
In considering an expansion of the current income tax exclusion
for accelerated death benefits, the inquiry should consider why the
exclusion applies only to payments received upon the death of the
insured, and if broadening the exclusion would promote the policy
objectives of Congress concerning life insurance reflected in its in-
come tax treatment. Accordingly, the policy underlying the treat-
ment of life insurance investment is considered in the next section.
Income of Insured % of Amount 1989
Under $ 5,000 Less than .5%
$ 5,000 - 7,499 Less than .5%
7,500 - 9,999 1
10,000 - 24,999 20
25,000 - 49,999 34
50,000 - 99,999 25
100,000 or more 20
Total 100
1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 12. These statistics, however, do not indi-
cate the percentage of total insurance in force owned by each income category. See infra
note 208.
102 Because of the administrative "load" charged by insurance companies municipal
bonds may provide a better tax shelter for very wealthy individuals. However, one commen-
tator has noted that the after-tax return on life insurance could exceed the modest tax-free
return on state and local obligations. See Graetz, supra note 3, at 189. Compare Mark War-
shawsky, Life Insurance Savings and the After-Tax Life Insurance Rate of Return, 52 J.
Risk & Ins. 585 (1985) (attributing a decline in life insurance as a percentage of household
savings to a widening of the after-tax rate of return differential in comparison with alterna-
tive investments, due in part to the slow adjustment of returns from long-term corporate
bond investments historically held by insurers in the face of high market interest rates).
Although historically life insurance was more attractive to taxpayers with mostly eaned
incomes, as compared to those with investment incomes, see Richard Goode, Policyholders'
Interest Income From Life Insurance Under the Income Tax, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 33, 45 (1962),
current planning literature praises insurance for the very wealthy:
With the advent of Sec. 2036(c) in Dec. 1987, as well as its successor, Chapter 14,
owners of estates as large as in the nine digits are fast becoming life insurance believ-
ers. Planning professionals... are now aggressively advocating life insurance as a key
ingredient in estate plans, including those with assets of $10 million and higher. A
contributing factor to this change of attitude ... is the product revolution in the life
insurance industry over the past 15 years and the introduction of innovative new
products.
Harold Wilshinsky, Life Insurance: A New Dimension In Estate Planning, 130 Tr. & Est.,
June 1991, at 10.
103 Based on 1989 insurance company statistics, less than .5% of ordinary life insurance
purchases were by people in the under $7,499 income range, and only 1% of total policy
amounts was purchased by individuals in the $7,500-9,999 income range. 20%, however, was
purchased by individuals in the $10,000-24,999 range. See supra note 101.
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However, a brief comment about health and long-term care insur-
ance is required.
As described in part III, many of the accelerated death benefit
policies, including the Prudential plan, offer long-term care op-
tions as well as terminal illness options."" As noted there, only
portions of the long-term care or nursing home benefits may be
eligible for an offsetting medical expense deduction in view of the
predominant custodial care, as opposed to skilled nursing care, as-
pects of long-term care confinement. 05 Proposed legislation ex-
cludes terminal illness benefits, but ignores long-term care bene-
fits.106 An income tax exclusion for long-term care benefits is
beyond the scope of this article, but is a related topic. For exam-
ple, an exclusion for life insurance terminal illness benefits and
long-term care benefits might not only be compared to a liberaliza-
tion of the life insurance death benefit exclusion, but also to a
broadening of the section 104(a)(3) exclusion for "amounts re-
ceived through accident or health insurance for personal injuries or
sickness." 0 7 An exclusion for long-term care, focusing on the pres-
ervation of life, more closely resembles the area addressed by an
exclusion for health insurance than would an exclusion for termi-
nal illness options which are directly related to the death of the
insured. An in depth analysis of the policies underlying the health
insurance exclusion, including its application to long-term care
benefits, is therefore not attempted in this article. 08 However, the
104 See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
105 See supra note 49.
104 See infra text accompanying notes 260-79 discussing legislative proposals for amend-
ments to I.R.C. § 101 to exclude proceeds of terminal illness payments.
10 See supra text accompanying notes 54-62 for a discussion of possible exclusion of ter-
minal illness benefits under I.R.C. § 104(a)(3). In hearings concerning an income tax exclu-
sion for accelerated death benefits, one insurance industry spokesman urged a broader ap-
proach, that would clarify the treatment of death benefits accelerated for conditions other
than terminal illness, and would extend health insurance treatment to long-term care insur-
ance. 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of Daniel A. Mica, Executive Vice
President, American Council of Life Insurance).
'" The I.R.C. § 104(a)(3) exclusion is applied to exclude all health insurance receipts,
irrespective of the actual amounts spent on health related expenses. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-
602, 1958-2 C.B. 109 (amounts under surgical expense indemnity were excluded although
paid irrespective of actual expenses); Rev. Rul. 69-154, 1969-1 C.B. 46 (excess indemnifica-
tion received from multiple insurance policies is excludable if from insured's own contribu-
tions). However, a deduction for medical expenses is denied to the extent reimbursed by
insurance, see I.R.C. § 213(a), and a subsequent year reimbursement of previously deducted
expenses can give rise to income, see Trees. Reg. § 1.213-1(g). This broad exclusion was
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long-term care, terminal illness overlay might also suggest a flaw in
the approach of proposed legislation. Instead of broadening the in-
come tax treatment of life insurance to accommodate accelerated
death benefits, the discussion should be directed at a broader ex-
clusion, along the lines of health insurance, for the care of the ter-
minally ill and their dependents. 09
B. The Significance of Death to the Exclusion
As will be demonstrated by the following discussion, the justifi-
cations for the longstanding exclusion of life insurance death bene-
fits are more clearly enunciated today than they were upon the
provision's adoption almost 80 years ago. It is likely that the un-
derlying policies have changed while the provision's language has
remained relatively static.
introduced in 1918, prompted by doubts of whether such receipts were "income" in a consti-
tutional sense, but has been retained on general policy reasons. See Bittker & Lokken, supra
note 3, 1 13.1.1, at 13-2. It would seem that the I.R.C. § 104(a)(3) exclusion is appropriate
because the taxpayer generally spends much, if not all, of the receipts for medical care.
There is no net gain, instead the taxpayer subsists. Long-term care is somewhat different,
however, because to the extent not spent on medical expenses, which are otherwise deducti-
ble, the proceeds may be spent on day-to-day care, a personal expense. These are the ex-
penses shared by all taxpayers to varying degrees, but for which a deduction is denied under
I.R.C. § 262. However, long-term care is more expensive than the day-to-day costs of inde-
pendent living and is linked to disability. Compare I.R.C. § 123 which excludes from in-
come, casualty insurance proceeds received for actual living expenses in excess of "normal
living expenses." This discussion arguably relies too much on concepts of what are deducti-
ble medical expenses. Such expenses are admittedly personal, it is just that Congress has
permitted their deductibility. An exclusion for long-term care benefits would simply expand
the classes of deductible personal expenditures. Properly circumscribed, the Treasury would
not be subsidizing high living, but rather the extraordinary living expenses of individuals
who cannot regularly dress, bathe, use the restroom, or eat without assistance.
'" The development by life insurance companies of accelerated death benefits, which
have long-term care aspects, has reportedly created friction with traditional health insur-
ance providers. See supra note 25. A focus on life insurance, rather than health or long-term
care insurance, is arguably misdirected:
If the purpose of the bill is to encourage individuals to purchase insurance that covers
the expenses of a terminal illness, the bill is inefficient because it requires the
purchase of life insurance in order to obtain the favorable tax treatment. A more
efficient approach would be to provide a tax subsidy for the purchase of terminal
illness insurance.
Staff Explanation, supra note 93, at 23. Legislation has been introduced in Congress which
would extend the existing health insurance benefits income tax exclusion to long-term care
insurance benefits. See H.R. 1693, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced April 10, 1991); S.
1021, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced May 9, 1991).
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1. Civil War and 1894 Tax Acts
During the Civil War era, income taxes were broadly cast and
could have arguably encompassed life insurance proceeds payable
upon the death of an insured.1 ' A series of Treasury rulings re-
solved this question in the taxpayer's favor by exempting life in-
surance proceeds and kindred receipts from taxation."'
110 The Act of August 5, 1861 levied a 3% tax on all incomes in excess of $800. The tax
base was "annual income ... derived from any kind of property, or from any profession,
trade, employment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere, or from any
source whatever .... " Special rates were provided for income from U.S. Treasury securities
and income of citizens residing abroad. 37th Cong. 1st Sess., ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309.
The Act of August '5, 1861 was repealed by the Act of July 1, 1862. See 37th Cong., 2nd
Sess., ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432, 473. The new statute defined the tax base as: "annual
gains, profits, or income of every person residing in the United States, whether derived from
any kind of property, rents, interest, dividends, salaries, or from any profession, trade, em-
ployment, or vocation carried on in the United States or elsewhere, or from any other source
whatsoever, except as hereinafter mentioned .... " See Id. § 90, 12 Stat. 473.
The Act of June 30, 1864 increased rates for the year ending December 31, 1864, retaining
similar definitions of the tax base. See 38th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 202, 281.
The Act of June 30, 1864 also imposed an inheritance tax on transfers of personal property
(see id. § 124, 13 Stat. 285-87) and real estate (see id. §§ 126-50, 13 Stat. 287-91). The Act of
July 4, 1864 imposed an additional tax for 1863 only, on incomes over $600. See J. Res. 77,
38th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 Stat. 417. The Act of March 3, 1865, 38th Cong., 2nd Seass., ch. 78, §
1, 13 Stat. 468, 479, amended the Act of June 30, 1864, retaining the same tax base, but
increasing the rate. The Act of March 2, 1867, amended the Act of June 30, 1864, imposing a
tax of 5% on income over $1,000, utilizing the same general tax base language. See 39th
Cong., 2nd Sess., ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 477-78. The Act of July 14, 1870, repealed the
June 30, 1864 Act, as amended by the March 2, 1867 Act. See Act of July 14, 1870, 41 Cong.,
2nd Seass., ch. 255, 16 Stat. 256, § 1. A new tax was imposed at 2 1/2 %, due to expire after
1871. See id. at § 6, 16 Stat. at 257. Before extinction, the definition.of the taxable base
reached its highest level of complexity with assorted exclusions and exemptions, but the
basic language of the earlier statutes was followed.
11" A letter dated April 23, 1866, signed by D.C. Whitman, Deputy Commissioner re-
sponded to the question of whether " a sum received by A. from a life insurance company,
upon a policy taken out by B. for the benefit of A., [is] taxable in any form under the excise
law?" The reply was "that by the ruling of this office, sums of money so paid by life insur-
ance companies are subject to neither legacy nor income tax." 3 Internal Revenue Rec. 140,
col. 2 & 3. Another letter dated March 30, 1866, signed by E.A. Rollins, Commissioner,
responded to the question of whether wrongful death damages paid to the guardian of minor
children are "taxed as a legacy, or distributive shares." The reply was that "the ruling of
this Office has always regarded moneys received in satisfaction of damages as neither legacy
nor income." 3 Internal Revenue Rec. 118, col. 1.
The treatment of gifts, however, was mixed. In an April 17, 1866 letter signed by D.C.
Whitman, Deputy Commissioner, two inter vivos gifts were treated as taxable income to the
recipients. This was indicated to be a change in Treasury policy, said to have occurred on
March 24, 1866. 3 Internal Revenue Rec. 140, col. 2. Another ruling dated April 17, 1866,
also classified lifetime gifts as taxable income. 3 Internal Revenue Rec. 133, col. 2. The
inquiry by an assessor in New York referred to an earlier ruling of Commissioner Lewis
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The short-lived'12 Act of 1894113 contained a broad catchall
phrase that could have been construed to include life insurance
death benefits."" The statute also expressly included as income
"money and the value of all personal property acquired by gift or
inheritance . . ... " The ambiguous treatment of life insurance
proceeds and the imposition of a tax on gifts, were accomplished in
an environment sensitive to the issue of whether a tax on certain
receipts was a direct tax in violation of the Constitution. One Civil
War income tax had already withstood this attack.116 Concerns
about the constitutionality of the income tax as applied to real es-
tate rents, for example, spawned an amendment, which was ulti-
mately rejected, to exclude "rents from real estate"." 7 At this
point, an express exclusion of life insurance proceeds, however, was
not proposed. The setting would change for future legislation with
the defeat of this statute on constitutional grounds and ratification
of the Sixteenth Amendment."8
which excluded gifts from income. The inquiry suggested that gifts be taxed as a backstop
to the inheritance tax (imposed by the Act of June 30, 1864, see supra note 110) which could
otherwise be avoided by lifetime gifts. However, in instructions dated January 1, 1868, for
the collection of taxes under the Act of March 2, 1867, gifts were excluded from income, as
well as "[a]mounts received on life insurance policies and damages recovered in actions of
tort." 7 Internal Revenue Rec. 58, 59, col. 2.
11 The law was declared unconstitutional, as an unapportioned direct tax, in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The Civil War Act of June 30, 1864 as
amended by the Act of March 3, 1865, had been upheld against constitutional objections as
a direct tax in Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (Court construed direct taxes
as primarily head and real estate taxes; the tax in question was an excise or duty not requir-
ing apportionment).
,,3 August 27, 1894, H.R. 4864, Pub. L. No. 227, 53rd Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509
[hereinafter Act of 1894].
'" The Act of 1894, id., described the tax base in relevant part as "all other gains, profits,
and income derived from any source whatever ... ." Act of 1894, § 28, 28 Stat. 553.
I" Act of 1894, supra note 113, § 28, 28 Stat. 553. Opponents of this addition unsuccess-
fully tried to exempt inheritances of spouses and lineal descendants (26 Cong. Rec. 6778-79
(1894)) and unsuccessfully tried to exempt gifts altogether (26 Cong. Rec. 6823-25 (1894)).
'" The early Supreme Court precedent focused the direct tax inquiry on head taxes and
taxes levied on real estate. See supra note 112.
117 The proponent of the amendment was Senator Hill. 26 Cong. Rec. 6826-27 (1894). The
word "devise" (which refers to transfers of real property) was also stricken from the provi-
sion for the taxation of gifts, to ensure that gifts on bequests of real property were not
taxed, because some feared this to be an impermissible direct tax. See 26 Cong. Rec. 6820-25
(1894).
"8 With the 1913 Income Tax Act some have suggested that the doubtful constitutional-
ity of taxing life insurance proceeds may have been a factor in the adoption of an express
exclusion. Of course, the focus had shifted from direct tax constitutional questions to the
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The imposition of an income tax on both gifts and inheritances
suggests no philosophical deference toward amounts received of a
testamentary nature, although congressional sentiment was bitterly
divided on this point.119 Gifts which had been taxable income in
several Civil War vintage administrative pronouncements 20 were
now expressly included. Personal injury awards and life insurance
death benefits which had been expressly excluded in similar rul-
ings2 were neither expressly included in nor excluded from in-
come in the statute. One might speculate that the reasons for the
prior administrative exclusion of life insurance death benefits were
still considered appropriate.' 22
2. 1913 Income Tax Act
The 1913 Income Tax Act2'2 contained the first statutory exclu-
sion for life insurance proceeds. 2 " The language of the congres-
sional debate suggests several bases for the exclusion.
meaning of "income" in a constitutional sense. See infra text accompanying notes 125-30.
"' Senator Hill strongly objected to taxing gifts and inheritances. 26 Cong. Rec. 6821-23
(1894). Senator Hoar first proposed an amendment which would exempt transfers from lin-
eal ancestors and descendents or between spouses. See 26 Cong. Rec. 6778 (1894). After that
amendment was rejected, he unsuccessfully proposed an amendment which would have cre-
ated a $5,000 exemption for gifts and inheritances. See 26 Cong. Rec. 6779-6780 (1894).
'20 The Civil War vintage pronouncements, with at least one exception, treated gifts as
taxable income. See supra note 111. The Civil War period saw the imposition of an inheri-
tance tax in the Act of June 30, 1864 (see supra note 110), repealed in 1870, and upheld in
Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331 (1874), while a death tax was not again seen until 1898 (Act of
June 13, 1898, §§ 29-30, 30 Stat. 448, 464-465), which was upheld in Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41 (1900). Some have analogized the current exclusion for insurance proceeds to the
exclusion of I.R.C. § 102 for gifts and inheritances. See infra text accompanying notes 134-
37.
"' See supra note 111.
I2I Regulations dated December 13, 1894, interpreting the Act of 1894, do not mention
personal injury awards or life insurance proceeds. Regulations, Dec. 13, 1894, 46 pp., Sec. 7,
No. 21, Treas. Dept. Doc. 1736, reprinted in Roger Foster & Everett Abbot, A Treatise on
the Federal Income Tax Under the Act of 1894, at 475-502 (1895). This is to be contrasted
with the instructions for the Civil War era Act of March 2, 1867, which expressly addressed
gifts, life insurance, and personal injury awards. See supra note 111.
1'3 Act of 1913, October 3, 1913, H.R. 3321, Pub. L. No. 16, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 16,
38 Stat. 114 [hereinafter Act of 19131.
1"I "Provided, [t]hat the proceeds of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the
person insured or payments made by or credited to the insured, on life insurance, endow-
ment, or annuity contracts, upon the return thereof to the insured at the maturity of the
term mentioned in the contract, or upon surrender of contract, shall, not be included as
income." Act of 1913 § II(B), 38 Stat. 167.
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Cordell Hull, the principal draftsman of the legislation, estab-
lished a sharp distinction between taxable "income" and returns of
"capital," stating that "[the statute] defines the net income of a
taxable individual or person. Income as thus defined does not em-
brace capital or principal, but only such gains ,r profits as may be
realized .... Congressman Hull then proceeded to imply that
insurance proceeds are nontaxable returns of capital, relying on
prior judicial and administrative treatments:
The rulings of the Treasury Department and the decisions of the
courts of this country with respect to similar -provisions of the old
income-tax laws, and also the English rules of construction... will
make clear the distinction between taxable profits or income on
the one hand and capital or principal on the other. The proceeds of
life insurance policies paid on the death of the person insured are
expressly exempted; likewise the return of any part of principal in-
vested in insurance during life, as distinguished from the earnings
upon same, would not be taxable."2 6
Hull's reference to clear "rulings of the Treasury Department"
must have been to those of the Civil War income tax period, which,
in their cryptic fashion, did not specifically refer to returns of capi-
tal or any other principle as a basis of decision.1 27 Seven years
later, the United States Supreme Court placed a constitutional
gloss on concepts of income in its landmark decision rendered in
Eisner v. Macomber, speaking of "gains" from capital.128 Later, the
Court stopped short of clarifying the issue by broaching, but re-
serving judgment on, the constitutionality of a tax on life insurance
death benefits. 1 9 Several commentators have suggested that the
111 50 Cong. Rec. 506 (1913) (statement of Congressman Hull).
126 Id.
"' See supra note 111.
118 252 U.S. 189 (1920). In its famous statement, the Court reaffirmed a definition of
income expressed in two earlier cases involving the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 "as the
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined." Id. at 207.
125 See United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924). The Court
noted that life insurance proceeds "are not usually classed as income," but did not decide
whether "Congress could call the proceeds of such indemnity, income, and validly tax it as
such." Id. at 195. The Court, in support of its view that insurance proceeds are not in the
nature of income reasoned that death benefits have no periodicity. Id. The Court then made
a replacement of capital argument, stating that "[ilt is a substitution of money value for
something permanently lost either in a house, a ship, or a life." Id. One commentator has
suggested that exclusions for personal injuries (see I.R.C. § 104) and disability proceeds (see
I.R.C. § 105) could reflect notions of a nontaxable replacement of impaired human capital.
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1913 statutory exclusion arose from doubts about the consitution-
ality of a tax on life insurance death benefits.'3 0
Providing incentives for the protection of survivors, the prevail-
ing justification today, was not expressly raised, but it was perhaps
almost too obvious to mention in view of the strong survivor pro-
tection theme that had pervaded the life insurance sales cam-
paigns. One writer, however, has asserted that the investment as-
pects of life insurance had become the primary selling point, with
survivor protection assuming second place, by the end of the 19th
Century.131 Congressman Hull responded to a question framed as
"whether a widow will be required to pay an income tax on the
money secured as the result of her husband's death, or whether
See Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1357
(1984). However, one cannot find any analogy by Professor Stephan to the life insurance
death benefit exclusion. That is not surprising because unlike personal injury awards or
disability payments which bear some relationship to an actual loss, the death benefit exclu-
sion is limited only by the amount of insurance purchased. The constitutional limitations on
taxable income have generated a number of scholarly discussions. See, e.g., Charles L. B.
Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 151 (1964); Philip Mul-
lock, The Constitutional Problem of Taxing Gifts as Income, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 247 (1968);
Phillip Mullock, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income - A Comment, 26 Ohio St. L.J. 43
(1965).
110 "This exclusion, in force since 1913, may have originally reflected doubts about the
constitutional validity of taxing the proceeds of life insurance, but the exclusion is now
based on a legislative policy judgment rather than on a perception of constitutional compul-
sion." Bittker & Lokken, supra note 3, 12.1.2, at 12-5. "Since life insurance proceeds paya-
ble on death have been excluded from gross income beginning with the 1913 Act, except in
the case of certain transfers for value, it may be assumed that such proceeds were not con-
sidered to be within the constitutional concept of gross income." Leslie M. Rapp, Some
Recent Developments in the Concept of Taxable Income, 11 Tax L. Rev. 329, 340 (1956).
"The rationale behind the exclusion ... is unclear. However, it may be that the exclusion
rests upon the same uncertainty that supports the exclusion of gifts and bequests, that is,
that the recipient does not have 'income' within the meaning of the statute, the sixteenth
amendment, or the Constitution." Thomas J. Gallagher, Jr., A Primer on Section 101 - Fed-
eral Income Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds, 49 Temp. L.Q. 831 n.2 (1976).
111 Life insurance advertising after the 1870's reflected the new emphasis on investment
by adopting an unemotional rational approach to its product. Traditional sales ap-
peals were criticized: "What has thus far been urged of life insurance is an argument
that it saves our homes from the claims of creditors, leaves a support for wives and
children. But all these plans place enjoyment in the distance." There were better
reasons to buy a policy .... Company publications briefly skimmed over the protec-
tive functions of a policy to concentrate on policyholder moneymaking .... By the
end of the Century, interest in the investment features of life insurance overrode all
other considerations.
Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer, Morals and Markets - The Development of Life Insurance in
the United States 106-07 (1979).
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that money will be considered as property?"' 32 He answered sim-
ply that "[iut never was contemplated to tax the proceeds of life
insurance policies."
s
Congressman Hull later observed that particularly where:
gifts, bequests, and devises are not made income, the return of in-
surance investments is held not to be taxable income. The proceeds
of life insurance policies paid to some third person on the death of
the insured is not considered taxable, and still less would any re-
turn of the investment to the person during lifetime be considered
taxable income."'
However, the exclusion of both gifts and life insurance proceeds
had not been the United States experience during the Civil War
years or in the 1894 legislation. " Although gifts and inheritances
were excluded from income in the Act of 1913, the stated reason
was the proposal of a separate inheritance tax at highly graduated
rates.13 6 The comparison made by Congressman Hull of life insur-
ance proceeds received upon death to testamentary transfers nev-
ertheless remains a persuasive argument in support of the exclu-
sion's consistency with the income tax treatment of property
received on account of an individual's death.
37
Congressman Hull offered an amendment, which was ultimately
adopted, expressly addressing the treatment of lifetime transac-
tions by the insured.3 8s He said that he did so because "it was de-
1 The question was posed by Congressman Madden. 50 Cong. Rec. 508 (1913).
188 Id.
18 50 Cong. Rec. 1239 (1913).
188 See supra note 111 and supra text accompanying notes 112-22.
186 50 Cong. Rec. 506 (1913) (statement of Congressman Hull). In 1926, with a temporary
hiatus in the gift tax regime, Senator Norris proposed the logical extension of Congressman
Hull's earlier justification, that in the absence of a gift tax, gifts and bequests be included in
taxable income. The provision was rejected after much debate. See 67 Cong. Rec. 3831-36,
3843-51 (1926).
'3 "Economically, life insurance 'proceeds are nothing more than a bequest procured
through the medium of an insurance company. Section 101(a) is the same as section 102."
Joseph M. Dodge, The Logic of Tax 105 (1989). "Additionally, the exclusion is consistent
with § 102, which excludes bequests from gross income, and with § 1014, which provides a
step-up in basis for appreciated property acquired from a decedent." Sanford M. Guerin &
Philip F. Postlewaite, Problems and Materials in Federal Income Taxation 139 (2d ed.
1988).
18 The exemption originally was stated as: "Provided, that the proceeds of life insurance
policies paid upon the death of the person insured, shall not be included as income." The
amendment made on the floor of the House added the following phrase after "insured": "or
payments made by or credited to the insured, or life insurance, endowment, or annuity con-
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sired by a number of gentlemen .. . ."1"9 It is unclear who the
gentlemen were. The debate indicated that a number of Hull's col-
leagues in the House were quite confused about the legislation, " '
but this is not to say that lobbyists were not active in the legisla-
tive process. Life insurance was already a major enterprise,"" and
Congressman Hull noted in debate that life insurance companies
had been encouraging complaints by their stockholders about the
legislation. " 2 One commentator has made a passing observation
that an insurance company lobbying effort was behind the enact-
ment of the death benefit exclusion. ' " Public support to this day
for a life insurance tax exemption might be found in invested self-
interest; according to 1989 insurance company statistics, 81% of
American households owned some form of life insurance.
14 4
The death benefit exclusion was conceded by Hull, so the taxa-
tion of insurance maturing or surrendered during the insured's life-
time occupied the debate. Some of the congressmen proposed, un-
successfully, that all insurance proceeds be excluded from
income. 46 The debate produced an early structural distinction be-
tracts, upon the return thereof to the insured at the maturity of the term mentioned in the
contract." See Jacob Stewart Seidman, Seidman's Legislative History of Federal Income
Tax Laws (1938-1861), at 988 (1938).
18. 50 Cong. Rec. 1239 (1913).
10 See discussion at 50 Cong. Rec. 1239, 1257-59 (1913).
' Life insurance in force in 1910 and 1915, was $14,908,000,000, and $21,029,000,000,
respectively. 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 16.
Congressman Hull stated:
Now, some of the companies have sent out alarming circulars to the stockholders,
which are calculated to impress upon them that they are about to be outraged or in
some other respect seriously injured by some of the provisions to be found somewhere
in the pending measure. As a matter of fact, there is no tax, as I said, upon the
proceeds of life insurance policies paid at the death of another. There is no tax im-
posed upon any individual with respect to the return of any sum or amount invested
in insurance as a business proposition during his life.
50 Cong. Rec. 513 (1913).
14 See John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax 78
(1985).
.4. 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 6.
14 Congressman Hinebaugh proposed an exclusion, stating "that the proceeds of life in-
surance policies shall not be included as incomes." 50 Cong. Rec. 1239 (1913). Congressman
Stafford later pressed the point:
For instance, a man has a 20-year-payment policy, or a 20-year endowment, or any
other period, and wishes to have it cancelled before the term. No provision has been
made to exempt the amount that is paid to the assured, yet we have the principle as
carried in the bill exempting the amount paid to the beneficiary on his death. Carry-
ing out the logic of the bill, I think there is no reason why the amount that may be
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tween payments upon death and those made during the insured's
life. An unlimited exclusion was extended to death benefits while
payments to the insured during his or her lifetime were essentially
treated as returns of capital to the extent of premiums paid, with
income realized only for any excess proceeds. "1 6 The other princi-
pal tax benefit of life insurance, the tax free inside buildup of
value, 4" was also established in the 1913 legislation. In the debate,
an analogy in support of tax free inside buildup was made to a
home which increases in value over the years, but the appreciation
is not taxed until sale.'4" Recent arguments in favor of retaining
the treatment of inside buildup have also rallied behind the home
analogy." 9 Elimination of this tax benefit has been urged by many
paid upon cancellation before the time expires should be considered as the income of
the assured or to whom it may be paid.
50 Cong. Rec. 1257 (1913).
148 The language of the act survived attempts by Congressmen Stafford, Lenroot, and
Martin to change the language to exclude even receipts from lifetime surrenders. See 50
Cong. Rec. 1258-60 (1913). Congressman Hull was solidly aligned with the principle of tax-
ing lifetime receipts in excess of an investment in the contract. It is unclear whether the
other congressmen were trying to clearly express that principle, or a broader one of total
exclusion. It is frequently observed that treating all premiums previously paid as a return of
capital overstates a policyowner's investment in the contract because a portion of the pre-
mium is paid for current death protection, term insurance, which expires and does not re-
semble a capital investment.
1'7 "The investment component of a life insurance premium is the portion of the pre-
mium not used to pay the pure insurance costs.... This amount, which is added to the cash
value of the policy, may be considered comparable to an interest-bearing savings deposit.
The cash value of the life insurance is credited with interest. This amount of interest is
called the inside buildup, and under present law it is not taxed as current income of the
policyholder." Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Tax Reform Proposals: Taxation of In-
surance Products and Companies 5 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter 1985 Insurance
Proposals].
18 Congressman Underwood stated:
Now, in the case of a life insurance policy, it is the same as an investment in a house.
The [insurance company], instead of the insured person, will be taxed on its net prof-
its during the period the insurance runs, and at the termination of the period the
insured will not pay a tax on his capital, but will pay a tax on the return of his
profits, just as the man would pay a tax by the increased value of his storehouse in
the case I cited.
50 Cong. Rec. 1259 (1913).
1,9 [S]ome may argue that analogizing life insurance to certificates of deposit or mutual
funds fails to recognize the character and importance of permanent life insurance...
. [Ilt is argued that the purchase of whole life insurance is similar to the purchase of a
home or other capital asset. The appreciation in value of the home or other asset is
not taxed until the asset is sold.
1988 Single Premium Pamphlet, supra note 11, at 26.
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commentators 5 ' and has been proposed in several recent tax re-
form measures.'51
3. Revenue Act of 1918
The Revenue Act of 1918152 narrowed the death benefit exclu-
sion to exempt only payments to individual beneficiaries or the es-
tate of the insured. 53 Congress was seeking to close an alleged
loophole utilizing corporate-owned life insurance.154 In a compan-
ion provision, deductions for corporate key employee life insurance
were prohibited.
15 5
4. Revenue Act of 1921
In the Revenue Act of 1921,1'4 Congress shifted course and rein-
stated the exemption for corporations and partnerships as an
owner or beneficiary of life insurance. 1 7 In view of the continuing
prohibition on the deductibility of key employee insurance premi-
ums, Congress apparently agreed with proponents of the amend-
ment that "such insurance constitutes a reasonable and proper
150 "There is nothing in the institution of life insurance which displaces the condemnation
of tax exempt interest that [Equity and Free Market Compatibility] always evoke." Joseph
T. Sneed, The Configurations of Gross Income 192 (1967). "The income on life insurance
savings could be taxed by including in adjusted gross income the portion of the annual
increases in the cash surrender value of life insurance policies that reflects interest earned
on past savings." Joseph A. Pechman, Tax Reform, The Rich and The Poor 67 (2d ed.
1989). See also, William Vickrey, Insurance Under the Federal Income Tax, 52 Yale L.J.
554, 562-63 (1943); Goode, supra note 102, (noting, however, serious practical difficulties in
taxing the interest element).
161 Treasury I, supra note 101, at 258-61; The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress
for Fairness, Growth & Simplicity 253-56 (May 1985) [hereinafter Treasury II]. The inside
buildup of value is already a component of "adjusted current earnings" for the purposes of
the corporate alternative minimum tax. See I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(B)(ii).
166 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 [hereinafter Revenue Act of 19181.
16 The exclusion was amended to exclude "The proceeds of life insurance policies paid
upon the death of the insured to individual beneficiaries or to the estate of the insured ....
Revenue Act of 1918 § 213(b)(1), 40 Stat. 1065.
Congressman Hull noted:
We found a number of large corporations, at the instance of big stockholders, had
dropped into the habit of taking out policies for such individuals and paying the
premiums in a way which would enable the individual to escape his proper income-
tax liability and probably later on to escape his estate tax liability.
56 Cong. Rec. 10,371 (1918).
16 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 215(d), 40 Stat. 1069.
16 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 [hereinafter Revenue Act of 19211.
67 Revenue Act of 1921 § 213(b)(1), 42 Stat. 238.
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provision against actual losses which business enterprises sustain
in the death of responsible officers and employees."' 8 The general
rule that precludes a deduction for life insurance premiums also
provides some justification for the exclusion of the death bene-
fits'"9 but such symmetry is not faithfully demonstrated in other
areas of the tax law. 160 The exemption might also be viewed as
'" The formal legislative history does not include this language. See H.R. Rep. No. 350,
67th Cong. 1st Sess. (1921). The language was contained in "Notes on the Revenue Act of
1918" submitted on Nov. 3, 1919 by the Secretary of Treasury, without recommendation, to
the Ways and Means Committee, reprinted in Seidman, supra note 138, at 818. Although
life insurance proceeds are excluded from corporate taxable income, the amount of proceeds
in excess of aggregate premiums paid by the corporation is included in earnings and profits.
See Rev. Rul. 54-230, 1954-1 C.B. 114. Aside from the effect on characterization of corporate
distributions, the inclusion in earnings and profits makes such proceeds a part of "adjusted
current earnings" under the corporate alternative minimum tax. See I.R.C. §
56(g)(4)(B)(i)(I).
'OB See, e.g., I.R.C. § 262 (denying a deduction for "personal, living, or family expenses");
I.R.C. § 264(a)(1) (denying a deduction for premiums of life insurance policies owned by a
business); Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(1) ("Premiums paid for life insurance by the insured are
not deductible."). But see I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(B)(ii) (permitting a deduction for the insurance
protection portion of premium payments in computing "adjusted current earnings" for pur-
poses of the corporate alternative minimum tax).
Professors Klein, Bankman, Bittker, and Stone state:
One alternative would be to treat premiums as nondeductible investment costs and at
death tax any gain and allow a deduction for any loss. People who died before their
life expectancy would tend to have gains, taxable at a time when the payment of the
tax might seem unduly burdensome (though there would be cash in hand). Others
would wind up with losses, deductible at a time when, because income is low, they
might not do much good. In addition to these negative considerations there is the
vexing question of whether to allow a deduction before death if insurance coverage is
permanently (for how long?) terminated. The second alternative would be to allow a
current deduction of all premium payments and treat all proceeds as income. Again,
the problem would be a heavy tax burden at a difficult time, and this problem would
be even more serious than with the first alternative because all the premiums would
have been deducted so the entire amount of the proceeds would be taxable ....
William A. Klein et al., Federal Income Taxation 174 (8th ed. 1990). "Benefits are properly
exempt, without allowing deduction of premiums when paid." Richard S. Musgrave & Peggy
B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 342 (4th ed. 1984).
Another commentator has, however, distinguished between insurance payments to the in-
sured and receipts by the beneficiaries upon the death of the insured.
The rule denying any deduction for the expense portion of the premiums is arguably
wrong, since the aim of the premiums is to make a profit .... [T]he fact that premi-
ums are nondeductible ... to other taxpayers would be deemed irrelevant .... The
"internal" logic of tax only requires that the same dollars not be taxed twice to the
same taxpayer .... Hence, § 101(a) .. .would be a prime candidate for repeal.
Dodge, supra note 137, at 105.
'" For instance, wagering losses are deductible .only to the extent of wagering gains unless
the gambler is in the trade or business of wagering. See I.R.C. § 165(d) and Commissioner v.
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rough justice which in the aggregate operates to offset the mortal-
ity gains of some persons against the mortality losses of others. 16'
5. Revenue Act of 1926
In the Revenue Act of 1926162 the modern language of the exclu-
sion "by reason of the death of the insured"'63 was substituted for
"upon the death of the insured." The new language was considered
necessary to ensure that installment payments of death benefits
would be accorded tax exempt treatment along with lump sum set-
tlements payable upon death."" The basic exclusion for benefits
paid by reason of the death of the insured was crystallized with the
1926 legislation.
6. Recent Developments
In recent years Congress has examined the taxation of life insur-
ance products with increasing frequency. Its primary focus has
been an attempt to preserve favorable income tax treatment for
life insurance contracts with a long-term perspective, while re-
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987) (professional gambler found to be in the trade or business of
wagering). As another example, while gains from the sales of non-business assets are in-
cluded in income, losses are denied upon the sale of assets not used in a trade or business or
in a transaction entered into for profit. See I.R.C. § 165(c).
101 Professors Klein, Bankman, Bittker, and Stone write:
In individual cases, where death occurs, large gains will escape taxation. In the aggre-
gate, however, the amounts paid out will equal the amounts paid in .... [Slince the
premiums are not deductible, the tax effect in the aggregate is roughly accurate: In
the aggregate, the amount received is a recovery of capital and no gain escapes taxa-
tion (assuming that we disregard the value of the piece of mind acquired by the
purchase of the policies).
Klein et al., supra note 159, at 173. The quoted passage focuses only on the mortality gains
or losses of pure insurance protection best exemplified by term insurance. The authors later
discuss the broader aspects of the death benefit exclusion, which can exclude from income
the proceeds derived from the inside buildup of value in life insurance, such as whole life
policies, with an investment feature. See id. at 175-76. This latter facet of the exclusion
cannot be supported on the basis of an aggregate netting of gains and losses.
162 Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9 [hereinafter Revenue Act of 1926].
10 Revenue Act of 1926 § 213(b)(1), 44 Stat. at 24.
10 "The House bill, in order to prevent any interpretation which would deny the exemp-
tion in the case of installment payments, amended this provision so that proceeds 'paid by
reason of the death' of the insured would be exempt." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 33 (1926). If we are to exalt literalism, recognize that any life insurance death




stricting uses driven principally by income tax *benefits.185 Con-
gress has shown a tendency to place stringent restrictions on in-
vestments such as tax deferred annuities and retirement savings
plans that do not have a life insurance component, while striving
to preserve income tax benefits for those considered sufficiently
"traditional." An issue related to the taxation of accelerated death
benefits is whether this congressional firewall construction is desir-
able and could be avoided by more closely aligning the income tax
treatment of life insurance with that of investments that serve sim-
ilar purposes.'
a. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
In the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act ("TEFRA"),1
6 7
Congress attempted to distinguish between retirement and tax
shelter uses of tax deferred annuities: "The Committee believes
that the use of deferred annuity contracts to meet long-term in-
vestment goals, such as income security, is still a worthy ideal.
However, the Committee believes that their use for short-term in-
vestment and income tax deferral should be discouraged." 1 8
Tax deferred annuities were often sold by life insurance compa-
nies. At maturity, the annuity payments were in part a nontaxable
return of capital and in part taxable income.1' 9 However, the in-
come tax treatment of interest and other returns during the ac-
cumulation phase and loans against the contract, strongly resem-
bled life insurance, as described by the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation:
18 This is not a recent lament. Randolph Paul wrote in 1940:
It may be noted in final conclusion that tax pressures are twisting out of shape the
underlying social function of life insurance. The old-fashioned function of life insur-
ance was to provide security for dependents .... It may still do so, but emphases
have changed, and today life insurance and annuities are sold by the tax saving ap-
peal .... Something is radically wrong in such a picture. The true function of life
insurance can never have been to accomplish an inequitable distribution of the tax
burden.
Randolph E. Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 418-19 (3rd ed. 1940).
'" Alternatives for the overall taxation of life insurance receipts are briefly considered at
infra text accompanying notes 238-59.
1"' Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
1S S. Rep. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 350, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1085.
See supra note 14 for a brief description of annuity benefit income taxation.
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The taxation of interest or other current earnings on a policy-
holder's investment in an annuity contract generally is deferred
until annuity payments are received or amounts characterized as
income are withdrawn .... [A]mounts paid out under a contract
before the annuity payments began, such as payments upon partial
surrender of a contract, were first treated as a return of the policy-
holder's capital and were taxable (as ordinary income) only after
all of the policyholder's investment in the contract had been
recovered. 170
The TEFRA amendments retained the deferral of tax on invest-
ment accumulations, but withdrawals or other dispositions of the
annuity contract were subject to new restrictions. To the extent
that the cash value of the contract exceeded the investment in the
contract, any partial surrenders or cash withdrawals prior to the
annuity starting date were treated as income.17 ' Borrowing against,
or the pledging of, an annuity contract was treated as a with-
drawal.17 2 The legislation also imposed a 5% penalty on the with-
drawal of amounts from the annuity prior to age 59 1/2 unless ac-
complished in equal installments over a 60 month period. 173
On the life insurance front, Congress adopted measures limiting
the tax deferral benefits of so-called "flexible premium life insur-
ance contracts.' ' 7 4 The concern was similar to that expressed for
170 1982 Blue Book, supra note 51, at 360.
171 See I.R.C. § 72(e)(2)(B).
17' See I.R.C. § 72(e)(4).
1I" The provision for a 60 month payout was found in § 265(b)(1) of TEFRA, codified at
I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(D). The TEFRA statute imposed the penalty only on amounts allocable to
investments made during the 10-year period ending on the date of the withdrawal, deter-
mined on a first-in, first-out basis. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §
222(a), 98 Stat. 494, 774, amended the provision to eliminate the 10-year provision, applying
the penalty to any amount distributed. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
1123(b)(2), 100 Stat. 2085, 2474, amended the provision to read as it does today, requiring
payments over the life of the taxpayer or the joint lives of the taxpayer and a beneficiary.
See I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(D). The 5% penalty on premature distributions was also increased to
10% by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1123(b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2474.
"' The Code defines a flexible premium life insurance contract as a "life insurance con-
tract ... which provides for the payment of one or more premiums which are not fixed by
the insurer as to both timing and amount." I.R.C. § 101(f)(3)(A). In the life insurance indus-
try a flexible premium policy is defined as "[a] life insurance policy ... under which the
policyholder ... may vary the amounts or timing of premium payments." 1990 Life Insur-
ance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 135. A common form of this insurance is "universal life
insurance" defined as a policy "under which the policyholder may change the death benefit
from time to time ... and vary the amount or timing of premium payments. Premiums (less
expense charges) are credited to a policy account from which mortality charges are deducted
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deferred annuities:
The committee believes that flexible premium life insurance con-
tracts should have the same tax treatment as traditional level-pre-
mium whole life insurance contracts if they are substantially com-
parable to traditional contracts. However, the committee is
concerned by the fact that some flexible premium contracts can be
overly investment oriented by allowing large cash value build-ups
without requiring a continued reasonable amount of pure insurance
protection.""
TEFRA provided temporary statutory guidelines for use in de-
termining whether flexible premium life insurance contracts quali-
fied as "life insurance" for purposes of the death benefit exclu-
sion. 170 The purpose of the limitation was primarily to limit the
death benefit exclusion to only traditional death protection. If the
guidelines were violated, the contract was separated into term in-
surance, for which the death benefit exclusion was retained, and
into an annuity or deposit fund.
177
b. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ("DEFRA")Y7" refined the
TEFRA amendments, implementing a definition of life insurance
contracts, applicable to all forms of insurance.179 If a life insurance
and to which interest is credited at rates which may change from time to time." Id. at 139.
Very simply stated, universal life provided a tax deferred savings account, the earnings of
which could be used to buy pure mortality protection, with the balance remaining invested.
The balance could be invested at a fixed or variable rate of interest (universal life) or in
diverse investments resembling a mutual fund (variable life) or a choice of investments (uni-
versal variable life). A brief description of term insurance, single premium life insurance,
universal life insurance, variable life insurance, and universal variable life insurance can be
found at 1988 Single Premium Pamphlet, supra note 11, at 2-4.
178 S. Rep. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 352, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 1087.
170 See I.R.C. § 101(f). TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 266(c)(2), (3), 96 Stat. 324, 550,
provided special transitional rules for contracts entered into before January 1, 1983. The
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 221(b)(2), 98 Stat. 494, 772, further
limited current I.R.C. § 101(f) to contracts issued before January 1, 1985.
"7" This result is not obvious from an examination of the statute, but is confirmed by the
opening paragraph of the Blue Book explanation, which should be consulted for explanation
and examples of the provision. See 1982 Blue Book, supra note 51, at 367-76. For another
explanation with examples see 1988 Single Premium Pamphlet, supra note 11, at 6-10.
178 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
" See I.R.C. § 7702. See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 3, 12.5 for a succinct explana-
tion of these guidelines. For an in-depth discussion see Andrew D. Pike, Reflections on the
Meaning of Life: An Analysis of Section 7702 and the Taxation of Cash Value Life Insur-
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contract does not meet the definition, the income on the contract
for any taxable year will be treated as ordinary income received or
accrued by the policyholder. 180 However, even if a life insurance
contract does not meet the definition, the excess of the death ben-
efit over the net surrender value of the contract is still deemed to
be paid under a life insurance contract for purposes of section 101
of the Code.'
c. Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986182 produced only minor adjust-
ments to the scheme of life insurance taxation. The $1,000 annual
surviving spouse benefit was repealed. 8 3 The legislation also
placed additional restrictions on policy loans' and deferred annu-
ities owned by other than natural persons.8 5
ance, 43 Tax. L. Rev. 491 (1988).
I" I.R.C. § 7702(g)(1)(A). For this purpose, income on the contract is the amount by
which the sum of the increase in the net surrender value of the contract during the taxable
year and the cost of life insurance protection provided during the taxable year exceeds the
amount of premiums paid less any policyholder dividends paid. I.R.C. § 7702(g)(1)(B).
101 I.R.C. § 7702(g)(2). Generally there should still be no inclusion in income for any por-
tion of the death benefit. The death benefit exclusion applies to the amount of proceeds in
excess of the net surrender value. The net surrender value is the cash surrender value of the
policy, determined with regard to surrender charges. I.R.C. § 7702(f)(2)(B). The aggregate
premiums paid will usually exceed the cash surrender value, because the portion of the pre-
miums paid for current death protection do not add to cash value. The policyowner should
therefore have an adjusted basis in the contract at least equal to the net surrender value so
that a receipt of the portion of the death benefit identified as such should be treated as a
nontaxable return of capital. See also I.R.C. § 7702(g)(3) (stating that a life insurance con-
tract which is a life insurance contract under "the applicable law" but does not meet the
definition of I.R.C. § 7702(a), is otherwise still treated as an insurance contract for purposes
of Title 26).
18" Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
18I Section 101(d) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, before its repeal by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514, § 1001, 100 Stat. at 2387, permitted a surviving spouse to
exclude up to $1,000 annually of installment life insurance payments received in excess of
the death benefit. The excess was, in effect, an interest equivalent on the installment
payout.
1" The deductibility of interest on policy loans in connection with a policy on the life of
an officer, employee, or other person financially interested in a business was limited if the
aggregate debt exceeds $50,000 per insured. I.R.C. § 264(a)(4).
188 Congress was concerned that employers would avoid the nondiscrimination rules
under qualified retirement plans through the purchase of deferred annuities by the employ-
ers which would be used to fund nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. S. Rep.
No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 566-67 reprinted in, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1075, 4488-89. The
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d. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
In the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988
("TAMRA")' 86 Congress revisited investment oriented life insur-
ance, focusing on single premium life contracts which were not ef-
fectively limited by the DEFRA insurance definitions. The single
premium life contracts enjoyed the usual tax benefits of life insur-
ance: tax deferred inside buildup of value; total exclusion from in-
come if benefits are received upon death; and flexibility in with-
drawing cash as a nontaxable loan or withdrawal not in excess of
the investment in the contract. However, some single premium life
insurance products were offered on terms which made them practi-
cally indistinguishable from a simple, lump sum tax deferred de-
posit arrangement.
8 7
The "modified endowment contract"'"" was identified as the new
villain. Essentially, the restrictive distribution and loan provisions
applied to annuities by TEFRA were now extended to the modi-
fied endowment contract. Amounts received under the contract
were first considered income, and then a recovery of basis.' With
two exceptions for. funeral expenses and small contracts, loans
under or against modified endowment contracts were generally
treated as distributions. e0 The legislation also extended the 10%
penalty that had been previously imposed on early distributions
from annuities,' 9 ' to most distributions from modified endowment
contracts received prior to age 59 1/2 .192
e. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
Congress revisited the modified endowment contract in the Om-
result was present I.R.C. § 72(u) which in general treats as ordinary income when earned,
the accumulation in value of a deferred annuity owned by a person who is not a natural
person.
180 Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
18' For several examples of advertising emphasizing the tax shelter advantages of the sin-
gle premium life insurance policy see 1988 Single Premium Pamphlet, supra note 11, at 23-
24.
18 See I.R.C. § 7702A.
See I.R.C. §§ 72(e)(2)(B), 72(e)(10).
'.o See I.R.C. §§ 72(e)(4)(A), 72(e)(10).
"o See supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
lo I.R.C. § 72(v)(2)(A).
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nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,"'3 with technical changes
aimed at sweeping an outbreak of decreasing death benefit single
premium contracts into the modified endowment contract
limitations.194
f. Summary and Overview
Congress has exhibited some pronounced patterns of behavior in
recent years in its dealings with the taxation of life insurance and
related products such as annuities. The goal of making annuities
and modified enowment contracts more long-term in nature, and
less tax driven, prompted the amendments to the treatment of
such investments. Congress drew from retirement plan taxation
concepts in limiting loans and penalizing early withdrawals. How-
ever, Congress remained committed to the search for a traditional
insurance paradigm. In trying to define this in the TEFRA amend-
ments, the penalty was a partial denial of the death benefit exclu-
sion. If this prize were removed from contention for all insurance
products, a degree of simplification and integration with the re-
lated annuity investments would be achieved. In DEFRA, Congress
again tried to define traditional insurance, and the penalty to
products failing to comply was current income recognition, a fate
not even visited on the annuity products. Still, the definitional
amendments to DEFRA were considered necessary to curb per-
ceived abuses of life insurance because other established restric-
tions which could promote a long-term view, such as loan limita-
tions and withdrawal penalties, were not considered appropriate
for the "traditional insurance" tax shelter. It is likely that addi-
tional remedial legislation will be required so long as Congress re-
mains committed to a "traditional insurance" model, with a death
benefit exclusion, tax deferred inside buildup, and facile loan and
withdrawal provisions. The protected incentives, including the
death benefit exclusion, should be evaluated with regard to their
effectiveness of furthering the societal goals in encouraging life in-
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101o239, § 7647, 103 Stat.
2106 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
'" The single premium contracts were structured to comply with the "7-pay test" of
I.R.C. § 7702A(a)(1)(B). However, the death benefit was decreased in the eighth year, reduc-
ing the mortality charge and creating a cash value that could be tapped through policy
loans. The 1989 amendments take such a reduction into account at the outset and apply the
7-pay test to the reduced benefit. See I.R.C. § 7702A(c)(6).
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surance protection.
C. Assessing the Success of the Regime
1. The Goal of the Incentives
In 1988 hearings, a representative of the Treasury spoke of the
policy supporting tax incentives for life insurance:
The Treasury Department has in the past recognized and contin-
ues to recognize the social benefits of encouraging insurance pro-
tection. In the event of the death of a working spouse, life insur-
ance proceeds can be a source of support for the surviving spouse
and minor children, and can enable the survivors to maintain their
standard of living. In certain cases, life insurance may enable the
surviving spouse and minor children to avoid becoming dependent
on governmental assistance, thereby relieving the government of an
obligation it otherwise would have to assume.
195
In a report prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation for use in 1985 hearings on life insurance, survivor pro-
tection policy was again at the forefront: "The traditional purpose
of life insurance has been to protect the policyholder's benefi-
ciaries (usually the policyholder's family) against a loss of income
and costs arising from the death of the person whose life was
insured."'- 9
2. Measuring Success
If one accepts the premise that the purchase of life insurance
should be subsidized by the Treasury to encourage survivor protec-
tion in the event of the death of a provider, then the tax incentives
should be judged by their success in encouraging such protection.
Three criteria in judging the effectiveness of the tax incentives are:
(1) Do the incentives promote the acquisition of insurance protec-
tion? (2) Do the incentives promote continuity of insurance protec-
tion? and (3) Do the subsidies flow to the parties that need protec-
199 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 118 (statement of Dennis E. Ross, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury).
'" 1985 Insurance Proposals, supra note 147, at 2. See also Bertram Harnett, Taxation of
Life Insurance 147 (1957); Solomon S. Huebner, Life Insurance 13 (1950). Even Benjamin
Franklin was an advocate, reportedly stating that "[a] policy of life insurance is the oldest
and safest mode of making certain provision for one's family." Id.
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tion most, and is the acquired insurance effective in keeping those
individuals from "becoming dependent on governmental
assistance"?
a. Promoting Acquisition
An empirical study isolating the effect of specific income tax in-
centives on the decision to purchase life insurance would aid as-
sessment of the effectiveness of such incentives to fulfill the policy
objectives of Congress. 197 Such an analysis would need to judge the
importance of each major tax incentive, tax deferred buildup, the
death benefit exclusion and flexible loan provisions.
The tax deferred buildup incentive, even if a significant factor in
the purchase decision, is highly skewed toward higher income
households. 198 The importance of the incentive to families of mod-
"9 The Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association could not provide this infor-
mation to the author and referred him to the American Council of Life Insurance. The
American Council of Life Insurance was very cooperative in providing other information but
did not produce specific information of this nature. Existing studies focus on a number of
other factors. See, e.g., John M. Fitzgerald, The Taste for Bequests and Well-Being of Wid-
ows: A Model of Life Insurance Demand by Married Couples, 71 Rev. of Econ. & Stat. 206
(1989) (wealth of widow generally correlated to her age at time of husband's death); Ritchie
A. Campbell, The Demand for Life Insurance: An Application of the Economics of Uncer-
tainty, 35 J. Fin. 1155 (1980) (factors include current wealth, age, number of dependents,
and sense of moral responsibility, education, and other traits); John Fitzgerald, The Effects
of Social Security on Life Insurance Demand by Married Couples, 54 J. Risk & Ins. 86
(1987) (husband's future earnings increase demand for insurance on his life, Social Security
survivor benefits decrease this demand, and Social Security retirement benefits increase the
demand).
"' The Treasury produced estimates of the average inside buildup, based on 1983 statis-
tics, for households with insurance.
Family Economic Income Average Annual Inside Buildup
0 -9,999 $ 85
10,000 --14,999 110
15,000 - 19,999 135
20,000 - 29,999 190
30,000 - 49,999 310
50,000 - 99,999 520
100,000 - 199,999 1,240
200,000 or more 3,050
All Families 355
Reprinted in Treasury I, supra note 101, at 262.
Anecdotal evidence that was presented in connection with the 1988 single premium life
insurance debate indicated that for segments of the population, tax incentives for life insur-
ance were important factors in the acquisition decision. The single premium policies were
extremely tax driven and might not be a good example. Moreover, the testimony was mixed
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erate means appears questionable; applying a 15% income tax rate,
the subsidy to families earning up to $30,000 is only $13-29
annually.199
It has been anecdotally stated that the insurance sales presenta-
tion does not emphasize the depressing death benefit aspects, 00 let
alone the income tax advantages of the death benefit exclusion.
Even if this factor is an inducement to purchase, it might be more
significant to wealthier, more tax sensitive clients.2 1
Policy loan provisions may indeed be an inducement to purchas-
ers, particularly those of limited means, because they provide the
current comfort of future liquidity.
2 2
as to the extent of their allure. Compare 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 13-18 (testi-
mony of Mark V. Heitz, Chairman of the Board, Am. Investors Life Ins. Co., Inc.) (noting
that one of the companies selling the notoriously abusive products was no longer in the
single premium life insurance policy business); id. at 18-19 (testimony of Barbara T. King,
Senior Executive V.P., A.L. Williams Corp.) (asserting that in 1987, single premium policies
accounted for over 48% of all new whole life insurance premium receipts and this occurred
due to liberal distribution rules and their tax deferred nature); id. at 21-22 (testimony of
Gordon N. Oakes, Pres. and Chairman of the Board, Monarch Capital Corp.) (asserting in-
surance is not a tax shelter, other investments have a better cash return if one does not need
the death benefit).
'" This applies a 15% income tax rate to the first four income ranges set forth in supra
note 198. The subsidy is not without great cost to the Treasury. In 1989, the revenue loss
from the exclusion of interest income on life insurance was estimated as $5.56 billion. See
infra note 258.
"One whole life insurance brochure ... does not mention insurance on either cover...
.The words 'death benefit' appear nowhere. Advertising life insurance as a savings plan is
nothing new." 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 2, at 105 (written statement of Gordon N.
Oakes, Jr.). On the other hand, "Policyholders like the tax free growth in their insurance
policies. But certainly just as vital to the sale is the death benefit that remains in effect for
the insured's entire lifetime and is more than the conservative investor could ever achieve
without the aid of life insurance." Id.
'01 The death benefit exclusion, of course, produces more after-tax cash from the life in-
surance investment and is a factor in the demand for insurance. Wilshinsky stated:
The financial benefits of using life insurance as a wealth replacement vehicle is deter-
mined by the ability of an insurance policy to generate an amount of death proceeds
substantial enough to provide a meaningful after-income-tax yield on the life insur-
ance premium dollars paid . . . .When viewing the viability of life insurance for
wealth replacement, the amount of death benefits paid is the controlling factor.
Wilshinsky, supra note 102, at 12.
102 "Not only is this characterization of a loan against life insurance sound in principle, it
is necessary to the decision to buy an adequate amount of permanent insurance. People will
not -- indeed often cannot - commit to years of premium payments without the knowledge
that, should a financial emergency arise, they can borrow against their policies on a tax
neutral basis." 1988 Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (testimony of William V.
Irons, CLU, Chairman and Fed'l Law and Leg. Comm., Nat'l Assoc. of Life Underwriters
and State Senator from R.I.). "Sixty-eight percent of permanent life insurance is purchased
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b. Promoting Continuity
The deferral of income on the inside buildup has been funda-
mental to the treatment of cash value insurance such as whole life
insurance. It is argued that, as a practical matter, whole life should
be encouraged because it provides greater lifetime insurance pro-
tection by its nature as compared to term insurance which is more
likely to be cancelled as the cost of pure insurance protection in-
creases with the age of the insured.2 03 As discussed above, the
by individuals earning less than $30,000. These individuals may be less likely to purchase
the insurance if their ability to borrow against the policy in the event of financial need is
subject to tax and penalties." Id. at 76, (written statement of Mark V. Heitz).
'1 It is often asserted that whole life has a greater inherent permanence because much
term insurance is group insurance through employment or is no longer renewable after age
65. Otherwise, this statement about cost of protection can be misleading. The annual pre-
mium for term insurance protection for a specified coverage is generally less than the annual
premium for a whole life policy of equal amount, particularly when the insured is young.
However, at some point, the cost of pure insurance protection, represented by the term
insurance premium, will exceed the established whole life premium, the pure insurance risk
portion of which is reduced by the cash value accumulated from past premiums in excess of
pure insurance protection costs, plus investment earnings thereon. Nevertheless, it is com-
mon advice that one should "buy term and invest the difference," creating a separate non-
insurance investment fund which can be used to pay the increased term insurance premiums
applicable during the advanced years of the insured. See, e.g., Greider & Beadles, supra note
11, at 43-45. This assumes that the insured can invest on an aftertax basis at a rate which
equals or exceeds the implicit return in the whole life policy, and that the insured consist-
ently adheres to this savings program. Id. The weaknesses of human nature in failing to save
in this fashion underlie the common argument in favor of whole life insurance as opposed to
term discussed in the following paragraphs.
There are two arguments in this regard. First, insurance is more automatic as a savings
plan, which avoids the shortsighted aspects of human nature. People would not, so the argu-
ment goes, save without the incentive of avoiding loss of their insurance coverage. Second,
insurance would still be needed to provide death indemnity. Term insurance can achieve
this, but term becomes expensive or unavailable when the insured is older (and again, due to
human failing, the insured failed to. invest the premiums saved through a lifetime of
purchasing term, rather than whole life insurance). The argument here is that the tax shel-
tered savings element of whole life, the proceeds of which are excluded on the insured's
death, encourages the acquisition of whole life insurance and, consequently, the mainte-
nance of lifetime protection. Speaking to taxation of financial buildup during the insured's
lifetime, a facet of the issue of the taxation of death benefits, the Staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation stated:
In addition, some point out that the goal of having individuals maintain adequate
death benefit protection should be encouraged through tax incentives. It is argued
that, without the existing tax benefits, policyholders would switch from whole life
insurance to term insurance coverage. Although policyholders could afford the term
insurance premiums while they are young, the costs might not be affordable in later
years. This argument assumes that the reduction in premiums resulting from the
purchase of term rather than whole life insurance would not be saved to reduce the
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value of the income deferral, however, varies with the economic
circumstances of the insured, and may therefore be of greatest
benefit to wealthier individuals who, in view of their other re-
sources, need less protection.
Inasmuch as there are more funds paid out each year by life in-
surance companies as lifetime surrenders than as death benefits, °0
the effect on behavior of the tax exemption for death benefits on
continuation of coverage is uncertain, except perhaps for the ter-
minally ill or elderly. Even the terminally ill or elderly might con-
tinue coverage more to preserve receipt of the full death benefit,
rather than to take advantage of the death benefit exclusion.
The loan provisions are of mixed effect. On one hand, they may
forestall a surrender of the policy. 20 5 On the other hand, the loan
proceeds may be dissipated while the outstanding loan amount
reduces the death protection afforded by the policy.
burden of the increased cost of the needed insurance protection in those later years.
Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 1985 Insurance Proposals, supra note 147, at 8-9.
Conjecture plays a part in this inquiry. Do the tax benefits play such a role as to stop
people from surrendering policies, or is taxation an issue but not the ultimate moving issue?
More funds are paid out by insurance companies as lifetime surrenders than as death bene-
fits. See infra note 204. Taxes aside, one frequently finds discussion of the "forced saving"
benefits of insurance: See McGill, supra note 12, at 56. Opinions, of course, differ on this
point. "If people want to save, they will; and real savers will reject life insurance as an
unrewarding vehicle." Ralph Hendershot, The Grim Truth About Life Insurance 45 (1957).
"In 1989 payments to policyholders totaled $27.6 billion, 54.2% of total life insurance
benefit payments." 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 48. Cash surrender val-
ues on policies terminated voluntarily accounted for $14.9 billion of that total, matured en-
dowments $727 million, disability payments $554 million (of which $206 million were direct
income payments and $348 million represented waived premiums) and dividends $11.4 bil-
lion. Id. An analysis of surrender values paid in September 1985 showed that 81.6% of the
surrender values were paid to policyholders under age 65, and 96.7% of the surrender values
were paid in a lump sum. Id. at 50. The overall voluntary termination rate of ordinary life
insurance policies in 1989 was 8.8%. The rate for policies in force less than two years was
18.6% and for those in force for two years or longer it was 6.7%. Id. at 67.
,05 However, policyowners apparently feel that they have a lesser stake in a loaned up
policy. "Since there is a higher termination rate of policies on which loans are outstanding,
companies urge that loans be used only in genuine financial emergencies, and that they be
promptly repaid." 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 67. Compare Mark War-
shawsky, Sensitivity to Market Incentives: The Case of Policy Loans, 69 Rev. Econ. & Stat.
286 (1987) (suggesting that due to self-control, a large group of policyowners resist borrow-
ing against life insurance policies even when the proceeds could be reinvested at a higher
market rate).
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c. Incentives and Protection
A significant issue is whether the tax incentives, including the
death benefit exclusion, function to keep individuals off the wel-
fare rolls in a meaningful way, or whether they instead maintain or
improve the comfort of households, the members of which would
not become wards of the state in the absence of the incentives. The
distribution of life insurance coverage appears to be skewed toward
middle and upper income individuals, with less than 1% of insur-
ance purchases made by individuals with income less than
$10,000.201 In 1989 the average insurance per household was a
modest $93,600, and the average amount per insured household
was an equally modest $115,500.207 However, since insurance own-
ership is disproportionately weighted toward wealthier people, the
ownership by poorer individuals is less than the average, and that
for wealthier individuals is more.208 A narrower, need-based exclu-
sion would seem more appropriate in implementing Congress'
stated purpose of aiding the bereaved who are .financially deprived
by the death of a provider. In establishing a need based exclusion,
Congress would need to determine the level of comfort, the main-
tenance of which requires an income tax subsidy. This would radi-
cally depart from the present system in which the insured deter-
mines the amount of the exclusion in choosing a level of insurance
protection.
In considering a need-based exemption for life insurance death
206 See supra note 101.
207 See supra note 10.
208 Although the averages stated in the preceding text are modest, large face amount poli-
cies constituted a large percentage of 1989 ordinary life insurance purchases.
Size of Policy % of Policies % of Amount
Under $2,000 2 Less than .5%
$ 2,000 - 4,999 6 Less than .5%
5,000 - 9,999 11 1
10,000 - 24,999 22 4
25,000 - 49,999 14 6
50,000 - 99,999 19 16
100,000 - 300,000 23 51
300,000 or more 3 22
1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 12. A 1984 survey conducted on behalf of
the American Council of Life Insurance reported the following average insurance coverages,
separated by household income:
Id. at 38.
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benefits, one must, however, acknowledge the entrenched regime
for the income taxation of gifts and inheritances. Some forms of
wealth, although passing from a decedent, are taxable in the hands
of the recipient as income in respect of a decedent. 09 However, the
general rule is that income does not include property received by
gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance. 10 The taxation of gratuitous
transfers of a decedent's wealth is left to the estate tax and gift
taxes.2 11 The current life insurance death benefit exclusion could
be seen as an extension of the gifts and inheritance income tax
exclusion which is available to all recipients, irrespective of their
level of income or wealth.2 12 Objections to the life insurance death
benefit exclusion should perhaps not be advanced as a separate
matter, but instead as part of revision of Internal Revenue Code
section 102.213 However, resolving the broader confrontation is be-
yond the scope of this article.2
Returning to an incrementalist reform 1 5 of the death benefit ex-
clusion, one could argue that the present exemption is overbroad.
It applies to related beneficiaries and relative strangers216 alike. It
'o See I.R.C. § 691 and Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-l(b) ("In general, the term 'income in
respect of a decedent' refers to those amounts to which a decedent was entitled as gross
income but which were not properly includible in computing his taxable income .. .under
the method of accounting employed by the decedent.").
10 I.R.C. § 102.
See infra note 224.
's See supra text accompanying notes 97-100 and 134-37.
21 Amending I.R.C. § 101 without addressing I.R.C. §§ 102 & 1014 might further validate
Professors Bittker and Lokken's observation that:
Most tax reformers, however, have avoided a direct assault on § 102, preferring to
push for peripheral changes in existing law (e.g., taxing unrealized appreciation when
property is transferred by gift or at death) and for a separate system of taxing gratui-
tous receipts. As a result, few provisions of existing law resemble their 1913 anteced-
ents as much as § 102.
Bittker & Lokken, supra note 3, 10.1, at 10-4.
2" Some commentators have urged the repeal of the I.R.C. § 102 exclusion which conflicts
with the ideal of a comprehensive tax base. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and
Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1978).
21 Incremental reforms may be the political reality.
Thus, at any point in time, decisions on tax policy fulfill most of the conditions of the
incremental model. They lead to primarily marginal variations in existing structures,
with little time spent in consideration of radical proposals; they are remedial in na-
ture, responding to general or particular needs or problems ....
Witte, supra note 143, at 247 (1985).
"' Life insurance is frequently obtained by employers and business associates on the lives
of valuable individuals, subject to the state law insurance requirement that the purchaser of
life insurance protection have an insurable interest in the life of the insured.
324 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 11:263
is neither tied to demonstrated need nor diminished at higher in-
come levels. With respect to the first point, insurance industry sta-
tistics suggest that the majority of benefits are in fact paid to sur-
viving spouses and children,217 but that does not establish that the
familial recipients were financially dependent on the insured.1 s
The second point is more provocative. If the justification for the
favorable income tax incentives rests on keeping survivors off pub-
lic assistance and to maintain the standard of living of those who
otherwise would suffer economically from the loss of a provider,
should all survivors, even the well-heeled, be allowed the exemp-
tion automatically? A need-based formula could be fashioned
utilizing, for example, an exemption which phases out at certain
income levels, 19 partial inclusion tied to an income base,22° inclu-
221sion in gross income with special averaging, or a graduated sepa-
M Based on a 1985 sample of benefit payments, 67.4% of ordinary life insurance benefits,
81.9% of group insurance benefits, and 75.5% of industrial benefits were paid to members
of the insured's immediate family. 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 47. If the
exclusion were limited to family members and dependents, recognition of nontraditional
households would be an issue. See, e.g., Joan B. Ellsworth, Prescribing TUM's: An Alterna-
tive to the Marital Deduction for Unmarried Cohabitants, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 137 (1991).
21' Insurance is usually said to offer protection against "premature" death, death before
the provider has lived long enough to accumulate capital. Based on statistics for ordinary
life policies for September 1985, 64% of total death benefits were paid on account of in-
sureds who died at over age 55. See 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 47. In
view of the percentage of death benefits paid when the insured dies at age 55 or older, one
might speculate that many of the children beneficiaries are adults and independent, and the
surviving spouse may be already provided for by other accumulated assets and sources of
income, including Social Security benefits. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 197. In evaluat-
ing the burden of federal wealth transfer taxation Professor Bittker observed: "Solicitude
for the orphaned babe in arms or young child should not blind us to the fact that the chil-
dren of these estate tax decedents are less likely to be five or fifteen years old than thirty or
forty." Boris I. Bittker, Federal Estate Tax Reform: Exemptions and Rates, 57 A.B.A. J.
236, 238 (1971).
219 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 32(b) (phaseout of earned income credit for higher income taxpay-
ers); I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (phaseout of 15% tax rate and personal exemptions at certain taxa-
ble income levels);
20 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 86(c) (inclusion of a portion of social security benefits for higher
income recipients).
... Prior to its repeal by the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232(b), § 72(e)(3)
of the 1954 Code provided a special averaging convention for the lifetime lump sum receipt
of surrender values or endowment proceeds. The tax attributable to the inclusion of the sum
could not exceed the aggregate of the taxes attributable to such part had it been included in
the gross income of the taxpayer ratably over the taxable year of receipt and the preceding
two taxable years. Id. The income averaging rules of §§ 1301-05 of the 1954 Code, repealed
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 182, provided more blunted relief. One writer
has proposed spreading lump sum insurance proceeds over the "period corresponding to the
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rate tax.22 Still, in view of the modest wealth of many insureds
and their survivors, an income tax on death benefits could poten-
tially touch only a fraction of individuals.223 If death benefit in-
remaining productive period of the insured had he lived." Vickrey, supra note 150, at 563.
This follows from viewing the pure insurance proceeds as "a replacement of income lost
through the death of the insured, rather than as compensation for loss of property ...." Id.
at 562.
222 This could resemble an estate tax progression, since wealth is being measured, or some
combination of the existing income tax rates and a flat tax rate. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 402(e)
(taxing lump sum distributions from qualified employee plans with reference to 5-year
averaging).
1,3 As of 1989, the average policy amount was only $93,600 and the average per insured
household was only $115,500. See Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9 at 5. However,
larger average amounts are reported for higher income households. See supra note 208. One
witness during the 1988 single-premium life insurance hearings noted that "Seventy-two
percent of our insureds have annual incomes of under $60,000 a year; 48 percent of the
insureds have annual incomes of under $40,000 a year." 1988 Senate Hearing, supra note 2,
at 13 (testimony of Mark V. Heitz). Anecdotal evidence, coupled with the author's own
experience, suggest that there are very wealthy individuals who use life insurance as a sig-
nificant income and estate tax avoidance tool. See, e.g., Wilshinsky, supra note 102 at 10. An
exemption might be structured to impact those individuals, while leaving untouched the
proceeds paid to others of modest wealth. The poverty level in 1988 for households with
four persons, for example, was $12,092. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Re-
ports, series P-60, No. 166, reprinted in 1990 Statistical Abstract, supra note 13, at 423. At
an 8% simple return, for example, a principal sum of approximately $150,000 would gener-
ate this income stream without consuming principal.
If $150,000 were chosen as the amount of a flat exemption, should other assets be consid-
ered? Probably not, to simplify matters, because Congress would probably exclude illiquid
assets or those which would frustrate other tax incentives, such as personal residences and
retirement savings. Otherwise, an exemption would be stated as the lesser of the amount of
life insurance proceeds received or $150,000 (or some level tied to other surviving household
sizes) reduced by the value of other household assets. Only one fixed exemption per insured
life would be available, lest insurance proceeds be spread among numerous parties, trusts,
etc. to obtain multiple exemptions. If a fixed dollar exemption is used, it is easy to apply in
the case of a widow or widower with minor children. It becomes more difficult to allocate
the exemption (unless we tax the insured's income tax estate) among beneficiaries, including
trusts and other entities, for the benefit of family members or otherwise. Elective allocations
by the insured might be permitted, with a default provision which allocates all of the ex-
emption first to the spouse, then dependent children, parents, siblings, etc. An alternative
would be a tax on the owner of the policy, permitting however, a deduction for amounts
paid to qualified beneficiaries such as spouses and dependents, but precluding any deduc-
tion for payments to employers, business associates, etc. If the owner and beneficiary were
not the same, this would require some mechanism whereby the owner of the policy could
recoup from the beneficiary a portion of the income tax paid. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2206.
The proposal assumes that Congress would not instead conclude that preservation of any
existing standard of living, no matter how comfortable, or increasing an existing standard of
living, is a worthy goal for insurance which should not be hindered by the taxation of life
insurance proceeds. The unlimited transfer tax marital deduction, for example, permits a
surviving spouse's continued enjoyment of all of the marital unit's wealth without the impo-
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come taxation would affect only a relatively small number of tax-
payers, an alternative to income taxation would be a strengthened
estate taxation system for life insurance proceeds, a difficult task
indeed.""
Despite the shortcomings of the death benefit exclusion from a
tax policy standpoint, Congress remains committed to retaining
the exclusion and other income tax incentives to encourage survi-
vor protection. It is against this measuring rod that proposals for
the taxation of accelerated payments of death benefits must be as-
sessed. However, if the exemption is not based on survivor protec-
tion, but is instead an extension of the gift and inheritance income
exclusion,225 the discussion can be summarily concluded: a termi-
nally ill insured individual cannot receive a gift or inheritance from
himself or herself.
226
sition of a tax until the surviving spouse's death, assuming the requirements for the deduc-
tion are met. See I.R.C. § 2056.
224 Congress is not totally benign, at least at face value, in its treatment of insurance
proceeds. The insurance benefits which are nontaxable in an income tax sense, can be sub-
jected to estate taxation. See I.R.C. § 2042. In view of the easy avenues of avoidance, the
estate tax on insurance proceeds, like much of the estate tax, is one of appearances without
substance. See generally George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisti-
cated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 161, 187 (1977) ("The most significant item
[for creating tax exempt wealth] is life insurance. This was frequently described by our
interviewees as the single most important weapon in the planner's arsenal .... "). Estab-
lishing the fixed exemption discussed in supra note 223 is in part difficult because the one-
time payment of life insurance proceeds resembles a transfer of wealth, arguably different in
nature from periodic income receipts. This notion was reflected in the "capital" versus "in-
come" distinctions of Congressman Hull in adopting the present death benefit exclusion.
See supra text accompanying notes 125-26. If the wealth of the recipient from all sources is
to be a factor, rather than that of the decedent insured, perhaps an accessions tax is a better
answer. However, there has not been much interest in resuscitating, or exploring alterna-
tives (such as an accessions tax) to, the wealth transfer taxation system. See, e.g., Joel C.
Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 1215 (1984);
Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 Yale L.J. 259 (1983) (a
tongue-in-cheek appraisal of the ineffectiveness of the system); Thomas A. Robinson, The
Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes-A Requiem? 1 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 25 (1982); American Bar
Association, Section of Taxation, Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 Tax Law.
395 (1988) (a conservative appraisal of reform opportunities). Compare Gutman, supra note
100.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 209-14.
" The inheritance characterization would not be valid for a lifetime transaction such as
the accelerated payment of death benefits. A gift could occur if someone other than the
policyowner paid a premium. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8). A situation resembling a gift
of proceeds might also arise if the terminally ill individual were not also the policyowner. A
gift would not occur if the terminally ill individual were merely designated as the benefi-
ciary, but the policyowner retained the power to change the designation. Id. A gift from the
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D. The Policy Goals of Insurance Incentives as Applied to an
Exclusion for Lifetime Payments of Death Benefits
1. Congruence With Existing Policy
If encouragement of survivor protection is the real justification
for the favorable income tax treatment of life insurance, an exemp-
tion for lifetime payments of death benefits may conflict with that
goal. The accelerated death benefit shifts the focus from care of
survivors to care of the insured. However, that distinction reflects
a narrow view of survivor support because the survivors may need
financial support during the prolonged illness of a provider. 27 One
possible concern is that family members will be reluctant to deny
the hedonistic, or selfish, last wishes of the ill individual. Even if
not spent on wasteful excess, the proceeds could be depleted by
medical expenses and other obligations that might otherwise go
unpaid or be assumed by public assistance.228 In that regard, state
debtor exemption laws clearly reflect a public policy of sheltering
insurance from the debts of the insured. 229 Even then, however, an
individual intent on using the insurance proceeds could borrow
and spend the cash surrender value2 30 or sell the policy.231 Never-
owner of the policy to the terminally ill beneficiary could occur, however, when the benefi-
ciary designation became final upon the death of the insured. See, e.g., Goodman v. Com-
missioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946); Rev. Rul. 77-48, 1977-1 C.B. 292. In a similar fashion,
the payment of the accelerated death benefit to the insured would also seem to be a com-
pleted gift.
117 It is commonly stated that prolonged disability of a provider is often a greater risk to a
household's welfare than the provider's death. With respect to long-term care, for example,
much of the burden reportedly falls on the individual and the family:
[Ajnywhere from one-third to one-quarter of those 65 or older are likely to need long-
term care at some point in their life. Since a good nursing home can cost up to
$40,000 a year, it is easy to see how an unexpected illness requiring long-term care
could easily wipe out savings. Today, of the $50 billion spent on long-term care,
nearly half comes straight out of the pockets of patients or their families.
Chambliss, supra note 25, at 58.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 80-87 for a discussion of the public assistance is-
sues presented by accelerated death benefit options.
a" See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. "Statutory exemption provisions have been
passed principally to prevent the widow and children of the insured from becoming public
charges." Appleman, supra note 78, § 1342, at 577. "The role of insurance as a family 'nest
egg' is normally reinforced by statutory provisions in the various states that afford exemp-
tion for life insurance policies and their proceeds from attachment by the decedent's credi-
tors . . . ." Harnett, supra note 196, at 4.
280 See supra note 11.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
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theless, an income tax exemption could make a decision to surren-
der the policy easier because a tax toll charge would not be due,
and an accelerated benefits option would make available a larger
portion of the face value than afforded under a policy loan or
surrender.
If Congress creates an exclusion it would be viewed as sanction-
ing the inter vivos use of insurance proceeds by the insured. The
avenue would probably be further widened by life insurance com-
panies who would respond to an exclusion with more liberal pro-
grams facilitating surrenders. The ultimate question is whether an
exclusion should be denied for all in fear of what might be done by
few insureds. 232 The challenge is fashioning a rule that can balance
survivor protection with the needs of the insured. This balancing
effort is addressed in Section V below which examines proposed
legislation. However, some consideration should be given to an ex-
clusion's place in the larger scheme of the taxation of life insurance
products.
2. Moving the Line - Again
Death as the determinative factor in taxing life insurance pro-
ceeds clearly reflected a passing of the insured and a focus on the
survivors, a "fresh start" in some sense.2 s3 An exclusion for acceler-
ated death benefit payments suggests deeper repercussions beyond
'32 A view of the insured as a spendthrift may be an exaggeration typical of most "pa-
rades of horribles." Recently published research suggests that a significant motivation for
total saving is a desire to leave bequests: the bequest motive. This motivation extends to life
insurance purchases where the insured will forego lifetime consumption via an annuity and
instead choose a vehicle with a death benefit. See B. Douglas Bernheim, How Strong Are
Bequest Motives: Evidence Based on Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance and An-
nuities, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 889 (1991).
The survivor protection argument has even less force if one is faced with the terminal
illness of an individual without survivor support obligations. In that regard, the reports of
sales of insurance policies to private brokers indicate that most of the sellers are suffering
from AIDS. See supra note 19. On the other hand, a Prudential spokesman was quoted as
saying that most of the individuals taking advantage of the living needs benefit are suffering
from diseases other than AIDS, such as cancer. See supra note 23.
133 Section 1014 of the Code and its collateral effect on transactions involving other sec-
tions, including, I.R.C. §§ 306, 368, 1031, 1245, 1250, and 1254, reflects this fresh start focus
on the living. The income tax exclusion for transfers at death, which has been previously
compared to the insurance exclusion, also demonstrates this passing, except that the I.R.C.
§ 102 exclusion also applies to the receipt of lifetime gifts. See supra text accompanying
notes 97-100 and 209-14.
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survivor protection, in the fundamental shift of focus from survi-
vors to the insured.34 If death recedes as a factor of distinction,
then life insurance resembles programs for the preservation or en-
hancement of the living standards of the insured, such as retire-
ment and health benefits.""s If six or twelve months, for example,
is so close to death to support equal treatment with death benefits,
can an exclusion for long-term care such as Prudential's nursing
home option be denied? Such an exclusion would detract even less
from the protection of the family because premature death of a
wage earner would be of less concern with a retired person needing
nursing home care.2 36 Even if .the nursing home patient has a
household, one could fashion a survivor protection argument based





3. Restoring Some Coherence to the System
If the focus of life insurance shifts to the insured's life and
needs, traditional distinctions of life insurance as an indemnity as
compared with other investments would require reexamination. As
discussed earlier in this article, Congress has been aligning the tax-
ation of certain lifetime benefits from annuities and modified en-
dowment contracts with that of retirement savings. 28 The regime
for tax deferred annuities and retirement plans tends to be much
more restrictive than that applied to life insurance.2 39 As discussed
'" Again, this is tempered somewhat by the reality that the onus of caring for the termi-
nally ill individual, financially, physically, and emotionally, would often rest on the survi-
vors. The accelerated death benefits could, in that respect, help lessen their burden in car-
ing for the insured. See supra text accompanying note 227.
'" There is arguably a fallacy here, at least in a relative sense, because the Internal Reve-
nue Code is so replete with special exclusions. The survivor protection rationale behind
I.R.C. § 101(a) seeks to aid in the replacement of human capital through life insurance when
a provider dies. See Guerin & Postlewaite, supra note 137 at 139. Section 104(a)(3) of the
Code would exclude disability payments received upon the disability of an individual.
Therefore, an exclusion could be consistent on that basis for lifetime payments of death
benefits to a terminally ill wage earner, where an exclusion for retirement income would not.
"I Of course, not all nursing home residents would be admitted due to the infirmities of
advanced age.
"" An exclusion for long-term care benefits is briefly discussed at supra text accompany-
ing notes 104-09.
"' See supra text following note 194.
,' The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation prepared a chart that compares the tax
incentives for individual retirement arrangements (IRA's), 401(k) plans, qualified pension
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earlier in this article, many of the difficulties in dealing with the
taxation of life insurance arguably spring from Congress' efforts to
maintain a boundary around "traditional" life insurance which re-
mains a target for those seeking to take advantage of its dearth of
restrictions. ' A brief discussion of alternative treatments of life
insurance follows.
a. Consumption or Accretion Taxation?
A vigorous tax policy debate has centered on whether a con-
sumption or expenditure tax 41 or an accretion-type tax24 2 is the
appropriate model for the income tax system.
The retirement savings provisions, which in general permit a de-
duction for retirement savings contributions, deferral of tax on in-
plans (including Keogh plans), deferred annuities, and life insurance. The chart focuses on
five attributes: (1) limits on contributions, (2) early withdrawal taxes, (3) treatment of loans,
(4) basis recovery rules for distributions and (5) restriction of benefits to individual
(noncorporate) owners. In the comparison (which excludes policies which would be modified
endowment contracts) life insurance clearly has the easiest path as there are no limits on
contributions, there is no tax on early distributions, loans are permitted without restriction
and not treated as distributions, distributions are first a return of basis and only if in excess,
income, and benefits are available to any owner of a policy. Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., Description and Analysis of S. 612 (Savings and Investment Incentive
Act of 1991) 16 (Comm. Print 1991).
,4 See supra text following note 194.
841 See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974) (proposing a consumption tax as a solution to many of the
problems displayed by the income tax) [hereinafter Andrews I]. But see William D. An-
drews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 947 (1975); Alvin C. Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 931 (1975)(questioning many aspects of the consumption tax,
in particular its effect on wealthier individuals); Alvin C. Warren, Would a Consumption
Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax? 89 Yale L.J. 1081 (1980) (asserting that without an
examination of wealth taxation, a consumption tax alone fails to address some of the redis-
tributive goals achieved by an income tax). See also Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575 (1979).
"I See, e.g., David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Tax-
ation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111 (1986). An accretion-type tax includes "money income (as a
proxy for purchased consumption and accumulation in the form of investment purchases
and money savings) plus unpurchased consumption and unpurchased accumulation." An-
drews I, supra note 241, at 1114. It resembles an economist's view of income, as the net
increase in wealth, plus consumption, and has been the basis for comprehensive tax base
proposals. See, e.g., Henry Aaron, What Is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway? 22 Nat'l
Tax J. 543 (1969). For that matter, following a comprehensive tax base model, recent Trea-
sury proposals have advocated current income inclusion of inside buildup in value of life
insurance policies. See supra note 151.
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vestment earnings, and full inclusion in income upon withdrawal
reflect consumption tax principles. Tax deferred annuities outside
of qualified retirement plans do not enjoy deductibility of contri-
butions and only allow deferral of tax on accretions in value, de-
parting somewhat from the classic consumption model.24 s Both re-
tirement savings and deferred annuities currently reject
"accretion-type" treatment which would require the current taxa-
tion of increases in value.2" Assuming that Congress continues to
draw from consumption tax principles for the taxation of retire-
ment savings and deferred annuities, rather than current income
recognition of accretions in value, a consistent treatment for life
insurance, which bears some similarities,245 could incorporate con-
sumption tax principles. Professor Andrews has proposed that
848 Michael Graetz proposed a classic consumption tax treatment for annuities, with a
deduction for purchases and inclusion in receipts as they are paid, rejecting "Yield Exemp-
tion" treatment under which no deduction would be allowed for purchases of annuities, but
earnings and withdrawals of principal would be exempt from a consumption tax. Graetz,
supra note 241, at 1613. The term "tax deferred annuity" as used in this article refers to
those investments discussed at supra text accompanying notes 167-73 and not to annuities
purchased in connection with a qualified retirement plan for which a deduction is permitted
for contributions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 403(b) (deduction for annuities purchased for tax ex-
empt organizations and schools).
"" Several recent proposals have addressed different facets of the issue of taxing accre-
tion. For example, President Bush's 1990 budget proposal included a "Family Savings Ac-
count" which would permit a person with an income of less than $80,000 to deposit up to
$2,500 a year and pay no tax on the interest if the account were maintained at least seven
years. A couple earning less than $120,000 could deposit up to $5,000. See Doubts Raised
Over Bush's Tax Plan for Savings, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1990, at D7. So-called "Super-IRA"
legislation has been introduced which would expand the eligibility for IRA contributions
and liberalize permissible early withdrawals without the imposition of penalties. Two IRA's
would be created. One would be funded with deductible contributions and all earnings
would be taxable upon withdrawal. The other account would be funded with non-deductible
contributions, but earnings would not be taxed if held in the account for at least 5 years.
The accounts could be tapped without penalty for first-time home purchases (including
purchases by children or grandchildren), certain education expenses, and catastrophic medi-
cal costs (those in excess of the 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income limitation of I.R.C. §
213(a)). S. 612, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
846 The purpose of qualified retirement plans is obviously to provide for retirement in-
come needs. The tax deferred annuity is also a retirement savings vehicle. See supra text
accompanying note 168. Cash value life insurance, particularly the flexible premium prod-
ucts, strongly resemble a tax deferred savings account plus death insurance protection. See
supra note 174. The policyowner accumulates, through the cash surrender value, a fund
which can be tapped for retirement or other needs. The endowment policy, which matures
at a certain time before death, is very similar to a tax deferred annuity. See supra note 14.
Pure term insurance, which has no investment element, however, does not share many simi-
larities with retirement savings.
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"Life insurance policies and annuity contracts would be treated
under a consumption-type personal income tax just like any other
investment: premium payments would be deductible and proceeds
would be fully taxable.
246
If something is to be learned from past experience with life in-
surance taxation, less stress will be placed on definitions of prod-
ucts qualifying for special tax incentives or subject to special re-
strictions, if investments which are comparable in economic terms
are subject to comparable rules of taxation. Nevertheless, an appli-
cation of either consumption or accretion principles to life insur-
ance on an incremental basis, without broad changes in the taxa-
tion of comparable products, creates inconsistencies with other
established regimes.
b. Adopting a Retirement Plan or Consumption Tax Model
A deduction for premiums paid 24 7 would be consistent with the
retirement plan analogy and consumption tax principles. However,
in establishing more congruence with retirement plans, insurance
policy loans would need to be restricted.248 No income tax exclu-
sion would be provided for death benefits or other payments when
received, although special averaging for death benefits might be
246 Andrews I, supra note 241, at 1164. Professor Andrews suggests that the beneficiaries
would bear the tax on the policy proceeds, but they could offset that inclusion by a deduc-
tion for investment, and "the net effect would be that proceeds would be taxable only if and
when devoted to consumption." Id.
147 The following countries reportedly permit tax deductions for personal life insurance
premiums: Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Luxembourg, Portugal, St. Lucia, Thailand, and Venezuela.
Coopers & Lybrand, 1988 International Tax Summaries, at E-3, F-3, G-17, L-36, P-70, S-3,
T-23 & V-7, respectively. Other countries permitting an income tax deduction are noted in
J. Pechman, Comparative Tax Systems (1987): France, id. at 12, 155, 168; West Germany,
id. at 17; Sweden, id. at 40; the Netherlands, id. at 101; and Japan, id. at 407. The United
States tax system permits an income tax deduction to individuals only for health insurance
premiums. See I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(C). However, a "deduction" for life insurance protection is
indirectly allowed to the extent an individual's employer maintains group term life insur-
ance protection, the premiums for which are not included in the employee's taxable income.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 79 (providing an exclusion for employer paid premiums for an amount not
in excess of $50,000 of group-term life insurance). If an income tax deferral for inside
buildup, or dividends used to pay mortality charges, were retained, a deduction would not
be allowed for insurance protection purchased with such funds.
140 Under a pure consumption tax, any loans would be treated as taxable consumption.
Retirement plans limit or completely preclude loans from the plan. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 72(p)
(loans permitted from qualified retirement plans but limited in amount and term); I.R.C. §
408(e)(4) (pledge of an individual retirement account treated as a distribtion).
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considered. " 9 A penalty on lifetime surrenders could be reserved
only for protection procured through a deductible premium, but a
penalty for any withdrawal not meeting hardship criteria would be
consistent with the existing treatment of other investments.2 50
Nevertheless, the retirement savings distribution rules would re-
quire some adjustments in an adaptation to the life insurance
context.251
As an alternative, one could continue the present prohibition on
the deductibility of most life insurance premiums (like, for exam-
" House Bill 3441, introduced on October 7, 1987, by Congressmen Stark & Gradison in
the 100th Congress proposed extending the deferred annuity taxation rules to all life insur-
ance policies, including income recognition upon loan transactions, income recognition first
(rather than return of capital) on withdrawals, and penalties for withdrawals prior to age 59
/2. H.R. 3441, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 219-23 (dis-
cussing averaging and exemption alternatives). Liquidity concerns have been raised by some
commentators with respect to taxing death benefits. See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 159
("a heavy tax burden at a difficult time"); Andrews I supra note 241, at 1164 ("might seem
to compound the tragedy of death"). However, this assumes the absence of a need based
exemption or special averaging. One must also ask if liquidity will ever not be a problem if it
is one even when the recipients have recently received a lump sum, cash life insurance
settlement.
25o Two of the leading articles proposing a consumption tax do not advocate penalties or
other disincentives on premature withdrawals of retirement savings, beyond taxing them as
current consumption. See Andrews I, supra note 241, nn. 143-44 (noting without comment
the penalty taxes on premature retirement plan distributions). Graetz, supra note 241, at
1629-34 (noting, however, that adopting consumption tax incentives for some types of in-
come may be required due to political expediency). Withdrawal restrictions might be re-
quired as a matter of retirement policy rather than tax policy. Presently tax deferred annui-
ties and modified endowment contracts, for which there is no deduction on the purchase of
the investment, bear retirement plan type premature withdrawal penalties. See supra notes
188-92. The premature distribution rules generally discourage withdrawals before age 59 1/2.
See I.R.C. § 72(t) (10% additional tax on early distribution from qualified retirement
plans).
sai While 59 2 approximates retirement age for many individuals, which justifies a relax-
ation of distribution restrictions, the mortality rate dramatically increases in the years
thereafter. See supra note 218. Moreover, participants in qualified retirement plans are re-
quired to commence withdrawals no later than April 1 of the calendar year following the
calendar year in which the employee attains age 70 2. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) ("a plan shall
not be qualified unless, in general, it requires distributions not later than the required be-
ginning date tied to age 70 V2 "). On the other hand, if life insurance is seen as an income
replacement upon the death of a provider, a surviving provider would be approaching retire-
ment age anyway and should have accumulated retirement assets to replace cash flow from
employment. Social Security retirement benefits would be an important asset affecting the
demand for life insurance. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 197. Dividends actually received
by the policyholder, often an adjustment of premiums payable, would be included in income
without the benefits of averaging or a recovery of basis. On the other hand, since insurance
protection is not eroded by the receipt, a withdrawal penalty would be inappropriate.
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ple, nondeductible IRA or tax deferred annuity contributions),
while taxing all of the proceeds (in excess of aggregate premiums
paid) upon ultimate receipt. The benefit of the arrangement to the
insured would be the deferral of tax on inside buildup. However,
the unique pure death protection aspects of insurance, which are
not shared by the retirement plan models, could produce a
"Iloss"1.252 A more refined response to this loss characterization
would allow a current income tax deduction or credit for all or a
portion of premiums paid for pure insurance protection. Upon the
insured's death, the death benefit would be treated as a tax-free
return of capital to the extent of premiums previously paid and
not deducted, with inclusion in income of any excess, subject to
any exemptions or averaging conventions. The deduction or credit
could be limited to a certain level of insurance protection and
could be phased out at certain income levels, producing an incen-
tive for the acquisition of death protection without creating a new
tax avoidance opportunity.
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c. Adopting an Accretion Model
A possible solution rests upon implementing a longstanding rec-
62, If an individual purchases a one year term insurance policy, for example, and it lapses
one year later without the individual's death, this could be the proper point for recognition
of a loss. See supra note 161 (asserting that the current death exclusion finds support in
producing, in the aggregate, no overall gain or loss due to individual mortality gains and
losses, but noting that this conclusion assumes that the peace of mind from current insur-
ance protection was not of value). This assumes that an economic loss has occurred. The
insured did receive protection for the one year period, much as the occupant of owner-
occupied housing receives protection (from the elements). Neither enjoyed benefit requires
inclusion in current income nor a deduction for the resources used to purchase the benefit
(if one ignores the mortgage interest deduction).
,' Tax shelter opportunities would not be greater than those currently afforded by cash
value insurance and deferred annuities, but if loan and withdrawal restrictions were more
broadly applicable, it would seem that the desirability would be reduced for those princi-
pally seeking tax advantages, A deduction for the pure death protection premiums would
resemble deductible gambling. A deduction for life insurance premiums would also run
counter to the thrust of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085,
which generally sought to eliminate deductions for personal expenses not of a business or
investment nature, although the taxation of death benefits would lend to a taxable invest-
ment characterization of life insurance. A solution which is simpler, but not symmetrical in
result, would ignore the "loss" suffered by the owner of an expiring policy, permitting no
loss recognition nor deduction for premiums paid. As under current law, aggregate premi-
ums could be offset against amounts received under the policy.
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ommendation, that inside buildup be taxed as accrued.2" However,
a deduction for pure death insurance protection could be permit-
ted on the terms described above in the retirement plan model,
with inclusion of death benefits in income. A deduction for the bal-
ance of the premiums would not be allowed, and accretions in
value would be taxed currently, producing a policyowner's adjusted
basis in the life insurance contract consisting of aggregate nonde-
ductible premiums paid plus accretions in value previously in-
cluded in income. 58 Under this regime, restrictions on withdrawals
and loan provisions would not be critical, from an income tax
standpoint, because there would be no income deferral.
A possible objection is that deferred taxation of inside buildup, a
needed incentive for acquisition and continuity of protection, has
been eliminated .25 A response is that the prior incentives flowed
in large part to the wrong individuals, 57 and a current deduction
for a portion of premium payments could provide a more targeted
incentive for the acquisition and maintenance of insurance
protection.
A more fundamental objection to taxing accrued inside buildup
is that it creates inconsistencies with comparable investments. Life
insurance would be subjected to harsher treatment with respect to
inside buildup than tax deferred annuities and retirement plans.
On the other hand, qualified retirement plans have restrictions on
loans, withdrawals, and the amount of contributions which limit
the tax advantages associated with the deferral of inside buildup
and which accomplish broader retirement policy objectives. The
comparison, therefore, is not fair. The argument is more difficult
with tax deferred annuities which, while subject to loan and with-
drawal restrictions, are not subject to limitations on the amount of
contributions one can make. The inconsistency could be removed if
Congress reassesses the unlimited opportunity for investment in-
s" See supra notes 150-51. The current recognition of investment income has already
been incorporated in the taxation of annuities not owned by individuals, see supra note 185,
and for life insurance not meeting the statutory taxation definition, see supra note 180. A
continuing proposal has been treatment of inside buildup as an item of tax preference. See,
e.g., 1988 Single Premium Pamphlet, supra note 11, at 38. Inside buildup is already a factor
in the corporate alternative minimum tax. See supra note 151.
255 This approach was proposed by William Vickrey in his 1942 article. See Vickrey, supra
note 150.




come deferral presented by the purchase of tax deferred annuities.
A degree of simplification and coordination of treatment of com-
parable investments would be achieved if no current deduction
were allowed for insurance premiums or annuity purchases, inside
buildup were currently taxable, and all proceeds were taxable, sub-
ject to a recovery of aggregate premiums paid plus any amounts
previously included in income. A deduction for "losses" arising
from cancelled insurance would be denied to provide an additional
incentive for continuity of protection and in the interest of simpli-
fication. This modified accretion approach would be better suited
to an incrementalist revision of the income tax system in lieu of a
broad implementation of a consumption tax regime.
Under any system outlined above, accelerated benefits in general
would be treated as taxable consumption or income upon receipt.
However, any exemption or averaging convention extended to
death benefits could be likewise extended to the receipt of acceler-
ated death benefits.
d. Summary
Coordination of all tax incentives for health insurance, long-term
care insurance, life insurance, and retirement benefits is beyond
the scope of this article.25 There might also be a tendency to see
this as only a tax matter, where "taxation is King," but a discus-
sion would also need to focus on broader aspects of national health
insurance and social security.259 An interim solution could address
I" One of the best discussions of the problems and possible solutions in dealing with the
taxation of life insurance and kindred products is the pamphlet produced by the staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation. See 1988 Single Premium Pamphlet supra note 11. The reve-
nue effect of all of this is uncertain. The exclusion of interest on life insurance savings was a
tax expenditure of $5.56 billion in 1989. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Special
Analyses, Budget of the United States Government, reprinted in 1990 Statistical Abstract
supra note 13, No. 503, at 314. The revenue cost of the death benefit exclusion was not
shown as a tax expenditure, although in view of the amount of death benefits paid annually
(during 1989, $23.3 billion in death benefits was paid, 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra
note 9, at 44), the tax thereon would appear to exceed the $1 billion de minimis threshold
for reporting.
'51 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax
Policies, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851 (1987) (arguing that a national retirement policy must coor-
dinate the coverage and incentives of at least three systems: the payroll tax, employer-pro-
vided pensions, and individual retirement savings). In enhancing incentives for life insur-
ance, one must consider the effect on other sectors such as employer-provided retirement
plans. Tax deferral of earnings under annuities owned by other than natural persons was
[Vol. 11:263
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the taxation of accelerated insurance death benefits, but with some
appreciation of the path broader reform might take. Some current
proposals are considered in the following section.
V. INTERIM LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR AN INCOME TAX
EXCLUSION FOR ACCELERATED DEATH BENEFITS
A. Current Proposals
In recent years several bills have been introduced in Congress to
liberalize the income tax treatment of accelerated death bene-
fits. 260 Senate Bill 284,11 for example, proposes the addition of a
new Internal Revenue Code section 101(g) which would treat pay-
ments made with respect to -terminally ill individuals as paid by
reason of the death of the insured.26 2 A similar bill has been intro-
duced in the House of Representatives.263 Neither bill would ex-
empt other payments, such as those for long-term care, from
taxation.
The proposed language of Senate Bill 284 permits an exclusion
for "any amount paid to an individual under a life insurance con-
eliminated, for example, because Congress feared that the deferral would aid employers in
using tax deferred compensation plans, to the detriment of qualified plans providing less
discriminatory coverage. See supra note 185.
16o Senator Bradley was one of the senators who introduced Senate Bill 2222, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990). The bill was reintroduced a year later as Senate Bill 284, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess, (1991) [hereinafter Senate Bill 284], gaining additional sponsors. Congresswoman Ken-
nelly introduced H.R. 3734, 101st Cong., '2d Sess. (1989) on November 19, 1989 and reintro-
duced a similar bill, H.R. 134, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter House Bill 134]
101 Senate Bill 284, supra note. 260, was introduced in the 102nd Congress, first session, by
Senator Bradley and 30 other senators.
161 New I.R.C. § 101(g) would read as follows:
(g) Treatment of Amounts Paid With Respect to Terminally Ill Individuals -
(1) In General - For purposes of this section, any amount paid to an individual
under a life insurance contract on the life of an insured who is a terminally ill
individual shall be treated as an amount paid by reason of the death of the
insured.
(2) Terminally Ill Individual - For purposes of this subsection, the term 'ter-
minally ill individual' means an individual who has been certified by a licensed
physician as having an illness or physical condition which can reasonably be ex-
pected to result in death in 12 months or less.
The amendment would apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1989. Senate
Bill 284, supra note 260, § 1(a).
168 House Bill 134, supra note 260.
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tract on the life of an insured who is a terminally ill individual
... -26, This suggests that payments to beneficiaries other than
the insured would also qualify.265 The language of House Bill 134
limits the exemption to "any amount paid under a life insurance
contract to an insured who is a terminally ill individual . . . . 266
The broader language of the Senate Bill might ensure that install-
ment benefit payments remaining at the time of the insured's
death would receive exclusionary treatment in the hands of the
beneficiary, but literally the deceased insured would not be some-
one who "is" a terminally ill individual. 67 If the terms of acceler-
ated benefit policies depart from the model established by the
Prudential plan and permit the receipt of benefits by persons
other than the terminally ill insured, the language of the Senate
Bill would suggest that such payments would be eligible for the
exclusion. This might be appropriate for dependent members of
the insured's household, as part of the insured's economic unit, but
it is not compelling for other beneficiaries. The Senate Bill lan-
guage also raises the issue of whether an individual who purchased
the policy of a terminally ill insured could utilize this exemption to
exclude the proceeds from income. This result would conflict with
other language of both bills, discussed next, which denies an ex-
emption for payments from the purchasers of policies. It also
would conflict with established tax law which limits the exclusion
available to a purchaser of a life insurance policy to the purchase
price plus premiums paid. 68
Senate Bill 284, supra note 260, at § 1(a).
2" Under the Prudential living needs benefit rider, for example, the living needs benefits
are paid only to the insured. Payments would be made to beneficiaries only if the insured
died before an installment payment plan was completed. See supra text accompanying note
43.
S6 House Bill 134, supra note 260, at § 1(a).
"6 The sole reason the beneficiaries would receive the unpaid installments would be due
to the death of the insured, and the death benefit exclusion would therefore appear applica-
ble, or failing that, the exclusion for bequests and inheritances. As to the latter exclusion,
the exception of Code § 691 pertaining to income in respect of a decedent should not apply
because under the proposed legislation the decedent insured would not have been taxable
upon the inter vivos receipt of the insurance proceeds.
'" Purchasers of life insurance policies would already be subject to I.R.C. § 101(a)(2),
which requires that the purchaser recognize income to the extent the death benefit proceeds
exceed the cost (to the purchaser) of the policy. This limitation was included in the 1954
enactment of the Internal Revenue Code because otherwise the death benefit exclusion
could "result in abuse in encouraging speculation on the death of the insured. . . ." S. Rep.
338 [Vol. 11:263
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Both bills state that the payments must be "under" the life in-
surance policy; proceeds from the sale of a policy would not be
eligible for the exclusion. Since accelerated death benefits are in
most cases available only on permanent life policies (as contrasted
with term insurance policies), 9 this leaves the seller of a term pol-
icy without an exemption. This concern will be alleviated as more
group insurance plans and other term policies offer accelerated
death benefits terms.2 70 Term insurance aside, the statute also
places the owner of a permanent policy not containing a living ben-
efits provision (or containing a provision on unfavorable terms) at
a tax disadvantage in selling the policy to a third party.2Y 1 Never-
theless, the language of the exemption appears to channel all of
the living benefits advantages back through life insurance
companies.2"2
A terminally ill individual under the Senate Bill is one "who has
been certified by.a licensed physician as having an illness or physi-
cal condition which can reasonably be expected to result in death
in 12 months or less. ' 27 The House bill is similar but describes a
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1954).
26, The Prudential living needs benefit plan, for example, is available only on permanent
life policies. See supra text accompanying note 35.
1o Some group term plans are already incorporating living benefits options. See supra
note 35.
'71 The insureds presently utilizing independent purchasers of policies reportedly include
those with life expectancies of 18 to 24 months. At that point they would not qualify for the
6-month terminal illness requirement of the Prudential plan. McCormack & Petersen, supra
note 12, at 1348. If legislation is enacted with the 12-month terminal illness requirement
described in the following paragraphs of the text, the insurance companies would probably
liberalize their terms accordingly. The owner of a permanent policy seeking enhanced accel-
erated death benefits could consider an exchange of policy contracts. See supra text accom-
panying note 64.
'2 If sales of policies were also eligible for an exclusion, the exclusion should be limited to
sales by only the insured. It seems inappropriate to permit policyowners, other than the
insured, to sell a policy on the terminally ill individual's life and be eligible for the exclu-
sion. On the other hand, if the seller is the spouse of the insured, and the funds are needed
to care for the insured and other family members, an exemption would not seem to be
troublesome. A concern is that no traffickers in policies be permitted an exemption, al-
though existing tax law would preclude such an exclusion. See supra note 268. In that re-
gard, five of the companies purchasing life insurance policies from the terminally ill indi-
cated in a January 1991 survey that they will purchase policies from a third party after a
transfer from the insured, and the other three companies indicated that they will consider
such a transaction. McCormack & Petersen, supra note 12, at 1355.
'" Senate Bill 284, supra note 260, at § 1(a). The 12-month period of the definition of
terminal illness exceeds, for example, the 6-month requirement of the Prudential plan. See
supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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licensed physician as "a physician, licensed under State law
... "2" The certification procedure understandably introduces
uncertainty into this area and could invite abuse because the ex-
clusion apparently is achieved if the insured receives the certifica-
tion, without further inquiry. As an alternative, the burden of
proving the existence of a terminal condition could remain with
the taxpayer.75 If the certification route is retained, a physician
might be subject to criminal fraud provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code and general federal law if the certification were fraudu-
lent or false.176 Congress could make this penalty clearer, at the
risk of chilling the availability of the exemption to the terminally
ill, if the physician were required to certify the insured's condition,
"in writing, made under the penalties of perjury. "277
Senate Bill 284 also amends the Social Security Act to prohibit
requirements that an accelerated benefit payment election be
made to qualify for assistance. 8 It would apparently not exempt
'7" House Bill 134, supra note 260, at § l(a).
"I Compare I.R.C. § 213(g)(3), repealed effective January 1, 1967, by Pub. L. No. 89-97, §
106(d), 79 Stat. 286, 337, which stated "An individual shall not be considered to be disabled
unless he furnishes proof of the existence thereof in such form and manner as the Secretary
or his delegate may require." The regulation required for the first taxable year for which
exclusion was claimed, "a doctor's statement as to the impairment of such individual upon
which the taxpayer relies." Treas. Reg. § 1.213-2(d)(2). See also I.R.C. § 72(m)(7) (incorpo-
rating the same statutory test of disability as former I.R.C. § 213(g)(3)). A spokesman for
the Treasury has testified that "a physician's certification . . .raises serious problems of
administration. 'Audit' of such a certification would be difficult, to say the least. Yet if the
standard is effectively unauditable, compliance concerns are certain to arise." 1991 Senate
Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy)
Department of the Treasury).
276 See I.R.C. § 6701, ($1,000 penalty for assisting in the preparation of a document that
will result in an understatement of tax liability). See also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (conspiracy
to defraud the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (knowing and willful making of any
false writing within the jurisdiction of any United States department or agency).
7 Under I.R.C. § 7206(1) it is a felony to make and subscribe "any return, statement, or
other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under
the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every
material matter . . . ." It is a misdemeanor under I.R.C. § 7207 to deliver to the Internal
Revenue Service "any list, return, account, statement, or other document" known to be
fraudulent or false in any material matter. A signature under penalties of perjury is not a
necessary factor since delivery of the statement constitutes the crime. Physicians would usu-
ally not deliver the statement to the Internal Revenue Service in the absence of provisions
requiring the delivery of information statements such as forms 1099.
270 Section 3 of Senate Bill 284, supra note 260, would add a new section to Title 42 of the
United States Code:
Treatment of Accelerated Death Benefits Sec. 1143(a) In General - Notwithstanding
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funds from inclusion in assets for public assistance eligibility if the
election is, however, made.279
B. Assessing the Proposals
As noted above, Senate Bill 284 and House Bill 134 appear to
qualify only life insurance company payments. The proponents of
the legislation were apparently shocked at the activities of inves-
tors such as Living Benefits, Inc.2 80 In response, the bill substitutes
an income tax penalty on the terminally ill individual281 as a form
any other provision of law, no individual who is an applicant for or recipient of aid or
assistance under a State plan approved under title IV, X, XIV, XVI, or XIX, of assis-
tance funded by payments under title V or XX, or of benefits under the Supplemen-
tal Security Income program established by title XVI shall -
(1) be required, as a condition of eligibility for (or of continuing to receive) such
aid, assistance, or benefits, to make an election to receive an accelerated death
benefit under a policy of life insurance, or
(2) by reason of failure to make such an election, be denied (or suffer a reduction
in the amount of) such aid, assistance, or benefits.
(b) Accelerated Death Benefit - For purposes of this section, the term "accelerated
death benefit" means any payment made under the terms of a life insurance policy,
while the insured individual is alive, as a result of a recalculation of the insured indi-
vidual's life expectancy.
The exemption for public assistance eligibility raises issues of whether government funds
should thereby be used, rather than the individual's, so that an inheritance is preserved. An
inheritance for dependent family members is one matter and comports with family protec-
tion policies; preserving an inheritance for adult children or other beneficiaries, on the other
hand, is quite another matter. For a discussion of these issues see Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid
Asset Planning by the Elderly: A Policy View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance,
24 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J., 1 (1989). For a discussion of mechanics see Louis A. Mezzullo,
Advice on Planning for Medicaid Qualification, 130 Tr. & Est. 8, July, 1991, at 8.
' The description of Senate Bill 284 prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, however, states as a "pro" of the bill that "The bill may reduce the amount that
would otherwise be paid under Federal or State public assistance programs (such as Medi-
caid) by encouraging terminally ill individuals to elect to accelerate the receipt of death
benefit payments." Staff Explanation, supra note 93, at 23. To the contrary, it would seem
that if the unexercised option is not to be considered as "available" for assistance eligibility,
but proceeds from the exercise of an election will be considered for eligibility, one would not
exercise the option to obtain the proceeds tax-free if public assistance were otherwise a
possibility.
Sso See supra note 20.
281 The purchaser already pays a form of income tax penalty under existing law through
the "transfer for valuable consideration" rules of I.R.C. § 101. See supra note 268. An expla-
nation of Senate Bill 284, supra note 260, makes it clear that private purchasers were
targeted. "Certain noninsurance companies currently purchase life insurance contracts from
terminally ill policyholders. These companies may not pay policyholders the present value
of the death benefit under the contract." Staff Explanation, supra note 93, at 23.
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of insurance regulation. This may not be a significant issue if com-
petition compels most life insurers to offer attractive surrender
terms; companies like Living Benefits, Inc. would probably see
shrinking business and profit margins.
28 2
A greater concern is the potential unavailability of an acceler-
ated death benefit option for many term policies, leaving sales to
third parties as the only alternative. 2 3 This implied rejection of all
policy sales comes in the face of evidence that there were few re-
ported abuses in the purchases of policies by independent bro-
kers.284 If Congress wants to engage in insurance regulation,8 s then
the tax exclusion could initially encompass all receipts but be fur-
ther conditioned upon the incorporation of consumer protection
measures, prescribing, for example, minimum payout percentages
and payment schedules and standards to be applied in determining
terminal illness.28s
For example, Living Benefits, Inc. would reportedly offer $66,000 for a $100,000 policy
on the life of a terminally ill person with a life expectancy of one year; a discount of approx-
imately 33%. See Belth, supra note 20, at 14. A January, 1991 survey of eight companies
that purchase life insurance policies from the terminally ill, reported that the maximum
purchase price ever paid as a percentage of face amount ranged from 50-80%. McCormack
& Petersen, supra note 12, at 1355. The Prudential brochure claims that its plan pays out
90-95% of the policy's face value, and actual experience has been reported as 96% of face
value. See supra note 39.
288 However, the living needs option is reportedly being extended to term policies, and if
that trend continues, this problem will diminish. See supra note 35.
See supra note 20.
288 Senate Bill 284, supra note 260, clearly has a regulatory purpose: "The bill would en-
courage policyholders to elect to accelerate the death benefit payment from the issuing in-
surance company, which is subject to State regulation and, therefore, is more likely to pay
the policyholder the present value of the death benefit under the contract." Staff Explana-
tion, supra note 93, at 23. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012 (1988)
provides that the regulation of insurance is subject to state law, and no act of Congress shall
be construed to impair or supersede state regulation unless the federal statute specifically
relates to the business of insurance. However, the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal
Trade Commission Act are applicable to the extent that such business is not regulated by
state law. See Spencer L. Kimball & Barbara P. Heaney, Emasculation of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 1 (1985) (discussing the
background of the law and federal legislative restraint, tempered, however, by expansive
judicial pronouncements). Congress, of course, is not foreclosed from enacting legislation;
the inquiry is often whether legislation specifically relates to the business of insurance.
I.R.C. § 832, concerning the taxation of life insurance companies, was held to be specifically
related to the business of life insurance in Hanover Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d
1211 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
... The easy analogy is to the combination of federal tax and labor law regulation in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
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The absence of a limit on the exemption, in the proposed legisla-
tion, or any familial or means-tested basis for exemption, could be
explained as a consistent extension of the broad exclusion pres-
ently contained in section 101 of the Code.2 s However, protecting
survivors from dissipation of the insurance proceeds by the insured
is a new concern presented by accelerated benefits plans, and not
by conventional death benefit payments. Survivor protection aside,
one might also propose that living benefits should be approached
as a narrow exception to the general death benefit rule, and any
exemption should be more circumscribed than the death benefit
exclusion. Although not answering objections raised by compari-
sons with the prevailing income tax treatment of lifetime sales of
other assets,28 the exemption could be limited to receipts by the
insured, his or her spouse, and dependents.
With survivor protection as a goal, one might propose a mone-
tary cap, say $50,000-75,000. If the primary purpose of an exemp-
tion is to provide for the needs of the insured during the last 6-12
months of life, while discouraging profligate spending of the survi-
vors' nest egg, this could promote that purpose. This, of course,
assumes that the arbitrary monetary limit is a reasonable amount
for the insured's needs. As of 1989, the average amount of insur-
ance per insured household was only $115,500,289 very close to all
but a very restrictive limitation. The statistics more directly appli-
cable to accelerated death benefits are even more modest. The av-
erage size of an individual AIDS death claim in 1989 was $28,200,
while the average group life claim identified with an AIDS death
829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). See generally Symposium:
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 19 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1 (1985).
While federal regulation would provide uniformity, it would supplant a longstanding tradi-
tion of state regulation, see id., and would be imposed in an area which has yet to demon-
strate widespread abuses. Moreover, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
has reportedly "developed guidelines, supported by the industry, for the regulation of these
products." ACLI Survey, supra note 30, at 3. Federal regulation of life insurance company
investments, however, is not an impossibility in view of the unfolding story of life insurance
company failures. See, e.g., Are You Really Insured, Bus. Week, August 5, 1991, at 42.
87 See supra text accompanying notes 215-18.
If one grants a tax exemption to lifetime receipts of life insurance, one must grapple
with tax breaks for lifetime sales of other assets when required by illness or other catastro-
phes. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
280 See supra note 10. The averages, however, are greater for wealthier households and
less for poorer households. See supra note 208.
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was $34,200.290 A survey commissioned by the American Council on
Life Insurance found that the average face amounts for terminal
illness, dread disease, and long-term care policies were $32,482,
$66,311, and $78,680, respectively. 291 Any arbitrary limitation is ir-
relevant, as a survivor protection goal, if the insured has no depen-
dents.92 A limit, no matter how determined, also produces addi-
tional complexity because matters such as the allocation of the
limitation among recipients and the effect of indirect beneficial in-
terests through trusts, for example, arise.2 a9 In view of such com-
plexity, the limited exclusion could be applied only to proceeds re-
ceived by the insured, or a trust for the benefit of solely the
insured, and by no other persons.
An arbitrary exemption could be restated as, or supplemented
by, a standard tied to the insured's uncovered medical care ex-
penses. Medical expenses not paid by insurance are already deter-
mined for purposes of the medical expense itemized deduction and
the exemption from premature retirement plan distribution penal-
ties, so a familiar standard would be utilized.2 9 ' This would intro-
duce to the system a need-based exclusion for insureds without de-
pendents. For insureds with dependents, it would introduce a
need-based standard and also further the congressional purpose of
providing for survivors by not creating a tax incentive for excessive
pre-death surrenders. However, reliance on the medical expense
deduction definition of allowable expenses may be too restrictive
in dealing with unapproved drugs29 and care which is custodial
290 1990 Life Insurance Fact Book, supra note 9, at 41.
ACLI Survey, supra note 30, at 2. The study notes that there was "considerable varia-
tion in the averages .... Although several companies reported average face amounts of less
than $10,000, others reported averages of $90,000 or more." Id. at 8.
"' See supra note 232.
9 See supra note 223.
29 See I.R.C. § 213. A more modest proposal would include benefits as income but ex-
clude them from adjusted gross income for purposes of the 7.5% of adjusted gross income
medical expense limitation. The so-called "Super IRA" proposals define distributions for
catastrophic medical expenses with reference to expenses in excess of the 7.5% adjusted
gross income limitation. See supra note 244. I.R.C. § 72(f)(2) similarly exempts from the 10
percent penalty tax on early distributions, retirement plan distributions for employee medi-
cal care deductions allowable under I.R.C. § 213.
n9 Incorporation of the deductible medical expense definitions would undeniably place
greater pressure on successful characterization under those provisions. For example, I.R.C. §
213(b) permits a deduction only for a drug which requires a prescription of a physician for
its use. Drugs not approved for use by the Food and Drug Administration would present a
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care, such as eating, bathing, dressing and walking, rather than
medical.2" On one hand, such a standard would ignore simple liv-
ing expenses of an individual too ill to support himself or herself
and any dependents.2 7 On the other hand, if an exclusion is to be
means-tested, inclusion of resources for living expenses in taxable
income may be appropriate, subject to the income taxation sys-
tem's other standard deductions, exemptions, and graduated
rates.2 8  However, an averaging mechanism would be
appropriate.299
In spite of obvious shortcomings, a limitation linked to actual
medical expenses and other expenses of care would be more desira-
ble than a requirement of spousal or dependent consent. There is
precedent for such a requirement under the Retirement Equity
Act,300 and the independent purchasers of policies reportedly re-
quire such waivers as a matter of course. 01 However, a consent or
waivable requirement would only subject the household unit to dif-
ficult pressures in the' insured's final days. An unyielding limit or
need-based requirement is not as flexible, but it would preclude
this controversy.
In summary, the broad exemption of the pending legislation
could be amended to better protect survivors and to align the
treatment with an ultimate elimination of the death benefit exclu-
sion for all beneficiaries in favor of a need-based exemption. A
problem in fulfilling this requirement. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Insurers Balk at 'Ex-
perimental Drugs,' Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1989, at 27 (in part briefly discussing the licensing
and experimentation aspects of the Food and Drug Administration approval process).
:" See supra note 49.
"7 The payment of living expenses is traditionally handled by disability insurance pro-
ceeds which are excluded from income under I.R.C. § 104(a)(3). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 54-62.
"8 The insured would also be entitled to offset his or her investment in the insurance
contract as under present law, consisting of aggregate premiums paid. See supra note 47. In
addition, this treatment assumes an incremental modification to life insurance taxation in
the absence of a broad-based exclusion for long-term care benefits. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 104-09. This treatment is arguably inconsistent with the present treatment of
disability insurance proceeds. See supra note 297.
Z' See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
,o Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). See Michael Dowdle, The Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 - Nature and Extent of Spousal Rights. Impact on Plan Distributions and Ad-
ministration, and Implications for the Non-ERISA Practitioner, 45 N.Y.U. Tax Inst. 13-1
(1987).
"o See McCormack & Petersen, supra note 12, at 1349.
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blanket terminal illness exclusion could be replaced by an arbi-
trary de minimis exclusion of $50,000, which could be supple-
mented by actual medical expenses not covered by insurance (to
the extent not otherwise deducted in that year as a medical ex-
pense0 2). Any additional receipts in excess of the taxpayer's in-
vestment in the contract would be taxable income, subject to an
averaging mechanism.
None of the technical problems with proposed legislation are in-
surmountable. However, in all candor, the author questions
whether the complexity generated by an averaging convention or
medical expense exclusion as outlined above for accelerated death
benefits is the appropriate avenue to use in introducing broader
insurance taxation reforms, irrespective of any theoretical inconsis-
tencies generated by an outright exclusion. Although the income
taxation of life insurance needs reform and coordination, the recip-
ients of accelerated death benefits and their dependents may gen-
erally be poorer individuals, because if they were not poor, they
would not resort to these surrenders. The numbers also seem to be
too modest.303 The degree of potential abuses that are sought to be
curtailed would need to be evaluated, or the risks of the experi-
ment would fall on those in the worst circumstances: the poor and
terminally ill.3 0'
VI. CONCLUSION
A clarification of the income tax treatment of accelerated death
benefits is necessary. A narrow exclusion for benefits paid to the
terminally ill can be fashioned, although such a provision is incon-
SOS To the extent that some of the uninsured expenses are deductible as an itemized de-
duction under I.R.C. § 213, increasing the exclusion by that amount would provide both an
exclusion and a deduction for the amount. In any event, the 7.5% adjusted gross income
limitation of § 213 of the Code would require an amendment to exclude insurance proceeds
from gross income for purposes of that limitation, and § 213 should also be amended to
clarify the deductibility of amounts defrayed by taxable reimbursements. See supra note 49.
$03 See supra text accompanying notes 289-91.
"I The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation suggests that an exclusion would benefit
wealthier persons who can afford more insurance. "In addition, the bill would primarily
benefit higher-income individuals who are able to afford greater amounts of life insurance.
A more efficient and equitable tax subsidy could be developed if the goal is to assist the
terminally ill." Staff Explanation, supra note 93, at 23. Although life insurance is owned by
wealthier individuals, see supra text accompanying notes 101-03, it is uncertain if truly
"wealthy" individuals would need to resort to an accelerated death benefit.
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sistent with, and could possibly detract from, the survivor financial
protection function of life insurance. An exclusion would mix life
insurance with care of the insured, a task for which long-term care
or health insurance is more suited. From a broader perspective, an
approach with some merit would be the adoption of a system in-
corporating features of that prescribed for retirement savings, but
the retirement model is not altogether comparable and ensuing
complexity aside, a number of inconsistencies would be generated.
A drastic alternative would render many insurance taxation issues
moot by removing, or limiting, many of the tax incentives now en-
joyed by life insurance, primarily tax deferred buildup and the
death benefit exclusion, reducing insurance to a more income tax
neutral status.
As an interim measure, a restricted exclusion for accelerated
death benefits, linked to an arbitrary amount plus uninsured, but
otherwise nondeductible, medical expenses, with an averaging con-
vention for the excess proceeds, could be appropriate. More far
reaching reform of the taxation of all insurance proceeds, however,
is needed. Even as an interim measure, an exclusion for terminal
illness benefits is defective. It excludes from income the gain on
the disposition of only one type of asset, life insurance, and does
not exempt gains on the sales of other assets prompted by terminal
illness. This area will need to be revisited, together with the exclu-
sion for health insurance benefits, if and when an exclusion for
long-term care benefits is considered. Pending a broad evaluation
of the interrelationships of health and long-term care insurance,
life insurance, and retirement savings, perhaps the best course of
action with respect to accelerated death benefits is, sadly, to do
nothing. However, if the evaluation is ever made, it should recon-
sider the overall role of life insurance, including the effect of re-
forms as a potential revenue source to support broader human wel-
fare goals.3 °5
305 Any such expansion of section 101 will bring forward proponents of further expansions
for similar needs - such as long-term care - or other worthy goals, such as education or
housing. Such expansions and the potential adverse revenue consequences they entail would
undoubtedly place section 101 under severe pressure. It is a journey we should not begin.
1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 21, (statement of Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary
(Tax Policy) Department of the Treasury). However, limiting the tax free inside buildup of
cash value life insurance and the death benefit exclusion could generate revenues to offset
the revenue losses in accomplishing "other worthy goals." See supra note 258.
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